Reaves v. Superior Court for San Joaquin County
| Citation | 97 Cal.Rptr. 866,20 Cal.App.3d 700 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 19 October 1971 |
| Parties | Willie C. REAVES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Respondent; L. N. PATTERSON, Superintendent of Deuel Vocational Institution, Real Party in Interest. Gerald C. WHITEHEAD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Respondent; L. N. PATTERSON, Superintendent of Deuel Vocational Institution, Real Party in Interest. John VILLALOBOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Respondent; L. N. PATTERSON, Superintendent of Deuel Vocational Institution, Allen F. Breed, Director of California Youth Authority, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 13094 to 13096. |
B. E. Bergesen, III, San Francisco, for petitioners.
James Jablonski, Prison Lawyers Association, Sacramento, Amicus Curiae.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., by Daniel J. Kremer and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for real parties in interest.
These consolidated cases involve petitioners who are seeking, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, a writ of mandate directing the Superior Court of San Joaquin County to adopt new and different procedures for the processing of petitions for extraordinary writs. Petitioners contend the present procedures violate certain provisions of the United States and California Constitutions and laws of this state. They also seek to mandate the superior court to forthwith hear and determine, in accordance with valid procedures, the three petitions involved herein and all future petitions.
The petitioners are confined at the Deuel Vocational Institution and have filed petitions for either a writ of mandate or habeas corpus which were denied by the respondent superior court.
At the time of the denial of these petitions, and at the present time, the respondent superior court utilized the following procedures with regard to extraordinary writs: After the filing of the petitions for a writ, it is reviewed by the judge presiding in the criminal department and is then forwarded to the district attorney's office so that any factual information can be verified, or if any additional factual information is necessary, that information can be obtained. 1 The district attorney's office is then requested to prepare a proposed order based upon the factual information contained in the petition or obtained as a result of their inquiries. This is done in a majority of the cases. If the petition presents an unusual factual situation, these matters are brought to the attention of the presiding judge of the criminal department who reviews the entire matter, and then directs the district attorney's office to prepare a specified order. In those matters where the district attorney's office submits a proposed order, the judge reviews such order and the order is either signed as submitted or signed as modified. In some instances the court will prepare the order itself. The assigned district attorney usually discusses the results of his investigation with the judge at the time of submitting the file unless the proposed order is a routine matter where the information in the prepared order is self-explanatory.
Petitioners first contend that the writ of mandamus is a proper remedy in this case. It is petitioners' contention that although the superior court is acting upon extraordinary writ petitions, it is not doing so in substance, and that the constitutional and statutory duty imposed upon the court to hear and determine such matters has effectively been transferred to the district attorney. Thus, it argues, such a situation may be remedied by mandamus. (See Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507, 517-518, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729, 476 P.2d 97; Robinson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 379, 383, 218 P.2d 10.)
In a similar vein, petitioners allege that they have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy other than this mandamus petition since the appeal process is not timely where the protection of constitutional rights is involved. Secondly, petitioners maintain that continued filings of petitions in the respondent court would be a futile act because of the procedures followed. (Cf. Robinson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d at pp. 383-384, 218 P.2d 10.) Thirdly, petitioners maintain the issue presented herein is of great public interest, and point out that these actions are brought as class actions, on behalf of themselves and all other inmates of Deuel whose petitions must be submitted, in the first instance, to the respondent court. (See Alden v. Superior Court (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 764, 268, 28 Cal.Rptr. 387.) 2
The respondent court 3 attacks the petitioners' position on two grounds. It argues that the present matter may not be raised by writ of mandate; that the appropriate manner to seek review from the denials of the writs should be through the delineated procedures governing habeas corpus, a remedy which has been deemed to be speedy, adequate and, in instances such as the present, exclusive in nature. (See Pen.Code, §§ 1473, 1474; Leach v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 531, 536, 12 P.2d 1.)
Secondly, respondent court contends that a representative suit is improper since the community interest is lacking. Petitioners have filed petitions for writ of mandate as individual parties and 'on behalf of all others similarly situated.' They state that the class is composed of all persons who are confined at Deuel Vocational Institution under the jurisdiction of either the California Department of Corrections or the California Youth Authority. Respondent court argues, however, that petitioners have failed to establish that all of the inmates confined at Deuel have filed petitions for extraordinary writs in the San Joaquin County Superior Court and have been denied relief. It contends that only those inmates whose petitions were wrongfully denied could classify as party plaintiffs, and concludes that a respresentative suit is improper here since the legal and factual differences do not meet the requirement for a community of interest.
We reject both contentions. Respondent court's first contention overlooks the precise relief petitioners are trying to attain. Petitioners are alleging that the court is employing unconstitutional procedures in processing extraordinary writs. This case does not concern the three individual petitions denied by the superior court except insofar as the procedures utilized in denying such writs are in issue. Further, petitioners have brought this action not only on behalf of themselves but on behalf of all of the inmates at Deuel. Thus, the relief requested extends to all future filings, and the mere refiling in this court of the three petitions would not be adequate as to such future filings. (Cf. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 286, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158.) We think the petitioners have made a sufficient showing that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (See United Farm Workers etc. Committee v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d at p. 769, 62 Cal.Rptr. 567.) Mandamus is therefore proper.
We also reject respondent court's argument that this is not a proper representative suit since there was no showing that all of inmates at Deuel had filed petitions and had them rejected. Again, the thrust of these petitions is that the court has used improper procedures in reviewing writs and will continue to do so in the future. The community of interest which members of the class share is simply that the respondent superior court henceforth act upon all petitions received from class members in a constitutional manner. We hold that this is a proper class action. (See Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809-810, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964.)
Turning to the crux of the matter, i. e., whether the procedures employed by respondent court, as described above, are legally proper, petitioners argue that the procedure adopted by the respondent superior court violates the California constitutional provision against the delegation of judicial functions. (Cal.Const., art. III; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 326, 109 P.2d 935; see also, People v. Bird (1931) 212 Cal. 632, 640, 300 P. 23 [].) Petitioners contend the superior court has in effect abdicated its responsibility to determine both the facts and the law, and has transferred this judicial responsibility to an officer who stands in an adverse position to the petitioners. (Cf. Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140; People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.)
Secondly, petitioners argue the procedure used by the court is violative of various statutory provisions governing mandate and habeas corpus. (See, e. g., Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1086, 1090, 1091; Pen.Code, §§ 1476, 1483, 1484.) They argue that where a petitioner alleges facts, which, if true, would entitle petitioner to some relief, the petition may not be denied 'out of hand,' and the court must grant the writ or issue an order to...
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