Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co

Decision Date19 March 1887
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesRaysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co.

Master and Servant—Contract—Implied Assent.

The plaintiff, an employe of the defendant, demanded an increase of wages to commence January 1, 1885, and gave due notice to defendant's agent that he would leave unless such increase was made. The agent promised to give an answer in two or three days, but failed to do so for several months, allowing the plaintiff in the meanwhile to continue work. Thereupon plaintiff was told that his salary would be increased as demanded, but to commence May 1, 1885. Held, that the silence of the agent did not raise the implication of assent on the part of the defendant, and that plaintiff was not entitled to the increase for the time from January 1 to May 1, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Charleston county.

Chas. Boyle, for plaintiff.

Chas. E. Carrere, for defendant and appellant.

McGowan, J. This was an action before Trial Justice Minott for $75. The plaintiff, Raysor, was a director in the defendant corporation, and employed by it as the superintendent of Raysor's Mills. Anterior to January, 1885, he was receiving a salary of $100 per month, and about that time he had an interview with John C. Mallance, superintendent of the affairs of the company in Charleston, and requested that his salary should be raised to $125 per month; stating that he would leave unless such increase was made. The justice reports: "As matter of fact, I found that plaintiff did give John C. Mallance, as agent of the said company, clearly authorized to contract for same, notice of his intention to resign his position unless his salary was increased from $100 to $125 per month after January, 1885; that said Mallance did then and there promise plaintiff to give him an answer some two or three days from that date, and failed to do so. The plaintiff heard nothing more from Mallance on that subject for several months, when he was informed that his salary had been increased as demanded in amount, but would commence from the first of May, 1885. The plaintiff continued in the service of the company until some time in November, 1885, and several times protested against the increase of salary being from the first of May, 1885, and claiming that same should date from February 1, 1885, the time named by him in his notice to Mallance; that plaintiff refused to sign all receipts for payment of salary except ' on account, ' in pursuance of his view of the agreement between himself and Mallance. As matter of law applicable to the foregoing facts, I held that the silence of said Mallance, after due notice given him by the plaintiff of his intention to resign unless his salary was raised after January, 1885, and his continuing to receive plaintiff's services for the company, amounted to an acceptance of plaintiff's terms, which entitled him to $125 per month from February 1, 1885. I accordingly rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $75 and costs, " etc.

Upon appeal to the common pleas, the circuit judge confirmed the report, and the defendant corporation appeals upon the ground "that his honor erred...

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7 cases
  • Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. McCarthy Improvement Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • 29 Septiembre 2020
    ...acceptance where nothing else is shown." H.A. Sack Co. v. Forest Beach Public Service Dist., 250 S.E.2d 340(1978); Raysor v. Berkley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co., 2 S.E. 119 (1887); Florence City-Cnty. Airport Comm'n v. Air Terminal Parking Co., 322 S.E.2d 471, 473 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). 165. If the......
  • Bowley v. Fuller
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 14 Diciembre 1921
    ...could be referred to that subsisting contract, and in the absence of any new contract, would be referred to it. Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & L Co., 26 S. C. 610, 2 S. E. 119. A mere failure to reject cannot be converted into an acceptance unless the offeree has agreed in advance that such s......
  • Florence City-County Airport Com'n v. Air Terminal Parking Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 25 Octubre 1984
    ...else is shown. H.A. Sack Co. v. Forest Beach Public Service District, 272 S.C. 235, 250 S.E.2d 340 (1978); Raysor v. Berkley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co., 26 S.C. 610, 2 S.E. 119 (1887). Air Terminal concedes that the parties never mutually agreed or negotiated a reduction in rental fees, but conte......
  • Colleton Realty Co v. Folk
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 3 Marzo 1910
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