Raytheon Co. v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.

• Citation: 307 N.E.2d 330,364 Mass. 593
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 13 February 1974
• Parties: RAYTHEON COMPANY v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY & another. 1

Page 330

307 N.E.2d 330

364 Mass. 593

RAYTHEON COMPANY v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY & another.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 2, 1973.

Decided Feb. 13, 1974.

Alfred C. Phillips, Lexington (Paul A. Butler and Charles H. Resnick, Lexington, with him), for Raytheon Company.

Joseph S. Ayoub, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hartley C. Cutter, Atty. Gen., and Israel L. Cohen, Boston, with him), for the Director of the Division of Employment Security.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

TAURO, Chief Justice.

On January 5, 1970, Etta L. Miller left her job as an assembler on the night shift at the Raytheon Company's plant in Dighton because she lacked means of transportation. A co-worker who had been providing her with passenger service to the plant had been laid off by Raytheon, and she was unable to find other means of transportation, public or private. She requested transfer to the day shift, which would have been accessible to her, but there were no openings. On January 12, 1970, she was granted unemployment benefits by the director of the division of employment security. Raytheon protested this immediate award of benefits, contending that Mrs. Miller was subject to temporary disqualification in accordance with the provisions of § 25(e) of G.L. c. 151A, as amended through St.1973, c. 899, § 2, which reads in pertinent part, 'No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter for . . . (e) A period of four to eight weeks, as the director shall determine, after the effective date of his claim if an individual has left his work (1) voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . ..'

A review examiner of the board of review rejected Raytheon's appeal and held that while Etta Miller's cause for leaving was not attributable to acts by Raytheon, her departure was involuntary within the meaning of the statute, and thus she was not subject to disqualification. The full board of review, one member dissenting, agreed with this decision and its reasoning. Raytheon then sought judicial review in the District Court of Central Middlesex. The judge rejected the board's rationale, but not its result, holding that Etta Miller's departure was voluntary, but was for good cause attributable to Raytheon in that the company laid off the co-worker who had provided her with transportation. We disagree with the District Court and agree with the decision of the Division of Employment Security.

In reviewing administrative agency decisions, this and all other courts are required to give 'due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.' G.L. c. 30A, § 14(8), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1. To the extent that an agency finding is one of fact, it must stand unless 'unsupported by substantial evidence.' Id. § 14(8)(e). Stated differently, if an agency's finding of fact is supported by 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' (Id. § 1 (6)), it will not be disturbed by a reviewing court. On the other hand, to the extent that an agency determination involves a question of law, it is subject to de novo judicial review. Id. § 14(8)(c). On one level, this case presents a pure question of law: can a departure from work for personal reasons ever be considered involuntary within the meaning of c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), if the position given up by the employee was still available at the time of leaving? For reasons set out below, we answer that question in the affirmative. The next level of analysis--were the personal reasons which caused an employee in a particular instance to leave work so compelling as to make the departure an involuntary one--brings into play the 'experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge' of the Division of Employment Security, and its finding on that question is entitled to considerable weight, Olechnicky v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 325 Mass. 660, 663, 92 N.E.2d 252 (1950), and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. Section 25(e)(1) establishes two distinct prerequisites to temporary disqualification from unemployment benefits. The departure from work must be both (1) voluntary and (2) without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent. We think that the element of voluntariness was includes in § 25(e)(1) for the purpose of avoiding temporary disqualification for persons who for compelling personal reasons are forced to give up an otherwise available position. The purpose and history of the unemployment compensation statute in general, and of § 25(e)(1) in particular, allow for no other interpretation. The grant of benefits to unemployed persons is not premised on the concept of employer fault: 'Relief of the physical needs of the unemployed who are without resources of their own is manifestly a duty of government. The Unemployment Compensation Law . . . puts that burden upon the employers and employees not exempted from its operation. . . . The harm to the common weal arising from unemployment of large numbers of people is beyond question. . . . This law affords some defence against that hazard.' Howes Bros. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Commn., 296 Mass. 275, 283, 5 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1936). '(T)he general...