Recktenwald v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.

Decision Date05 November 1906
Citation97 S.W. 557,121 Mo. App. 595
PartiesRECKTENWALD v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

In an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff, owing to a street car running into his vehicle while plaintiff was driving along the track ahead of the car, defendant requested an instruction that, though the motorman saw plaintiff, he had the right to assume that plaintiff would get across or off the track and out of danger of a collision with the car before it would reach him, and that the motorman was not required to stop the car nor slacken its speed until there was actual danger of a collision. The instruction was given with a modification consisting in adding "if he gave warning of the approach of the car" after the words "had the right to assume." Held, that the modification was proper; a contention that defendant was not required to perform any act looking to the safety of persons on the street until they were found in a perilous position being untenable.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; John G. Park, Judge.

Action by Peter Recktenwald against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John H. Lucas, Ben T. Hardin, and H. H. McCluer, for appellant. Walsh & Morrison and Horace H. Blanton, for respondent.

BROADDUS, P. J.

This action is based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant in the operation of its street car whereby the plaintiff was injured. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff shows that, on the 28th day of March, 1903, while he was driving his vehicle north along Main street in Kansas City, Mo., in close proximity to, and part of the time upon, the tracks of the defendant, he was struck by one of defendant's cars going in the same direction, which had the effect of throwing him from his vehicle, and whereby he was injured. The plaintiff was driving a blind horse, and was sitting between two other persons when the car struck his wagon. He drove unto Main street from Thirty-Third street, and proceeded north until he approached Twenty-Ninth street, at which time there were several other wagons proceeding slowly in the same direction. He was aiming to pass these wagons, and, in doing so, it was necessary for him to approach closely the tracks in question. He was thus traveling part of the time, some witnesses say, with one wheel on the track for a distance of from 100 to 150 feet when, in order to pass the last of said wagons, he pulled onto the track, at which time he was struck by defendant's car. He did not look back at any time for an approaching car, but trusted to his hearing for that purpose. He and his witnesses state that no bell was rung by the motorman until just before the car struck the wagon, and too late to avoid the collision. The car ran about 100 feet before it was stopped. Plaintiff stated that it was inconvenient for him to look back, sitting as he was between the two other persons. At the point in question the street is down grade. The time of the occurrence was daylight, the track in good condition; and it was shown that the car in question could have been stopped in a distance of 50 feet. The defendant's motorman testified that he was ringing the bell, but for another wagon close to the tracks; that he did not see plaintiff's wagon until just before he struck it; and that he stopped the car in about 30 feet after the collision. To the plaintiff's case, as thus made, defendant interposed a demurrer which the court overruled. Plaintiff recovered in the sum of $1,500, from which defendant appealed.

Defendant contends that, as plaintiff could have seen the approaching car, and avoided the injury had he looked, he was guilty of such contributory negligence as precluded his right to a verdict. This claim ignores the negligence of defendant's motorman in failing to see plaintiff's peril after he got upon the tracks in time to have avoided the collision. That is to say: "Where the plaintiff has been negligent a recovery can never be had on account of defendant's mere negligence." The defendant's position in this respect is based upon its construction of the meaning to be given to the ruling in Markowitz v. Railroad, 186 Mo., 350, 85 S. W. 351, 69 L. R. A. 389. It was there held that "a showing of a mere possibility that the accident might have been avoided in spite of plaintiff's contributory negligence is not sufficient to authorize the invocation of the humanitarian doctrine." The holding has no application here, as it was shown that the motorman saw, or could have seen if he had been looking, which it was his duty to do, that plaintiff was in peril and unaware of his danger, in time by the exercise of ordinary precaution to have avoided the collision. The position is sought to be upheld by the holding in Tanner v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Mo. 497, 61 S. W. 826. But there is nothing in that case that tends to support defendant's theory. It is merely a statement of the humanitarian rule which the court holds does not apply under the facts in evidence. In Morgan v. Wabash Railroad Co., 159 Mo. 262, 60 S. W. 195, the humanitarian doctrine was elaborately discussed in an opinion...

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  • Johnson v. Springfield Traction Company
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 11 December 1913
  • Johnson v. Springfield Traction Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 11 December 1913
    ...or admit her own negligence, and it is asserted that this doctrine rests only on conceded negligence, citing Bectenwald v. Railway Co., 121 Mo. App. 595, 601, 97 S. W. 557. Aside from the fact that defendant submitted the same theory by its instruction numbered 6, and cannot now be heard to......
  • Agnew v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 3 June 1907
    ...Co., 119 Mo.App. 358; Campbell v. Railroad, 176 Mo. 174; Oats v. Railroad, 168 Mo. 544; Beier v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 215; Rectenwald v. Railroad, 97 S.W. 557; Cole v. Railroad, 97 S.W. 555; Peterson Transit Co., 97 S.W. 860; Latson v. Transit Co., 192 Mo. 499; Beier v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 21......
  • Everett v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 3 July 1908
    ...182 Mo. 611, 81 S. W. 1134." And the Kansas City Court of Appeals, through Judge Johnson, in the case of Cole v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 121 Mo. App., loc. cit. 612, 97 S. W. 557, has well expressed the rule in the following language: "The principles of right and justice do not tolerat......
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