Rechberger v. Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners
Decision Date | 04 April 2019 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA0474 |
Citation | 454 P.3d 355 |
Parties | David RECHBERGER; Nicollette Munson; Rolf Munson; Laurel Hyde Boni; Dinah McKay; Donald Sherwood ; William Swafford, Jr.; Marilyn Kepes; Donald Wrege; and Douglas Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOULDER COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Boulder County Housing Authority, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Chipman Glasser, LLC, David S. Chipman, John M. Bowlin, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Benjamin Pearlman, County Attorney, David Hughes, Deputy County Attorney, Catherine Ruhland, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
¶ 1 Plaintiffs David Rechberger, Nicollette Munson, Rolf Munson, Laurel Hyde Boni, Dinah McKay, Donald Sherwood, William Swafford, Jr., Marilyn Kepes, Donald Wrege, and Douglas Johnson appeal the district court’s order dismissing their complaint against defendants, the Boulder County Board of County Commissioners (the County) and the Boulder County Housing Authority (BCHA), for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.
¶ 2 Plaintiffs alleged that the County reneged on promises it made in a 1993 campaign to solicit support for a referred ballot measure raising taxes for the purchase and maintenance of "open space" around their community.
¶ 4 Asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraudulent conveyance of the Twin Lakes Property, and declaratory and mandamus relief, plaintiffs requested (1) declarations that the County has an obligation to "match up to $1.9 million of GPID residents' contribution," that the County has failed to do so, and that the Twin Lakes Property purchase was the purchase of "open space within the GPID boundaries on behalf of and for the benefit of the GPID"; and (2) specific performance of the County’s contractual obligations by ordering it to "purchas[e] back the Twin Lakes Property [from the BCHA] with the remaining funds owed to GPID and dedicating it as open space"; or, in the alternative, (3) a writ of mandamus to be issued compelling the County to either (a) satisfy its remaining funding obligation to the GPID to purchase, within one year, open space within the GPID; or (b) pay damages for breach of contract.
¶ 5 The County and the BCHA moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction) and C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) ( ). The district court granted the County’s motion, ruling that plaintiffs (1) lacked standing to pursue, and failed to state, claims for breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance; (2) were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), sections 24-10-106, - 108, and - 118, C.R.S. 2018, from pursuing their fraudulent conveyance claim; and (3) otherwise failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted for promissory estoppel and declaratory or injunctive relief.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint. Because we conclude that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any of their claims, we disagree. See Laleh v. Johnson , 2017 CO 93, ¶ 24, 403 P.3d 207 ( ); Steamboat Springs Rental & Leasing, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver , 15 P.3d 785, 786 (Colo. App. 2000) ().
¶ 7 Standing is a threshold, jurisdictional issue that presents a question of law that we review de novo. Ainscough v. Owens , 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004). "Whether a plaintiff has standing depends on whether the plaintiff has alleged an injury-in-fact and, if so, whether the injury is to a legally protected or cognizable interest." Rangeview, LLC v. City of Aurora , 2016 COA 108, ¶ 8, 381 P.3d 445.
¶ 8 In determining whether a plaintiff has alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing, an appellate court considers the allegations in the complaint, as well as testimony and other documentary evidence in the record. Id. at ¶ 11 ; see Marks v. Gessler , 2013 COA 115, ¶ 88, 350 P.3d 883 ().
¶ 9 Initially, we note that plaintiffs' substantive claims — for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraudulent conveyance — share one focal point, i.e., plaintiffs' asserted right to enforce a purported promise made to them by a governmental entity in the course of a campaign to effectuate a proposed tax increase.
¶ 10 Ordinarily, "to support standing, a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that plaintiff has a personal stake in the alleged dispute and that the alleged injury is particularized as to the plaintiff." Grossman v. Dean , 80 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2003). But plaintiffs' asserted injuries here are no different than those suffered by other individuals who had voted for the proposed tax increases.1
¶ 11 Although Colorado permits "broad taxpayer standing," this doctrine typically applies when plaintiffs allege constitutional violations. See Ainscough , 90 P.3d at 856 ( ); see also Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. , 2014 CO 77, ¶ 11 n.10, 338 P.3d 1002 ; Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 247 (Colo. 2008) ( )(emphasis added). Plaintiffs alleged no constitutional violations;2 consequently, they do not have "taxpayer standing" to sue.
¶ 12 Nor do plaintiffs have standing as voters. They do not allege that they were denied the right to vote, that their votes were diluted, or that their right to vote was otherwise infringed upon, apart from having unfulfilled expectations regarding the consequences flowing from their votes.
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...as well as testimony and other documentary evidence in the record." Rechberger v. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 2019 COA 52, ¶ 8, 454 P.3d 355, 357. "Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue is a question of law that we review de novo." Barber , 196 P.3d at 245.¶34 Because Stanczyk and ......
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Rule 12 DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS — WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED — BY PLEADING OR MOTION — MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS.
...increase because those expectations are not legally protected or cognizable interests. Rechberger v. Boulder County Comm'rs, 2019 COA 52, 454 P.3d 355. Permission to amend should be given where there is possibility of adequate statement of claim. While a judgment of dismissal for failure to......