Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McGowan, J
• Citation: Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co, 2 S.E. 119, 26 S.C. 610 (S.C. 1887)
• Decision Date: 19 March 1887
• Parties: Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co.

2 S.E. 119

(26 S.C. 610)

Raysor

v.Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 19, 1887.

Master and Servant—Contract—Implied Assent.

The plaintiff, an employe of the defendant, demanded an increase of wages to commence January 1, 1885, and gave due notice to defendant's agent that he would leave unless such increase was made. The agent promised to give an answer in two or three days, but failed to do so for several months, allowing the plaintiff in the meanwhile to continue work. Thereupon plaintiff was told that his salary would be increased as demanded, but to commence May 1, 1885. Held, that the silence of the agent did not raise the implication of assent on the part of the defendant, and that plaintiff was not entitled to the increase for the time from January 1 to May 1, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Charleston county.

Chas. Boyle, for plaintiff.

Chas. E. Carrere, for defendant and appellant.

McGowan, J. This was an action before Trial Justice Minott for $75. The plaintiff, Raysor, was a director in the defendant corporation, and employed by it as the superintendent of Raysor's Mills. Anterior to January, 1885, he was receiving a salary of $100 per month, and about that time he had an interview with John C. Mallance, superintendent of the affairs of the company in Charleston, and requested that his salary should be raised to $125 per month; stating that he would leave unless such increase was made. The justice reports: "As matter of fact, I found that plaintiff did give John C. Mallance, as agent of the said company, clearly authorized to contract for same, notice of his intention to resign his position unless his salary was increased from $100 to $125 per month after January, 1885; that said Mallance did then and there promise plaintiff to give him an answer some two or three days from that date, and failed to do so. The plaintiff heard nothing more from Mallance on that subject for several months, when he was informed that his salary had been increased as demanded in amount, but would commence from the first of May, 1885. The plaintiff continued in the service of the company until some time in November, 1885, and several times protested against the increase of salary being from the first of May, 1885, and claiming that same should date from February 1, 1885, the time named by him in his notice to Mallance; that plaintiff refused to sign all receipts for payment of salary except ' on account, ' in pursuance of his view of the agreement between himself and Mallance. As matter of law applicable to the foregoing facts, I held that the silence of said Mallance, after due notice given him by the plaintiff of his intention to resign unless his salary was raised after January, 1885, and his continuing to receive plaintiff's services for the company, amounted to an acceptance of plaintiff's terms, which entitled him to $125 per month from February 1, 1885. I accordingly rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $75 and costs, " etc.

Upon appeal to the common pleas, the circuit judge confirmed the report, and the defendant corporation appeals upon the ground "that his honor erred...