Reams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 July 1973
• Docket Number: Nos. 42,282,42,314,s. 42,282
• Citation: 279 So.2d 839
• Parties: Carey A. REAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee (two cases).
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 839

279 So.2d 839

Carey A. REAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee (two cases).

Nos. 42,282, 42,314.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 5, 1973.

Tobias Simon, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McCAIN, Justice.

By direct appeal we have for review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Lake County, holding Fla.Stat. § 458.15, F.S.A. constitutionally valid on its face and as applied to appellant. Although appellant continues to attack the validity of § 458.15 as applied to him, on this appeal he has abandoned his contention of invalidity per se. In Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439 (Fla.1963) we specifically decided that an appeal from a judgment holding a statute invalid as applied to specific facts could be taken directly to this Court as one directly passing upon the validity of a statute. We continue to adhere to that view. Thus, jurisdiction over the cause vests in this Court pursuant to Fla.Const., Article V, Section 3(b)(1) 1973, F.S.A.

On October 11, 1971, Carey A. Reams was informed against in the Circuit Court of Lake County on five counts of practicing medicine without a license and one count of using the title 'Doctor' in conjunction with the unauthorized practice of medicine. After trial by jury, he was adjudged guilty of all six counts and sentenced on the first count to a fine of one thousand dollars or one year in the county jail. On the remaining counts imposition of sentence was deferred, and appellant was placed on probation for a period of seven years. We reverse, for reasons stated hereinafter.

The testimony at trial was lengthy. Eighteen witnesses testified for the State; none testified for the defense. Reams himself did not testify. Of the five persons alleged in the information to have been diagnosed or treated by Reams, Otis Boyd, Ella Miller and Felita Foxwell all testified to their experiences with defendant. Mrs. Eva Allgood and Edward Fogg, Jr., did not testify but relatives appeared on their behalf. Additionally, various supportive witnesses, including several physicians who subsequently treated some of the defendant's patients, testified.

Much of the testimony was cumulative and overlapping. From it there emerged a definite pattern as to defendant's course of procedure with his patients. When a person with real or imagined health problems came to Reams' premises in Lake County for treatment, Reams administered certain tests, including urine and saliva tests and possibly blood pressure and examinations. Thereafter, Reams analyzed the results of the tests and diagnosed the patient's health problem. In the case of Otis Boyd, Reams diagnosed a 'twisted colon'; Mrs. Allgood's problem was determined to be too much salt in her urine, which would produce a heart attack; Fogg's illness, including convulsions, resulted from the secretion of too much alcohol by his pancreas; Mrs. Miller was told she had diabetes, adhesions and an infection in the right breast; and Felita Foxwell was diagnosed as suffering from low blood sugar, an infection of the kidneys and some type of liver trouble.

Reams then suggested a course of treatment to be followed by the patient. Generally, the patient was advised to spend a week or two weeks at Reams' farm undergoing tests and following a healthful diet, and possibly taking vitamin supplements. Reams generally informed his patients that he could cure or substantially alleviate their difficulties if his recommended treatment were followed.

Had the state limited its presentation to the above testimony and supportive testimony by physicians, relatives and friends of the individuals concerned, we would have no difficulty sustaining Reams' conviction. Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, the Medical Practice Act, makes it unlawful for any person not holding a lawfully issued medical license in full force and effect to:

'(a) Practice or advertise to practice medicine;

'(b) Use in connection with his name any designation tending to imply or designate him as a practitioner of medicine;

'(c) Use the title 'doctor,' or any abbreviation thereof in connection with his name, or with any trade name in the conduct of any occupation or profession, involving or pertaining to the public health, or the diagnosis or treatment of any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition unless duly licensed by a board created under the laws of the state; . . .' (Fla.Stat. § 458.15.)

The practice of medicine is defined by Fla.Stat. § 458.13(1), F.S.A. as follows:

'(1) Any person, except as hereinafter provided, shall be deemed to be practicing medicine within the purview of this chapter who holds himself out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate, or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical or mental condition or who shall offer or undertake, by any means or method, to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical or mental condition.'

It seems clear that Reams 'diagnosed' the health problems of his patients within the meaning of the Medical Practice Act. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1968, defines diagnosis as 'a medical term, meaning the discovery of the source of a patient's illness or the determination of the nature of his disease from a study of its symptoms. Said to be little more than a guess enlightened by experience.' Reams' procedures fall squarely within this definition. He first conducted certain examinations on each patient, and after analysis of the results, purported to 'discover the source of the patient's illness' and/or 'determine the nature of his disease.'

Moreover, insofar as he prescribed a proper diet to cure or alleviate the specific medical problems he diagnosed, Reams 'treated' the illnesses of his patients. We reject the argument that because the substances 'prescribed' were vitamins or food rather than 'medicines' as that word is generally used, Reams did not treat diseases in the medical sense. We are persuaded in this respect by the arguments of the New Jersey Supreme Court, considering a statute similar to ours, in Pinkus v. MacMahon, 129 N.J.L. 367, 29 A.2d 885 (1943). In that case, in conjunction with the operation of a food store, defendant diagnosed shoppers' illnesses, prescribed a healthful diet and sold certain vitamin substances which he held out as having curative or restorative powers. The New Jersey court said, and we agree:

'Prosecutor (defendant) contends that there was no evidence before the trial court of any violation of the statute. In other words, he insists that the conduct described by the witnesses for the state board does not amount to the practice of medicine and surgery as above defined. We think it does. Whether or not the substances he sold and prescribed are to be classed as medicines or not makes no difference. Clearly prosecutor attempted to diagnose the 'physical condition' of the witnesses and to ascribe a cause for its existence and prescribe for such condition.

'It is argued that prosecutor was merely engaged in the sale of food and food products, having special knowledge concerning food. But he went far beyond the mere sale of food when he diagnosed alleged ailments of the witnesses and expressed an opinion as to their cause. We think the practices engaged in by the prosecutor come within the inhibition of the act.'

However, Reams argues that he is a 'nutritionist', i.e. one who advocates nutrition as an aid to human...