Reardon v. Allegheny College

Decision Date01 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 1785 WDA 2006.,1785 WDA 2006.
Citation926 A.2d 477
PartiesLaura REARDON, Appellant v. ALLEGHENY COLLEGE, Megan Reilly, Stacy Miller and Margaret Nelson, Appellees.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Timothy J. Codelka, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Martha H. Munsch, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, BOWES and TAMILIA, JJ.

OPINION BY TAMILIA, J.:

¶ 1 Laura Reardon appeals from the August 15, 2006, Order dismissing her complaint with prejudice and sustaining appellees' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.

¶ 2 The trial court found the following facts. See Trial Court Opinion, Folino, J., 10/4/06, at 1-2. Appellant was a student at Allegheny College (Allegheny) majoring in music with a minor in biology, having since graduated. During the spring semester of 2004, appellant, as part of her biology curriculum, enrolled in an investigative laboratory biology course taught by appellee Margaret Nelson. Professor Nelson assigned appellant, appellee Stacy Miller, and appellee Megan Reilly to work on a lab experiment as a group. Each student was required to submit an individual paper analyzing the results of the experiment upon completion.

¶ 3 When Professor Nelson viewed the class paper submissions, she immediately suspected plagiarism as appellant and Reilly's papers contained identical sections. Upon further reflection, Professor Nelson's suspicions pointed to appellant as the plagiarizer. Shortly thereafter, Allegheny's administration was notified of appellant's indiscretion.

¶ 4 The trial court concluded Allegheny faithfully adhered to its internal procedure in adjudicating the plagiarism charge. First, a panel of the Honors Committee was convened and it determined there was a reasonable likelihood that appellant had violated the Honor Code, thereby warranting further action. Next, the College Judicial Board (CJB) conducted a lengthy adjudicatory hearing wherein appellant was given the opportunity to present evidence and confront the witnesses offered against her. The CJB found appellant guilty of plagiarism and imposed a failing grade for the biology lab course; stripped appellant of her Latin Honors; ordered appellant to complete community service; and placed appellant on academic probation for the duration of her academic career at Allegheny. Appellant then was afforded the opportunity, as of right, to appeal to the school's President who affirmed the findings and disposition of the CJB.

¶ 5 On April 7, 2006, appellant filed a written complaint raising claims for breach of contract against Allegheny and, in a separate count, against Professor Nelson; claims for defamation against Allegheny and Professor Nelson and, in a separate count, defamation claims against both Miler and Reilly. She also pursued a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress against Allegheny, Professor Nelson, Miller, and Reilly. Record, No. 6. After appellees filed preliminary objections that were sustained, appellant filed an amended complaint raising, with more specificity, the claims that had been raised in the first complaint along with a newly pled negligence claim against both Allegheny and Professor Nelson. Appellee responded by demurring to all six counts contained in the amended complaint. Following dismissal of the amended complaint, appellant perfected a timely appeal with this Court in which she raises the following issues:

1. Did the Lower Court err when it determined that the Appellee College complied substantially with the requirement of providing a fair and impartial judicial process and did not breach its contract with Appellant?

2. Did the Lower Court err when it determined that the Appellant failed to plead sufficient information to show that a third-party contractual relationship may exist, and that if one did, Appellant failed to sufficiently plead that such contract was breached?

3. Did the Lower Court err when it determined that the statements made by Appellees, under all of the circumstances, could not be construed as defamatory?

4. Did the Lower Court err when it determined that the Negligence claim was barred by the "Gist of the Action Doctrine" and that no other duties or obligations existed between the parties, under all of the circumstances?

5. Did the Lower Court err when it determined that the actions of all of the Appellees, under all of the circumstances, were not sufficient to support an action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress?

