Reardon v. Country Club at Coonamessett, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 February 1968
• Citation: 353 Mass. 702,234 N.E.2d 881
• Parties: Marguerite G. REARDON v. The COUNTRY CLUB AT COONAMESSETT, INC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 881

234 N.E.2d 881

353 Mass. 702

Marguerite G. REARDON v. The COUNTRY CLUB AT COONAMESSETT, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Feb. 7, 1968.

Decided Feb. 29, 1968.

William C. O'Neil, Jr., Worcester, for defendant.

Walter J. Griffin, Worcester, for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER and KIRK, JJ.

KIRK, Justice.

In this action of tort for personal injuries, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The sole question before us is whether there was error in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The defendant argues as matter of law that it was not negligent, that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to her injury, and that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury.

We summarize the evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had been regularly playing golf for fifteen or more years, playing approximately once a week during the golf season. She had previously played on the defendant's course only once--about two years before August, 1960. She was familiar with golf courses in general but had no memory of the layout of the defendant's course. On August 19, 1960, she and two companions went to the defendant's course to play a round of golf. They paid their fees and were admitted to the course. At the time of the accident, they had completed their round and were walking toward the parking lot maintained by the defendant.

A gravel path or unimproved road runs from the eighteenth hole parallel to the fairway of the tenth hole to the clubhouse and parking lot. Part of the path is lined with trees and undergrowth on both sides. At a point about eighty yards from the tenth tee, generally in the direction in which balls are hit while playing the tenth hole, the line of trees ends abruptly. As the plaintiff emerged from the tree-lined part of the path, she was hit on the head by a golf ball struck from the tenth tee. The plaintiff testified that she did not see any sign warning of the danger of balls coming from the tenth tee or any screen to protect against such balls. The defendant's manager testified that a sign had been placed in the area 'in 1959 or the spring of 1960' and that a screen had been erected 'to the best of his recollection approximately in June or July of 1960.' In rebuttal, the plaintiff testified that the manager had admitted, when he testified in the District Court, that the screen was not there on August 19, 1960.

The screen appears in photographs which are in evidence but which were taken at various times after the accident. The screen consists of chain-link fencing stretched between a rectangular frame of metal tubing. The bottom of the frame is supported approximately two feet above the ground. The top appears to be approximately six feet off the ground. The screen is solidly and permanently installed and seems well designed to prevent golf balls from flying dangerously onto the path.

In her game on the afternoon of the accident, the plaintiff had played the tenth hold. The tenth hold is a 'dogleg.' The ball is driven in one direction from the tee and then in another direction to reach the green. It would be permissible, however, according to the rules of the game and the rules applicable on the defendant's course, to cut the dogleg angle and direct the ball over the trees in the area where the plaintiff was struck. Some players could be expected to attempt this.

We examine first the sufficiency of evidence of negligence. 'One maintaining a place of amusement who has invited the public to attend upon the payment of an admission fee is bound to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for their use, and to warn them against any dangers which he knows or ought to know they might encounter while upon the premises and which they reasonably could not be expected to know.' Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Assn. Inc., 307 Mass. 102, 104, 29 N.E.2d 716, 718; Jeroma v. McNally, 324 Mass. 385, 387, 86 N.E.2d 638; Farinelli v. Laventure, 342 Mass. 157, 159--160, 172 N.E.2d 825. Applying this rule to the case before us, we think that there was sufficient evidence to reach the jury on...