Rease v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | INC,ANHEUSER-BUSC,No. 92-4192,92-4192 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2231 Janet REASE, Appellant, v., a Missouri corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Scott Thomas Fortune, Atlantic Beach, for appellant.
Eric J. Holshouser and Timothy B. Strong, Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, Jacksonville, for appellee.
Janet Rease appeals a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in her action for damages against Anheuser-Busch for terminating her employment because she pursued workers' compensation benefits. Her action was premised on section 440.205, Florida Statutes (1985). 1 Rease challenges a number of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and contends that this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Because the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Anheuser-Busch's past conduct and statements, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Rease was involved in an industrial accident on August 29, 1985, when she slipped and fell at work, severely injuring her shoulder. She reported the accident to Anheuser-Busch and made a valid claim for workers' compensation benefits.
After a period of recuperation, Rease was returned to work by her treating physician with some limitations and restrictions. Rease testified that on several occasions between her release and December 1985, she was assigned to jobs that exceeded what she understood to be her specific medical restrictions. On one such occasion, in December 1985, Claimant reinjured her shoulder while operating a floor buffer machine and was not permitted by her treating physician to return to work for approximately six months.
Rease was again released to work on "light duty" in late June 1986. However, in July, Rease again complained that she was unable to perform the assigned job without reinjuring her shoulder. As a consequence, she was sent home and remained home until October 1986. During this period, she received physical therapy and saw her treating physician on a regular basis. The evidence is conflicting as to the extent of any physical restrictions or limitations placed on Rease when she was released to return to work in October. However, between October 1986 and July 1987, Rease successfully performed several different jobs at the brewery without problems or further injury to her shoulder.
At the end of July 1987, Rease was requested to operate a filler machine. Although she objected to the assignment, she performed the job and, as a result, was forced to miss three days of work due to a flare-up of her shoulder. When she returned to work, she performed without further injury and missed no work until August 5, 1987.
In the meantime, due to Rease's complaints of inability to perform her job assignments, Anheuser-Busch inquired of her physician about any specific physical restrictions. Based on information ultimately received from the physician's office, the company concluded that there was no acceptable work available for Rease within the advised restrictions. Consequently, on August 5, 1987, Rease was informed that she would not be permitted to work and was sent home. Although Rease continued to search for other jobs, she remained unemployed after August 5, 1987. As a result of her job search, she received workers' compensation wage-loss benefits. In addition, in accordance with company policy, Anheuser-Busch provided Rease with supplementary benefits that equal the difference between the amount of workers' compensation benefits she was receiving and $425 per week.
After unsuccessfully pursuing a grievance against Anheuser-Busch, 2 Rease commenced the present action on August 1, 1991, when she filed a complaint alleging that Anheuser-Busch terminated her employment on August 5, 1987, in violation of section 440.205. Specifically, Rease alleged that Anheuser-Busch began a practice of threatening, intimidating, and coercing her by assigning her to duties beyond her physical restrictions and by repeatedly threatening that she would be sent home without pay if she did not follow orders to perform these duties. Anheuser-Busch filed its answer denying that Rease had been terminated from her employment and asserting, among other things, that Rease's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Anheuser-Busch's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations had run was denied, and the case was set for trial.
Prior to trial, Anheuser-Busch filed five motions in limine, all of which were granted. The trial court's rulings on two of these motions are relevant to this appeal. Anheuser-Busch moved to exclude a July 9, 1991, letter to Rease's workers' compensation attorney from Anheuser-Busch's attorney, E. Robert Williams, wherein Anheuser-Busch stated that it considered Janet Rease "terminated." Anheuser-Busch contended that this letter was written in the context of settlement negotiations involving Rease's workers' compensation claim for benefits and thus was inadmissible under section 90.408, Florida Statutes (1991). The trial court agreed and ruled that the letter and any reference thereto would be inadmissible as part of an offer to compromise a claim.
Anheuser-Busch also sought to prohibit Rease from introducing any evidence of intimidation, coercion, threats, or other conduct on its part occurring before August 1, 1987 (just prior to Rease's alleged discharge), on the ground that any such incidents were barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed with Anheuser-Busch, but it later allowed limited testimony of events occurring before that date leading up to the termination.
On Rease's motion, the trial court addressed whether Anheuser-Busch would be permitted to introduce evidence of Rease's receipt of workers' compensation wage-loss benefits. Rease argued that such evidence was an improper consideration of a collateral source and was irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether Anheuser-Busch violated section 440.205. Anheuser-Busch responded that the "collateral source doctrine" did not apply to this case and that the evidence of Rease's receipt of wage-loss benefits was relevant to the issue of whether she was still an employee. The trial court ruled that Rease's receipt of workers' compensation benefits and their amount was admissible. During trial, Rease renewed her objections to comments and evidence regarding her receipt of these benefits, exclusion of evidence relating to incidents that occurred before August 1987, and exclusion of the July 9, 1991, letter written by E. Robert Williams.
At the close of Rease's case, Anheuser-Busch moved for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages on the ground that there was no factual basis in the record to support such an award. Rease responded that she had been precluded from presenting evidence linking her 1985 injury and her workers' compensation claim to her 1987 discharge, which would have supported her claim for punitive damages. Nevertheless, the court expressly confirmed its previous ruling that evidence of conduct prior to 1987 was inadmissible, even if its admission was sought for the limited purpose of revealing Anheuser-Busch's state of mind. It granted the motion for directed verdict on punitive damages.
During the jury charge conference, conducted prior to closing arguments, Rease requested that the jury be given the standard collateral source rule jury instruction. The court declined to do so. Rease also moved to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, arguing that the parties had tried by consent the issues of coercion and intimidation in addition to the alleged improper termination. The court granted the motion and instructed the jury in a manner that would have permitted the jury to make a finding of liability based on intimidation or coercion alone, without a finding of improper termination. Following its deliberations, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Anheuser-Busch did not discharge Rease by reason of her claim for compensation under the workers' compensation law, did not threaten to discharge Rease by reason of her claim for compensation, and did not intimidate or coerce Rease by reason of her claim for compensation.
On appeal, Rease challenges the court's ruling on the admission of evidence of Rease's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, the court's exclusion of Rease's proffered evidence concerning Anheuser-Busch's conduct commencing immediately after her claim for workers' compensation benefits and leading up to her 1987 discharge, and the court's ruling that the July 9, 1991, letter from E. Robert Williams to Rease's workers' compensation attorney was inadmissible as an offer to compromise a claim.
Regarding Rease's receipt of workers' compensation benefits, Rease argues that the admission of this evidence contravenes the collateral source rule. 3 Rease explains that workers' compensation benefits have traditionally been considered a collateral source, that Anheuser-Busch's status as being self-insured does not change the collateral nature of the benefits, and that the payment of workers' compensation benefits was not probative of whether she had been terminated in violation of section 440.205, since the obligation to pay wage-loss benefits continues even after the employee is terminated. Finally, she contends that, even if the payment of wage-loss benefits was held to be relevant to the issue of termination, the evidence would still be inadmissible because of its potentially prejudicial effect on the jury's determination of liability.
We hold that the collateral source rule does not apply here because the fact of Rease's receipt of benefits was relevant to the issue of Anheuser-Busch's liability. The gravamen of Rease's claim was that she was, if not terminated from her employment, not permitted to work; and she was...
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