Appellant's brief at 7.1

¶ 6 Our standard and scope of review over a trial court's decision to sustain a litigant's preliminary objections are well-settled:

Our standard of review mandates that on an appeal from an order sustaining preliminary objections which would result in the dismissal of suit, we accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the Appellant['s] complaint and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. This standard is equally applicable to our review of PO's in the nature of a demurrer. Where, as here, upholding sustained preliminary objections would result in the dismissal of an action, we may do so only in cases that are clear and free from doubt. To be clear and free from doubt that dismissal is appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law would not permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred. Any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the objections.

We review for merit and correctness—that is to say, for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. This case was dismissed at the preliminary objections stage on issues of law; our scope of review is thus plenary.

Donahue v. Federal Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 241 (Pa.Super.2000), quoting Ellenbogen v. PNC Bank N.A., 731 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa.Super.1999).

¶ 7 Appellant contends Allegheny breached its contract with her by failing to follow its promised internal procedure for disposing of academic misconduct claims. She further contends Allegheny breached the contract by conducting the process in a "flawed, biased, and unfair" manner.

¶ 8 The relationship between a privately funded college and a student has traditionally been defined in this Commonwealth as strictly contractual in nature. Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122, 122 A. 220, 221 (1923); see also, Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F.Supp. 147, 152 (M.D.Pa.1978). As such, we review the agreement between the parties concerning disciplinary procedures, contained within a portion of the student handbook known as The Compass, as we would any other agreement between two private parties. See Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 777 A.2d 418, 428 (2001).2 "When a contract so specifies, generally applicable principles of contract law will suffice to insulate the institution's internal, private decisions from judicial review." Id. at 429.

¶ 9 Appellant does not contend the language of The Compass is ambiguous.3 See generally, Murphy, supra at 429 ("When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone."), quoting Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White, 451 Pa. 137, 302 A.2d 347, 351 (1973) (additional citation omitted). Rather, she contends Allegheny breached its promised procedure by failing to notify her of a preliminary hearing held by the Honors Committee panel. Appellant's brief at 14, 21.

¶ 10 A thorough review of The Compass reveals the Honors Committee had an express obligation to inform appellant of the hearing that was held to determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that she committed an Honors Code violation. Record, No. 12, Amended Complaint, Exb. 1, The Compass ("The Panel shall inform the accused student(s) of the time and place of the hearing."). Appellant avers she was not notified of an Honors Committee hearing held on September 1, 2004. Record, No. 12 at 8. Appellee contends appellant was given notice of, and indeed did attend, an Honors Committee hearing held on May 1, 2004. Appellees' brief at 14 n. 7. Appellee further states the September 1, 2004, hearing pertained to the plagiarism allegations leveled against Miller and Reilly and, as such, appellant was not entitled to attend that meeting. Id. at 15.

¶ 11 A thorough review of appellant's amended complaint reveals appellant acknowledges a hearing did take place on May 1, 2004. Record, No. 12 at 8. In a not so creative attempt at subterfuge, appellant contends over and over again that she was not informed of the September 1, 2004, hearing, yet she never once states she did not receive notice of the May 1, 2004 hearing.4 The terms of The Compass do not give an accused student the right to attend a preliminary hearing held by the Honors Committee pertaining to charges leveled at a co-defendant, irrespective of the nature of the testimony and evidence to be offered at such a hearing. See Record, No. 12, Exb. 1. Furthermore, there is nothing in The Compass stating that a defendant is entitled to more than one preliminary hearing—the pertinent provisions unambiguously states the Honors Committee is required to hold "a" hearing. Id.

¶ 12 Appellant also attacks the actual proceedings themselves by forwarding a laundry list of complaints, wherein she contends Allegheny breached The Compass procedures in the following manner: 1) allowing attendance at various meetings by people who should have not attended; 2) allowing prejudicial and biased statements to be made by Professor Nelson prior to the CJB hearing; 3) failing to conduct an impartial hearing by allowing various members of the CJB to make unsupported statements; 4) allowing a committee member to improperly provide assistance to a witness against Reardon; 5) allowing confidential information about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings to be leaked to the college community; and 6) by failing to retrieve potentially exculpatory evidence from appellant's student computing account.

¶ 13 Assuming,...

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