Reaves v. State, 79575
| Decision Date | 07 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 79575,79575 |
| Citation | 639 So.2d 1 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly S173 William REAVES, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee, Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jonathan Jay Kirschner of Carbia, Kirschner & Garland, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Sara D. Baggett, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.
William Reaves appeals his conviction for murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The victim, Deputy Sheriff Richard Raczkoski, at or about 3 a.m. on September 23, 1986, responded to a 911 call from a phone booth outside a Zippy Mart near Vero Beach. The deputy acknowledged his arrival at the Zippy Mart and inquired about outstanding warrants on William Reaves. Within minutes of the call, the deputy was found near the phone booth with four gunshot wounds from which he died later that morning. A piece of paper inside the deputy's vehicle had written on it: William Reaves, black male, 4336 38th Avenue, date of birth 12/30/48.
Witness Whitaker, who discovered the deputy, testified that he saw a black man wearing red shorts and a white T-shirt running from the scene in a manner similar to men in Vietnam under fire. (William Reaves served in Vietnam.) Witness Hinton was ruled unavailable to testify, section 90.804(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), and his testimony from the 1987 trial 1 was read into the record. According to Hinton, Reaves, wearing red shorts and carrying a gun wrapped in a white T-shirt, came to his apartment after the shooting and said: Hinton testified that Reaves quoted the deputy as saying, to which Reaves responded, Hinton had no trouble understanding Reaves; his speech was not slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties. Witness Fredell testified that Reaves was wearing red shorts and a white T-shirt on the afternoon prior to the early-morning murder and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Detective Pisani quoted Reaves as stating that while he and the deputy were conversing, a gun fell out of Reaves' shorts. The deputy put his knee on the weapon, Reaves pushed the knee back, picked up the gun, refused to surrender it, and in a panic and "wired on cocaine" shot the deputy as he was running away. Reaves admitted that he emptied the seven-round clip of his .38 when he fired. A firearms expert testified that Reaves' gun was a type that required a pull of the trigger each time it was fired; it was not an automatic.
The jury convicted Reaves of premeditated first-degree murder and recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial judge imposed the death sentence, finding three aggravating circumstances 2 and no statutory mitigating circumstances. The judge found three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 3
Reaves presents sixteen issues, twelve in the guilt phase and four in the penalty phase.
Reaves argues to this Court that several statements made by Hinton, under oath, prior to his 1987 trial testimony, 4 were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991). 5 We agree that Hinton's prior inconsistent testimony should have been admitted, but we find that the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was harmless error. Hinton's inconsistent statements pertained to details and did not repudiate the significant aspects of his testimony.
Reaves challenges the trial judge's rulings regarding jurors Dudley, Hambleton, Mills and Kaplan. In response to Reaves' voir dire questioning, prospective jurors Dudley and Hambleton indicated that they would automatically recommend a death sentence if a person were found guilty of murder. Based on these answers, Reaves asserts that the trial judge's refusal to strike Dudley and Hambleton for cause was an abuse of discretion. Under Bryant v. State, 601 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla.1992), when a venireperson expresses an opinion which indicates a substantial inability to properly perform a juror's duties either the prosecutor or the judge must "make sure the prospective juror can be an impartial member of the jury." Our reading of the record shows that both Hambleton and Dudley were properly rehabilitated by the judge and State Attorney respectively 6 and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's denial of Reaves' challenge for cause relative to these jurors.
Reaves further avers that the court improperly granted the state's challenge for cause regarding prospective juror Mills. During voir dire, Mills expressed reluctance in her ability to sentence someone to death, yet she also indicated that she could follow the judge's instructions relevant to a capital sentencing. We have previously held that a trial judge must determine if a prospective juror's opinions will act as an impediment in the proper performance of her duties. Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 694 (Fla.1990). Our review of the record shows that the court granted the state's challenge based on what it considered Mills' "at best" equivocal answers. We find that the transcript fairly and adequately supports the trial judge's findings and there was no abuse of discretion.
Reaves argues that the court erred by allowing the state to peremptorily challenge, in a racially discriminatory way, Kaplan, the panel's sole Jewish member. We find Reaves' contest of prospective juror Kaplan meritless. Nothing in the record indicates, nor proves that the state used Kaplan's racial or religious background as grounds for challenge. The record indicates that the state's challenge was based on what it perceived as Kaplan's misunderstanding of the burden of proof. Accordingly, we find no error in the court's granting of the challenge.
Reaves argues that the trial judge erred when he refused to admit evidence of "Vietnam Syndrome" in the guilt phase of the trial to support his "excusable homicide" defense. 7 We find no error. We said in Bunney v. State, 603 So.2d 1270, 1273 & n. 1 (Fla.1992), that "evidence of certain commonly understood conditions that are beyond one's control ... should also be admissible" in the guilt phase of the trial; but "evidence relating to a general mental impairment or other esoteric condition" is not. There is no evidence in this record to support Reaves' assertion that "Vietnam Syndrome" is a commonly understood condition; it therefore was properly excluded in the guilt phase. We find, moreover, that even if this evidence's exclusion was error, it was harmless. There is no reasonable possibility that it would have affected the jury's verdict. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
Reaves argues that the state attorney's office should have been disqualified from prosecuting him on his retrial. We disagree. The trial judge found that Reaves was properly shielded from his former prosecutor, Mr. Colton (who was earlier Reaves' public defender). The judge's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and we affirm them.
Reaves raises several issues regarding the trial judge's denial of his motions for mistrial based on alleged errors in the prosecutor's closing argument. First, he brings to our attention the fact that the prosecutor referred to him as a "cocaine seller." This reference was indeed error, but it was not made a feature of the trial and we find it harmless. 8 DiGuilio. Reaves next complains that the prosecutor made a prohibited golden rule argument when he said: The trial judge interrupted and directed the jury to disregard the statement and directed the prosecutor not to put the jury "in any position." Thus the error was immediately cured. Singularly or cumulatively, these errors fall short of the standard for granting a reversal: Whether the error was so prejudicial as to "vitiate the entire trial." State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955, 956 (Fla.1984).
Reaves also argues that prosecutor counsel acted improperly when he "portrayed the slain deputy speaking from the grave." We find no error when this assertion is viewed in context: Defense counsel argued in closing that it made no sense for Reaves to shoot the deputy because the deputy had already phoned in a warrant check on Reaves; the logical conclusion therefore was that the murder was not premeditated. We find that the prosecutor's assertion, that the deputy was the only person who could say from a witness stand that Reaves was the person who shot him at the Zippy Mart, was proper rebuttal; it reminded the jury that Reaves had a motive to kill the deputy.
Reaves raises as his sixth claim that the introduction of evidence that he attempted to sell cocaine was error. The state...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Braddy v. State
...(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion by grouping thirty-four proposed mitigators into single category); Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1994) (holding that trial court reasonably consolidated several proposed mitigating factors into three categories). 11. Braddy first obj......
-
Muhammad v. State
...San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841, 119 S.Ct. 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998); Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1994); Randolph v. State, 562 So.2d 331, 337 C. Proceeding Regarding a Witness Held Outside the Defendant's Presence In this point on......
-
Looney v. State
...proof of Looney's guilt.17 The erroneous admission of Hathcock's testimony would in no way "vitiate the entire trial." See Reaves v. State, 639 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1994). Therefore, after careful review of this record, we hold that the introduction of the challenged statement was harmless beyon......
-
State v. Johnson
...and four shots into his bulletproof vest, killing did not satisfy heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstances); Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 990, 115 S. Ct. 488, 130 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1994) (where defendant fired seven shots at deputy sheriff, strik......