RCG PROPERTIES v. City of Atlanta

Decision Date19 March 2003
Docket NumberNo. A02A1669.,A02A1669.
Citation260 Ga. App. 355,579 S.E.2d 782
PartiesRCG PROPERTIES, LLC v. CITY OF ATLANTA BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alston & Bird, Peter M. Degnan, Candace N. Smith, Atlanta, for appellant.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Cristine K. Huffine, Lisa A. Wade, Bradley S. Wolff, Susan P. Langford, David D. Blum, Lemuel H. Ward, Atlanta, for appellees.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

We granted the application of RCG Properties, LLC (RCG) for discretionary review after the trial court dismissed RCG's appeal of a decision of the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) without addressing the merits of that appeal. In dismissing RCG's appeal, the trial court decided that RCG lacked standing to seek judicial review of the BZA's decision. Because the trial court overlooked the controlling law and failed to apply the proper standard of review, we reverse and remand this case with direction.

On January 19, 2001, Holder Properties, Inc. (Holder) submitted an application to the City of Atlanta Bureau of Planning (bureau) for a special administrative permit (SAP) that would allow construction of "an eleven story precast concrete parking structure" at 221 Peachtree Center Avenue. This property lies within an area zoned as Special Public Interest-1 (SPI-1) in the Central Core District of Atlanta. Holder understood that it could not build its proposed parking structure unless the bureau approved its application for the permit. On February 14, 2001, Alycen Whiddon, the assistant director of the bureau, granted Holder's application for the permit and also granted a variation to Holder from SPI-1 district regulations. The variation authorized "a reduction of public space requirements to accommodate retail, from required 4570 sf to 3334 sf."

RCG, an owner of adjacent real property, filed a timely appeal of the bureau's administrative action with the BZA. When considering an appeal of a decision made by the bureau, the BZA is required to find for the appealing party "upon an expressed finding by the board that the administrative official's action was based on an erroneous finding of material fact, or that he acted in an arbitrary manner." City Code § 16-30.010(d). In seeking review of the bureau's action, RCG contended that Holder's application did not comply with certain mandatory criteria for obtaining a permit and asserted that the bureau failed to consider all of the applicable standards. RCG claimed "the approval of the SAP and the variation [were] based on an erroneous finding of material fact and constituted an arbitrary act" in that the bureau "failed to follow the requirements in Sections 16-25.002(3) and 16-18.007 of the Zoning Ordinance."

Among the stated goals for SPI-1 is the intention to maximize mass transit. City Code § 16-18A.002 expressly provides,

The intent of this chapter in establishing the SPI-1 Central Core District is as follows: It is within the public interest to: (1) Preserve and protect the hub of the Atlanta Metropolitan Area for specific functions appropriate to the central core. (2) Encourage the development of major office uses within this district. (3) Encourage the maintenance and expansion of this area as the major retail center for the City of Atlanta and the Metropolitan Area. (4) Encourage the development of high-intensity housing within multi-use complexes or independent structures within this district. (5) Encourage the highest densities of development in this area at the crossroads of the mass transit system. (6) Maximize the advantages of mass transit. (7) Facilitate safe and convenient pedestrian circulation and to minimize pedestrian/vehicular conflicts through the implementation of the pedestrian space plan within the Special Public Interest districts.

City Code § 16-18A.003 lists the "[p]ermitted principal uses and structures" in SPI-1. Including some repealed, this section lists 33 principal uses of buildings and structures. Paragraph (22) of that section authorizes: "Parking structures and surface parking lots with fewer than 30 parking spaces." Parking decks and park-for-hire facilities do not appear on this list for SPI-1.

