Read v. City of Lynwood

• Decision Date: 07 October 1985
• Citation: 173 Cal.App.3d 437,219 Cal.Rptr. 26
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Sandra READ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LYNWOOD, Charles Gomez, and E.L. Morris, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. B011106.

Page 26

219 Cal.Rptr. 26

173 Cal.App.3d 437

Sandra READ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LYNWOOD, Charles Gomez, and E.L. Morris, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. B011106.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Oct. 7, 1985.

[173 Cal.App.3d 439] Joseph Posner, Inc., Los Angeles, and Michael P. Calof, Inc., Encino, for plaintiff and appellant.

Stradling, Yocca, Carlson & Rauth, Paul L. Gale and Randall J. Sherman, Newport Beach, for defendants and respondents.

HASTINGS, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff/appellant Sandra Read (appellant) appeals the dismissal of her suit against defendants/respondents City of Lynwood (the City), Charles Gomez (the city manager) and E.L. Morris (the mayor). The dismissal followed the sustaining of respondents' demurrer to the first amended complaint, the operative one on appeal. ¹

FACTS:

Appellant was hired by the city as Development Division Manager in September 1981. Her supervisor was the city manager. As required by the city code, appellant had a six-month probationary period which she passed with favorable ratings.

On July 1, 1983, appellant accepted an appointment as Community Development Director for the City. Because this was a new position, appellant was required to complete another six-month probationary period. Under the terms of the City code section 24-56, should she fail to pass her probation, she would return to her former position as Development Division Manager, provided it was extant. On December 12, 1983, the city council voted to eliminate the position of Development Division Manager by a vote of 3-2. Appellant alleges that This sequence of events seems straightforward enough. The plot is thickened, however, by the accusations and allegations made by appellant in her subsequent suit. Appellant alleges that during her tenure as Development Division Manager she "became aware of a number of suspected criminal activities by City employees, especially by [the city manager] and other defalcations on his part." (First Amended Complaint, para. 8.) She alleges that in the Spring of 1983, the City was seeking bids from developers for a city project; the city manager and the mayor were "pushing for the appointment" of a certain developer; appellant had heard that this developer had earlier attempted to bribe a City employee; she believed this developer to be the least qualified for the project and his appointment to be against the best interests of the City; she made her objections well known. Appellant further alleges that in 1982 or 1983 she was informed that city employees were performing work for the city manager at his home on city time. In addition, she claims the city manager frequently used erratic, volatile and unpredictable methods of management, including undermining the authority of those in inferior positions to him. Appellant met with the mayor and related her concerns and misgivings regarding the city manager's management style; she also voiced her opposition to appointment of the developer. ² Appellant alleges the elimination of her former position and her subsequent discharge were in retaliation for this meeting with the mayor.

City code section 24-67 requires a 4-1 vote to eliminate a position; therefore, this vote was null and void. On December 30, 1983, appellant was informed that she had failed to pass her probationary period as Community Development Director, and since her former position with the City had been eliminated, she would no longer be employed by the City.

Appellant sued for wrongful discharge and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both against the City; for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the City, the city manager and the mayor; and for intentional interference with employment relationship against the city manager and the mayor. ³ Respondents demurred, arguing that all causes of action were barred by the doctrine of discretionary immunity (Gov.Code, § 820.2) ⁴ in that termination of a probationary employee is well within respondents' statutorily granted discretion. They also asserted that appellant's allegations lacked the requisite elements for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to the last cause of action, respondents averred that the city manager and the mayor were absolutely immune. Appellant's opposition to the demurrer focused primarily on public policy considerations. She argued that California's strong public policy against bribery and corruption as well as the policy of protecting from retaliation those who exercise their constitutional rights mandated the overruling of the demurrer.

The court disagreed. It's minute order dated December 20, 1984, in pertinent part, held: "Demurrer sustained without leave to amend. [p] 1. Court does not consider extraneous matters. [p] 2. Plaintiff has failed to overcome the immunity issues. [p] 3. There is no violation of public policy. [p] 4. City Code Sect. 24-67, City Council may eliminate unoccupied positions by 3-2 vote."

On appeal, appellant reasserts the arguments raised below. ⁵ Respondents counter that since their actions were wholly within their discretion, they are immune. They agree that a longstanding public policy against bribery and malfeasance in office exists but argue that appellant's complaint fails to allege that either the city manager or the mayor participated in such bribery. Moreover, appellant's assertion that she heard city employees were working at the city manager's home was merely an allegation that she heard something NOT that the "illegal" work had, in fact, occurred.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer is treated as admitting the truthfulness of properly pleaded factual allegations of the complaint but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 827, 134 Cal.Rptr. 839.) On appeal, we make an independent judgment regarding the sufficiency of the facts pleaded in the complaint. (Miller v. Bakersfield News-Bulletin, Inc. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 899, 901, 119 Cal.Rptr. 92.) We do so below and conclude that respondents' demurrer was improperly sustained and reverse the judgment ordering dismissal of the suit.

Respondents are correct when they assert that Government Code section 820.2 grants them immunity from liability for any injury resulting from the exercise of their statutorily granted discretion. This immunity extends to the public employee's employer (Gov.Code, § 815.2(b)). City code section 24-56, in pertinent part, provides, "The appointing authority may dismiss the probationary employee at any time, with or without cause, during the probationary period. Such dismissal shall not be subject to review or appeal." Moreover, the courts have long held that the decision to terminate a probationary employee is within the employer's discretion. (Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 340, 345-346, 159 Cal.Rptr. 440.) When appellant assumed the new position of Community Development Director, she once again became a probationary employee. Her dismissal before the end of the six-month probationary period is allowed by both Government Code section 820.2 and City code section 24-56. Problems arise, however, when a public body or official acts outside the limits imposed by the statute granting it discretionary authority.

Appellant argues that under the provisions of city code section 24-56 she should have been allowed to return to her former position as Development Division Manager. This section, in pertinent part, provides: "An employee dismissed from a probationary appointment who, immediately prior to receiving such appointment, held appointment to another position ..., shall be returned to the previously held position unless dismissed for cause." She urges that this section applies because the City Council's vote to eliminate this position by a 3-2 vote was a violation of city code section 24-67. It provides:

"Whenever in the discretion of a four-fifths majority of the council it becomes necessary in the interest of economy or because the necessity for the position or employment involved no longer exists, to abolish a certain position or employment in the classified service and lay-off, demote, or transfer the employee holding such position or employment, the council may take the necessary actions without filing statement of reasons and without the right of appeal." (Emphasis added.)

As can be seen from the underlined phrase, the 4/5 majority is required when the position to be eliminated is filled by an employee, and the vote to eliminate that position would require that employee to be laid-off, demoted or transferred. At first glance, it appears that this was not the case here. Respondents argue that when appellant assumed the new position, the former one became and remained vacant until the city council voted to eliminate it; and in such circumstances, a simple majority of the city council suffices. The lower court reached this conclusion. We agree that such an analysis is consistent with the statute but conclude that the statutory 4/5 requirement may still have been...