Reaves v. State
Citation | 485 So.2d 829,11 Fla. L. Weekly 150 |
Decision Date | 03 April 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 66436,66436 |
Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 150 James REAVES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
James H. Greason, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Richard E. Doran, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.
We accepted jurisdiction of Reaves v. State, 458 So.2d 53 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), based on asserted conflict with Nowlin v. State, 346 So.2d 1020 (Fla.1977). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. On closer examination, it is clear that there is no direct and express conflict and that review was improvidentially granted.
The facts of the case are drawn from the district court opinion below. When first arrested following a lethal stabbing, petitioner received and invoked his Miranda 1 right to remain silent. When approached by a second officer shortly thereafter, petitioner agreed to talk and made several inculpatory admissions. Thereafter, petitioner received additional Miranda warnings enroute to and upon arrival at the police station and made another statement after the latter (fourth) Miranda warning. The trial court suppressed the statements as involuntary and the state was not permitted to use them in its case-in-chief. However, at trial, petitioner took the stand and testified contrary to the admissions he had made to the second police officer. Upon motion of the state, the trial court ruled that its earlier use of "involuntary" in suppressing the statements had been inadvertent and that the statements had been suppressed because the police had violated Miranda by persisting in their questioning after petitioner invoked his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the state was permitted to use the suppressed admissions to the second police officer to impeach petitioner's trial testimony. 2 The district court reviewed the record, recited the facts it found pertinent, and held that the admissions were voluntary, even though suppressible under Miranda from use in the case-in-chief, and that the trial court did not err in permitting their use in impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1974).
The district court decision correctly states and applies the law based on the facts given. 3 However, in dissent, Judge Hendry canvassed the record and concluded, contrary to the majority, that the statements were in fact involuntary and could not be used in impeachment. Petitioner is asking that we find conflict with Nowlin. In order to do so, it would be necessary for us either to accept the dissenter's view of the evidence and his conclusion that the statements were involuntary, or to review the record itself in order to resolve the disagreement in favor of the dissenter. Neither course of action is available under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Shelly v. State
...be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision " of the district court . Reaves v. State , 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986) (emphasis added). The jurisdictional rationale suggested by the majority fails this well-settled requirement.According to t......
-
Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc.
...of the majority decisions. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish jurisdiction. Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1986). When placed side-by-side, the facts set out in Sibley and the facts set out in the majority opinion in the district court in this ......
-
Dotson v. Buss
...§ 3. The conflict "must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision." Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986); cf Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980) ("This Court may only review a decision of a district court of appeal......
-
Newton v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp.
...[was] mere obiter dicta "). Also, the conflict must "appear within the four corners of" the district court's decision. Reaves v. State , 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986).The majority has accepted this case on the basis of alleged conflict between Newton v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corp ......