City Code § 16-25.002(3), entitled "Construction, generally:" states: "No special permit shall be issued unless it is determined that, in addition to meeting the special requirements set forth within the district within which such special permit is located, satisfactory provisions and arrangements have been made concerning the following [criteria], applicable to each application." City Code § 16-25.002(3) lists many factors, including: ingress and egress; off-street parking and loading areas when required; refuse and service areas; appropriate buffering or screening to alleviate such potentially adverse effects as may be created by noise, glare, odor, lighting, signs, or traffic congestion; hours and manner of operations; and the like. Additional standards must be met by "park-for-hire facilities," which the pay parking structure at issue here appears to be, according to City Code § 16-29.001(36). That code section defines a "park-for-hire facility" as: "Any facility for the parking of motorized vehicles, for which service the operator thereof charges a fee." Subsection (j) of § 16-25.002(3) requires that all applications for park-for-hire facilities contain the following information:

(i) In addition to the requirements in section 16-25.002(3)(a), the ingress and egress requirements for park-for-hire facilities shall include the following: The size of the proposed facility and especially in relation to the vehicular capacity of streets of ingress and egress; the physical arrangements for ingress and egress; the reservoir space for incoming and outgoing vehicles; the effect of any plan for traffic improvement, such as the expressway program or major street plan on the flow or the pattern of traffic adjacent to the affected streets; and the financial responsibility of the applicant.

* * *

(iii) Applications for park-for-hire facility shall include the following information: The capacity of the proposed facility; the proposed location of entrances and exits to the facility; the capacity and location of the reservoir space to be used for the receiving and temporary storage of incoming vehicles; the proposed parking plan showing the size and location of the parking stalls and the aisles to serve them; the location, width, and general design of ramps or elevators to be used inside of structures; and any other information required to enable the mayor and council to make a fair and complete appraisal of the operation of the proposed park-for-hire facility.

(Emphasis supplied.)

RCG argued that "[t]here is no indication in the file ... that any of these criteria were used to evaluate Mr. Holder's application." RCG also asserted that the bureau should have denied the application " because of significant problems with ingress and egress to the property." The appeal noted that "the three driveway format will create significant conflict between pedestrians and motor vehicles, which would severely compromise public safety." In addition, RCG pointed out that the application mischaracterized the building as a "parking structure" and claimed that "park-for-hire facilities are not included in the list of permitted SPI-1 uses."

Before the scheduled hearing before the BZA on RCG's appeal, Hyatt Hotels and Peachtree Center notified the BZA that they opposed the SAP and fully supported RCG's appeal of the SAP. Their letter noted that "Hyatt, Peachtree Center and RCG own virtually all of the property in the same block and the blocks surrounding 221 Peachtree Center Avenue. They, along with the entire downtown area, will suffer ... serious detriments... if the proposed parking structure is allowed to be constructed."

At the hearing before the BZA, RCG pointed out that Neighborhood Planning Unit-M had voted unanimously against the permit. RCG argued that the pay parking structure would be an eyesore to RCG's property, a major detraction from the area's current pedestrian-friendly environment, and would be inconsistent with the existing retail and restaurant development on the west side of Peachtree Center Avenue where RCG's property is located. RCG claimed that by granting the SAP, the bureau engaged in bad planning that would prevent the continuation of the appropriate type of development as intended within SPI-1. Terming the proposed parking deck a "planning nightmare," RCG contended that the permit process had not allowed "adequate public input." Claiming "there simply can be no doubt here that this freestanding parking lot out in the middle of the block with no attached buildings is a park-for-hire facility," RCG also pointed out that the ordinance requires evaluation of certain technical criteria that the bureau failed to consider. RCG claimed that the SAP was not in compliance with the SPI-1 district regulations. Although the term "standing" was not used during the hearing, RCG vigorously explained why it considered itself aggrieved both in its written appeal submitted to the BZA and during oral argument before the BZA.

At the hearing, Holder asserted that its parking facility was a permitted use under City Code § 16-18A.005. Holder further contended that "[w]e're building a parking structure" and disagreed that it was building a park-for-hire facility. Holder claimed that "the park for hire is not an issue here." When a board member asked Whiddon, "is a special use permit for a park-for-hire facility required in SPI-1 district?" Whiddon responded in the negative.1 According to Whiddon, an "independent primary parking facility" is a permitted use in the district and that Holder was required only to obtain a SAP. Whiddon admitted that neither she nor anyone in the bureau had prepared any type of written report or otherwise documented compliance with the criteria set forth in the code. She...

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