Rector v. Price

• Decision Date: 31 May 1822
• Citation: 1 Mo. 198
• Parties: RECTOR v. PRICE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

1 Mo. 198

RECTOR

v.PRICE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

May Term, 1822.

MOTION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CHANCERY.

M'GIRK, C. J.

The case is, that Rector commenced his suit in chancery, before the Chancellor, involving the consideration of a judgment at law; the Chancellor, before his appointment, was of counsel for Price, during the pendency of the proceedings at law. The Legislature, at their June session, 1821, passed an act, directing the Chancellor in cases where he had been employed as counsel, to certify such causes to the Supreme Court, for their adjudication and determination. In this case, there has been no decision or decree. The Chancellor refuses to certify the proceedings and cause to this Court, on the ground, that the Constitution of the State, vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction only; and that, until there has been an adjudication in the cause, no appellate jurisdiction can attach. The application is to the authority of this court, to bring the cause by certiorari. This application is resisted on the part of the Constitution (art. 5. sec. 2), which says, the Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise directed by this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive with the State, under the restrictions and limitations in this Constitution provided. The application is supported by the 3d section, same article, which says: The Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts of law. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas carpus mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same.

We will first consider the effect and extent of the words. The Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise directed by this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only. If this clause did not contain an exception, then there could not well be any doubt about the meaning of the clause; but, as it is, it must be construed to mean what it says, and that is, that the Supreme Court can only act, where there has been, in some inferior court, an adjudication in the cause. But the exception is, that, although this is the general office and end of the court, yet, cases may exist, where they shall exercise original jurisdiction, and the genus of those cases is pointed out by the Constitution itself.

We will now consider the case contemplated by the exception, which will be found in the 3d section of the above article; which is, that the Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control, &c. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, &c., and to hear and determine the same. Here, the exception to the court's appellate jurisdiction only, is satisfied and filled up, and there is nothing also in the Constitution, with respect to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which directs otherwise. This direction, with respect of these writs, is clearly otherwise than the exercises of appellate jurisdiction only. Granting,...