Reagan v. Copeland
| Decision Date | 19 December 1890 |
| Parties | REAGAN v. COPELAND. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from district court, Cherokee county; J. I. PERKINS, Judge.
W. S. Herndon and Ben B. Cain, for appellant. McClure & Gibson, for appellee.
Copeland sued Reagan for the value of certain personal property which he charged was taken from his possession by Reagan, as United States marshal for the eastern district of Texas, under an execution issued out of the United States circuit court upon a judgment against other parties. The petition charged that plaintiff owned the property, and that it was not subject to the writ under which it was wrongfully taken. The defendant answered, and applied for a continuance, which was refused. After his application for a continuance was overruled, the defendant and a number of other persons, who, it was alleged in the pleading, had obtained separate judgments against the party who was the defendant in the execution levied by the marshal, filed a pleading representing that they had sued out executions, which had been levied by the marshal on the property in controversy; that they had made to the marshal bonds of indemnity, with certain persons as their sureties, who also joined in the pleading, binding themselves to protect the marshal, and defend him in any suit brought against him for levying upon the said property. These parties waived process, submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, prayed to be treated as defendants, adopted the pleadings of Reagan, and prayed for the entry over against themselves, of any judgment rendered against Reagan. The court, upon the objection of the plaintiff, refused to permit them to be made parties defendant. Upon the verdict of a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, and the defendant, Reagan, appealed.
The record contains no statement of facts, but certificates and affidavits have been filed here showing that one was prepared and submitted to the district judge by the attorneys of appellant, before the adjournment of the term of the court at which the judgment was rendered. They show that the failure to file a statement of the facts was the result of the unexplained omission of the district judge, and was not in any manner the fault of the appellant's attorneys. Appellant, for the first time, suggests in his brief filed in this court that the judgment should be reversed because of the failure of the judge to approve a statement of facts. If we could reverse a...
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Cleveland v. Ward
...31 Cyc. pp. 360, 361, 365, 367, 470, 396; Revised Statutes 1911, arts. 1824, 1848; Rev. St. 1925, arts. 2001, 1998, 1992; Reagan v. Copeland, 78 Tex. 551, 14 S. W. 1031; Jolley v. Oliver (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 1152; I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Howell (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 560; Hartford F......
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Way v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
...31 Cyc. pp. 360, 361, 365, 367, 470, 396; Revised Statutes 1911, arts. 1824, 1848; Rev. St. 1925, arts. 2001, 1998, 1992; Reagan v. Copeland, 78 Tex. 551, 14 S. W. 1031; Jolley v. Oliver (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 1152; International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Howell (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 560;......
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Koonce v. City of Mesquite
...and will not be considered when presented only for the first time in the appellate court. 3 Tex.Jur. 2d Sec. 487, p. 732; Reagan v. Copeland, 78 Tex. 551, 14 S.W. 1031; Ennis Mercantile Co. v. Wathen, 93 Tex. 622, 57 S.W. So far as the record discloses, there are no fundamental errors, the ......