Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 82SA288
Decision Date | 27 February 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 82SA288,82SA288 |
Citation | 676 P.2d 1189 |
Parties | Warren F. REAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF GRAND JUNCTION, a body politic and corporate, and the City Council of the City of Grand Junction, and Louis Brach, Frank Dunn, Dale Hollingsworth, Karl M. Johnson, William G. O'Dwyer, Robert Holmes, Jane Quimby, as members of the City Council of the City of Grand Junction, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Feder, Morris & Tamblyn, P.C., Harold A. Feder, Stephen B. Schuyler, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Gerald J. Ashby, City Atty., Grand Junction, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff, Warren F. Reams, appeals a judgment of the Mesa County District Court upholding the validity of a Grand Junction municipal ordinance assessing plaintiff's property for costs of a special improvement district. 1 We affirm.
On April 2, 1980, the Grand Junction City Council (council) adopted a resolution declaring its intention to create Local Improvement District No. ST-80, Phase A (the district) for the purpose of constructing an elevated arterial roadway and appurtenant sidewalks, curbs and gutters. The council also adopted a resolution approving plans and specifications for the contemplated improvements and authorizing publication of notice of intent to create the district.
On May 7, 1980, the council conducted hearings on the proposed district. Plaintiff filed "Objections and Exceptions" requesting exclusion of his property from any assessment of costs for the proposed district. 2 Plaintiff also presented testimony by an appraiser, Richard Hodges, to the effect that the proposed improvements would result in a twenty-four percent decrease in the value of the Reams property and would not benefit such property. The hearing was continued until May 14, 1980, on which date further evidence was presented. The council then adopted a resolution authorizing creation of the district which, as defined, included plaintiff's property.
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106, plaintiff sought judicial relief to exclude his property from the operation of the proposed ordinance. Recognizing that no assessment had been made against plaintiff's property, the parties agreed to a stay of the district court action until such assessment occurred.
Subsequently, a hearing to determine appropriate assessments for the project was conducted. 3 At that hearing, the city's appraiser testified that in his opinion plaintiff's property had been benefited by the roadway to the extent of the proposed assessment against such property. 4 When asked to explain the basis of his opinion, he stated in part as follows:
On cross-examination, when asked to state what "dollar calculations" he made in determining the value of the property, the city's appraiser stated,
Plaintiff's appraiser also testified at this hearing. He stated that there were "no special benefits" to plaintiff's property from the roadway construction, and further opined that, based upon a comparable sales analysis, plaintiff's property would sustain a loss equivalent to "approximately $32,892."
On April 1, 1981, the council adopted an ordinance approving the assessable costs of the district. Plaintiff's property was included. With respect to plaintiff's property, the ordinance contained the following pertinent language:
This ordinance also contained the following provision:
On April 30, 1981, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the pending district court action, requesting that the ordinance assessing his property be set aside, and seeking a declaration pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 that such ordinance was unconstitutional. On May 9, 1981, a notice of assessment was mailed to plaintiff stating that his property had been assessed in the principal amount of $48,524.87 for the project. The notice stated that
The trial of plaintiff's civil action commenced June 17, 1981. During the trial, the attorney for the council acknowledged a "flaw" in section 7 of the assessment ordinance, stating that "I think that when there is added 'or for such other purpose as the City Council of the City of Grand Junction may from time to time direct,' I think that is wrong...." The council asserted that this limited portion of the ordinance could be severed, leaving the remaining portion of section 7 and all other provisions of the ordinance intact.
On November 23, 1981, the trial court entered judgment finding that plaintiff's property was benefited by the improvements and denying plaintiff's request for relief. With regard to section 7 of the April 1, 1981, ordinance, the trial court entered the following pertinent conclusions:
Plaintiff first contends that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the district benefited his property, and, therefore, the assessment ordinance must be declared unconstitutional with respect to him. We disagree.
Special assessments, sometimes referred to as local assessments, are ancient devices of English origin designed to finance local public improvements. See C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 29.2 (1980). See also Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258 (1857). We first addressed issues involving local assessments in the context of a special benefit accruing from a public improvement in Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106 (1881). In Palmer, a Denver ordinance which assessed owners of lots abutting upon city streets for the cost of constructing sidewalks on the owners' property was upheld as an exercise of the police power. The decision also stated that such special assessments violated constitutional requirements of uniformity and could not be upheld under the power to impose taxes. In City of Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 30 P. 1041 (1892), we rejected the latter portion of Palmer 's holding in determining that the uniformity clause of the Colorado Constitution, Article 10, Section 3, does not apply to...
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