Rea v. Feeback
| Decision Date | 14 January 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 42312,42312,2 |
| Citation | 244 S.W.2d 1017 |
| Parties | REA v. FEEBACK |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Paul C. Sprinkle, William F. Knowles, Roy F. Carter, Sprinkle, Knowles & Carter, Kansas City, for appellant.
T. James Conway, S. David Trusty, Sam Mandell, Kansas City, for respondent. Popham, Thompson, Popham, Mandell & Trusty, Kansas City, of counsel.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
This is an action by a husband, W. C. Rea, to recover $15,750 consequential damages resulting to him because of the personal injuries sustained by his wife, Cora Rea, when she was involved in an intersectional automobile-truck collision with the defendant, Lyle B. Feeback. The husband's right to recover and the defendant's liability were hypothesized upon a finding of the applicability of the humanitarian doctrine, and particularly upon a finding that the defendant saw or should have seen Mrs. Rea in peril in or near the intersection of Brooklyn Avenue and U. S. Highway 71, unable to extricate herself, and that, thereafter, he could have slackened the speed of his truck or swerved it and thereby have avoided the collision and the injuries to plaintiff's wife. Upon the trial of the cause a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant but the trial court sustained the plaintiff husband's motion for a new trial upon the ground that the court had erred in instructing the jury and the defendant, Feeback, appeals from the order granting the new trial. The plaintiff's evidence demonstrated the hypothesized cause of action under the humanitarian doctrine and the sole question upon this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff a new trial because of error in instructing the jury.
At the behest of the defendant the court gave, among other instructions, instruction D: 'The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff's right to recover herein on Count One is dependent upon the right of the wife to recover for her injuries so, therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence that the plaintiff's wife could not recover against the defendant herein for her injuries then you are instructed that your verdict shall be for the defendant herein.' In justification of the instruction the appellant makes the following argument, and in determining whether it was prejudicially erroneous we accept, for the purposes of this appeal, the appellant's interpretation of its meaning. It is said that the instruction in effect told the jury that the husband It is first stated that had this case been submitted on primary negligence, that this instruction would have meant 'that the contributory negligence of plaintiff's wife would have barred a recovery by the plaintiff in this action.' It is then said to follow in the second place, since contributory negligence on the part of the wife would bar the husband's right to recover, that 'it naturally follows that under a humanitarian negligence case if the plaintiff's wife was not in a position of imminent peril in time for the defendant to have seen and taken some action towards avoiding the accident then the plaintiff's wife would not be entitled to recover and in turn the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.' In summary, the appellant's argument is that the instruction 'merely tells the jury that the husband must stand in his wife's shoes in the action he brings for loss of services and medical expenses in a case submitted under the humanitarian theory even as he does in a primary negligence case.'
The appellant's argument unnecessarily confuses several unrelated matters and does not accurately state or precisely delimit the principles necessarily involved. A husband may not recover the consequential damages resulting to him on account of his wife's injuries unless the...
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Warren v. Kansas City
...specific facts and therefore misleading and confusing. Morris v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 Mo. 479, 173 S.W.2d 39; Rea v. Feeback, Mo.Sup., 244 S.W.2d 1017; Wallace v. Herman Body Co., 349 Mo. 1093, 163 S.W.2d 923. If in point of fact an instruction is not erroneous as to a matter......
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Cragin v. Lobbey
...his wife's companionship, society and services. The causes of action are separate and each is an entirety unto itself. Rea v. Feeback, 244 S.W.2d 1017, 1019 (Mo.1952). And while Rule 66.01(c) requires the two causes of action to be filed jointly (Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Associatio......
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Hampton v. Cantrell
...based upon the injuries to the other spouse, and these claims were separate, each being an 'entirety unto itself.' Rea v. Feeback, Mo., 244 S.W.2d 1017, 1019(2); Robben v. Peters, Mo.App., 427 S.W.2d 753, 756--757(4). Rurther, the injury to plaintiff Roger Hampton, who was nine years old wh......
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Kestner v. Jakobe
...a claim for medical expenses and loss of services. He was actually asserting a separate, distinct cause of action. Rea v. Feeback, Mo., 244 S.W.2d 1017, 1019(2). Mr. Kestner died before the second trial was had, and his cause of action abated. State ex rel. National Refining Co. v. Seehorn,......