In re G.W.
| Docket Number | C-230268 |
| Decision Date | 24 April 2024 |
| Citation | 2024 Ohio 1551 |
| Parties | IN RE: G.W. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Charles H. Bartlett, Jr., for Appellant Father,
The Helbling Law Firm, LLC, and John J. Helbling, for Appellee Mother.
{¶1} This case arises from a custody dispute between appellant ("Father") and appellee ("Mother") over their minor daughter, G.W. On appeal, Father argues that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to hold Mother in contempt for violating a court-approved shared-parenting plan and by awarding Mother custody of G.W. Because the record supports the juvenile court's determinations that Mother substantially complied with the terms of the shared-parenting plan and that awarding Mother custody of G.W. was in the child's best interest, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment and overrule Father's assignments of error.
{¶2} In March 2018, the juvenile court approved an agreed shared-parenting plan ("SPP") under which the court granted Mother and Father equal legal and residential custody of G.W. The SPP provided, "[e]ach parent shall be entitled to speak with or otherwise communicate with their minor child at all reasonable times." It required Mother and Father to mediate "any major disagreement between them relating to the minor child" before any court hearing and to "consult as to the appropriate school placement for the minor child." Finally, the SPP stated,
{¶3} In October 2019, Mother moved to terminate the SPP and sought sole custody of G.W. Her motion additionally requested that the court hold Father in contempt for failing to follow the SPP. Likewise, in December 2019, Father moved to terminate the SPP and sought legal and residential custody of G.W. In 2020, Father petitioned the court to find Mother in contempt for failing to follow the SPP and moved for sole custody of G.W.
{¶4} After the court approved the SPP, G.W. split time between Mother and Father. Mother had lived in Colerain Township for nine years with her other daughter, Z.T., who was born in 2013. Father lived in St. Bernard when he signed the SPP. He moved to Harrison, Ohio, with his wife, their infant child, and his wife's son from a prior marriage. Father has since moved to Indiana.[1]
{¶5} Regarding the logistics of G.W.'s medical care, for a time, Mother provided health insurance for G.W. through her service with the Ohio National Guard. Father testified that on multiple occasions, he asked Mother to provide him with a copy of her insurance card, but she never delivered. Mother explained that her insurance information was contained on her military identification card, which she could not copy per military policy. Mother testified that whichever parent was with G.W. at the time a medical appointment needed to be scheduled would make her medical appointments and then tell the other parent about the appointment.
{¶6} While both parents initially agreed that G.W. would attend preschool, after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Father objected to G.W. attending preschool. He cited his concern for his mother and father, both of whom had health issues. As a result of Father's objections, G.W. did not attend preschool during the 2020-2021 school year. When the 2021-2022 school year came around, Father again objected to G.W. attending preschool. Mother, however, enrolled G.W. in a preschool in her district. (Mother also contacted a preschool in Harrison, Ohio, near Father, but the preschool was not accepting new students.) During that school year, Mother took G.W. to preschool during her parenting time. Father did not take G.W. to preschool during his parenting time.
{¶7} From 2019 through 2022, Mother signed G.W. up for several extracurricular activities, to which Father objected, partly due to his concerns with the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2019, Mother asked Father if he would consent to G.W. participating in gymnastics. While Father objected, Mother, believing that the SPP allowed either parent to enroll G.W. in one extracurricular at a time over the objection of the other parent, signed G.W. up for gymnastics. In 2020, G.W. quit gymnastics and Mother enrolled her in ballet. In 2021, Mother asked Father to consent to G.W. participating in T-ball as well as ballet. But because Father objected, Mother did not register G.W. in T-ball. In 2022, G.W. quit ballet and resumed gymnastics. Mother again asked Father if he would consent to G.W. participating in T-ball and Father again objected. Though Father objected to T-ball, Mother testified that she signed G.W. up for T-ball because she believed that T-ball would not overlap with cheerleading, a new activity for which Mother had registered G.W. As it turned out, T-ball overlapped with gymnastics and T-ball games fell on one of Father's days with G.W.
{¶8} Following the hearing, the magistrate granted both parties' request to terminate the SPP, denied both parties' motions for contempt, and granted Mother sole custody of G.W. {¶9} Regarding custody, the magistrate noted that R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) sets forth the factors to consider in determining the child's best interest and found that R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d), "the child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community," was most applicable and weighed in favor of Mother. And the magistrate found that neither Mother's nor Father's actions rose to the level of contempt. Father objected to the magistrate's decision.
{¶10} In April 2023, the juvenile court overruled Father's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. The juvenile court, like the magistrate, found that R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d) weighed in favor of Mother, noting that G.W. had spent nearly a full school year at the school in Mother's district. The juvenile court found that Mother substantially complied with the SPP and denied both parties' contempt motions. The court terminated the SPP, awarded Mother legal custody of G.W., and awarded the parties equal parenting time.
{¶11} Father raises two assignments of error: The trial court erred by (1) failing to hold Mother in contempt, and (2) awarding Mother custody of G.W.
{¶12} In asserting that the trial court erroneously denied his contempt motion, Father argues that Mother testified that she failed to give Father a copy of her insurance card despite multiple requests, did not consult with Father before making medical and dental appointments, allowed G.W. to sleep in the same bed as Mother, interfered with Father's phone calls to G.W., and failed to use mediation to resolve disagreements with Father.
{¶13} An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a contempt motion for an abuse of discretion. Morrison v. Walters, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220643 and C-220644, 2023-Ohio-2887, ¶ 19, citing Wolf v. Wolf, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4. A court abuses its discretion when its judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A court has broad discretion to determine whether a party violated its orders and what conduct constitutes contempt. In re Ayer, 119 Ohio App.3d 571, 576, 695 N.E.2d 1180 (1st Dist.1997).
{¶14} Parents subject to a custody order may seek a contempt finding when the other party interferes or fails to comply with the order. R.C. 2705.031(B)(2). A moving party establishes a prima facie case of civil contempt by proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the nonmoving party's failure to comply with an existing order. Morrison at ¶ 19, quoting Wolf at ¶ 4. Once the movant establishes a prima facie case of contempt, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish a defense for the noncompliance. Wolf at ¶ 4. A party's substantial compliance with a court order can serve as a defense to a contempt finding. See State v. Ritter, 1st Dist. Butler No. 78-05-0048, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10200, 1 (Oct. 1, 1980); see also Norman v. Bethany Music, 4th Dist. Highland No. 20CA07, 2021-Ohio-824, ¶ 14. A technical violation of a court's order does not necessarily require a contempt finding. Norman at ¶ 13.
{¶15} The record supports the juvenile court's finding that Mother substantially complied with its order. Regarding the health-insurance card, the juvenile court credited Mother's explanation that Mother could not provide Father with a copy of her insurance card due to military policy prohibiting her from copying the card. Moreover, Mother testified that she attempted to provide Father with her insurance account numbers and made herself available for Father to call her so that she could give medical providers her insurance information over the phone. As to Mother's failure to mediate, Father never moved to compel mediation. Further, Mother and Father, with their attorneys, met several times to attempt to resolve disputes. Next, regarding Mother's enrolling G.W. in preschool, she agreed to forego preschool for the 2020-2021 year and attempted to consult with Father for the 2021-2022 school year. Notably, the SPP did not expressly require that the parties agree to G.W.'s school placement-instead, the plan required the parties to "consult." Finally, there was conflicting evidence...
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