O'Reagan v. Daniels
Decision Date | 14 November 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 47668,47668 |
Citation | 241 Iowa 1199,44 N.W.2d 666 |
Parties | O'REAGAN v. DANIELS. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
H. J. Williamson, of Manchester, and Elliott, Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas H. Tracey, William W. Gilkey, and Yoran & Yoran, all of Manchester, for appellee.
The facts in this case are not in dispute in any material matter.
Plaintiff, 54, had worked for defendant in his lumber yard, and on his farm, for about six years. In May, 1946, defendant directed the plaintiff to help defendant's daughter, Gwen Daniels, and Joe Penado, another employee of defendant, to haul baled hay to the barn on defendant's farm, and to hoist and store it in the haymow of the barn. The barn had gable ends. In the east end of the barn a large door opened into the haymow. This door was six-feet wide and extended to the upper angle of the gable. The sill at the bottom of the door opening was eighteen feet above the floor of the haymow. At that end of the mow the floor was bare and free of hay. Attached to the door sill on the inside was a narrow platform, the width of the door. A sort of catwalk. It was about eighteen inches wide in the middle and tapered to a width of six or eight inches at each end. To reach the door sill from the the mow floor there was a ladder made by nailing cross-pieces between and to two studs. The equipment for hoisting the hay was similar to that commonly used in farm barns for that purpose. The hay fork was attached to the lower end of a rope which extended upward to, and over, a stationary pulley in the upper angle of the gable just above a trip at the east end of a track which extended horizontally just under the ridge of the roof to the other end of the haymow.
The hay was hauled in a flat open truck to beneath the haymow door. Plaintiff's normal work was on the floor of the mow, and, when the equipment was working properly, his duties consisted in seeing that the hoisted bales were properly piled in the haymow. Penado would stick the prongs of the fork into the bales of hay, and then signal Gwen Daniels, who was operating another truck with the other end of the rope attached to its rear end, and running through other pulleys, to drive forward and hoist the loaded fork to the haymow door, where it would enter the trip and the track and be drawn back into the haymow.
The difficulty with the process was that when the fork began to rise the rope between the fork and the pulley above would often twist and kink and would not pass through the pulley. When this would happen 'the girl had to stop or else the rope would break or a pulley would tear loose.' When the rope became tight and taut behind the truck she would know the rope was jammed. Sometimes she would continue forward and the rope would untwist and go through the pulley, but sometimes it would not. She would then back the truck and lower the loaded fork and in whirling as it descended the rope would untwist, and then by going forward the rope would sometimes pass through the pulley, but more often the rope would again twist and kink. It was then the plaintiffs duty to climb to the catwalk and whirl the loaded fork until the rope would untwist and unkink and go through the pulley. For these occurrences when the rope would jam, a four-foot stick was kept near by to aid in twirling or whirling the loaded fork, but if the load was stalled high near the pulley, the stick was of little help and it was necessary for plaintiff to stand on the catwalk and untwist the rope by whirling the fork load with his hands. When the rope unkinked the tension of the taut rope itself would sometimes pull the fork into the trip and the load would suddenly swing through the door, and unless the plaintiff was watchful and active he was in danger of being struck. The stick was not about on the day of plaintiff's injury.
There is no controversy over the facts stated above or those which we now state. The jury could have found, and there was no evidence to the contrary, that this rope was defective with respect to twisting and kinking from the time it was purchased in July, 1945. They had trouble because of its twisting during the hay season that year. Plaintiff testified:
Speaking of the day of his injury, in the latter part of May, 1946, plaintiff testified:
On cross-examination plaintiff testified: * * *'
Plaintiff testified that he had a stick sometimes and sometimes used his hands, and that it wasn't possible to straighten out the fork full in any other way; that he had got up on the middle of the platform fifty times or more to untwist the rope.
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Joe Penado testified that when he and the plaintiff were leaving in the truck on the day of the injury, the defendant said to him:
Speaking of what took place during the morning of plaintiff's injury, Penado testified: ...
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