Rector v. Teed

• Decision Date: 24 June 1890
• Citation: 24 N.E. 1014,120 N.Y. 583
• Parties: RECTOR, ETC., OF ST. MARK'S CHURCH v. TEED.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

120 N.Y. 583

24 N.E. 1014

RECTOR, ETC., OF ST. MARK'S CHURCH

v.TEED.

Court of Appeals of New York,

Second Division.

June 24, 1890.

Appeal from an order of the general term of the supreme court, in the second judicial department, reversing a judgment entered upon the decision of the court at special term.

Action on a written instrument whereby the defendant promised to pay to the plaintiff, a religious corporation, the sum of $500. The answer alleged that said promise to pay was made without any consideration,-good, valuable, or otherwise,-and that it is of no force or effect. Upon the trial it appeared that on February 1, 1875, one Lewis T. Wright died, leaving a last will and testament, which in due time was presented for probate to the surrogate of the proper county by the defendant, who was the executor named therein. Objections to the probate of the will were filed by Thomas Wright, the only brother, heir at law, and next of kin of the decedent. On the 14th of April, 1875, while the issue was on trial, the defendant, desiring that the contest should be withdrawn, made an arrangement with Thomas Wright, whereby the latter agreed to withdraw his opposition to the probate of the will, provided the former would pay the plaintiff the sum of $500 ‘in the manner, at the time, on the conditions, and for the purpose expressed in the undertaking or obligation hereinafter set forth.’ The defendant agreed to and accepted said terms of compromise, and thereupon, executed and delivered the following instrument, viz.: ‘For value received, I hereby promise to pay to Saint Mark's Church, New Castle, Westchester county, the sum of five hundred dollars. It is understood that said church will appropriate the interest of said money to the improvement, adornment, and care-taking of the church-yard of said church; but the payment thereof shall not be exacted till the decease of Thomas Wright. It is further understood that, upon the execution and delivery, by the residuary legatees named in the will of Lewis Wright, of a written agreement or a sufficient promise to bind them, instead of the undersigned, to the above, then this writing shall be destroyed, or delivered to the undersigned. CHAS. G. TEED. In presence of LEWIS C. PRATT. Dated April 14th, 1875.’ In consideration of the execution and delivery of this agreement by the defendant, said Thomas Wright withdrew his objections to the probate of the will, which was immediately admitted to probtae; and letters testamentary were issued to the defendant thereon. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had any interest in the estate of said decedent, either through the will or otherwise, but one ground of objection to the probate was that the testator had agreed to leave $500 to the plaintiff. The legatees were relatives of the defendant, and on their account he desired that the contest should be abandoned. Said instrument was duly delivered to the plaintiff, and it has ever since been the lawful owner and holder thereof. Thomas Wright died September 20, 1882; and said agreement has never been complied with by the residuary legatees, nor performed by the defendant. The trial judge, after finding the foregoing facts, in substance, found as a conclusion of law that the complaint should be dismissed with costs.

POTTER, J., dissenting. Affirming 44 Hun, 349.

William H. Robertson, for appellant.

Walter Edwards, for respondent.

VANN, J.

The question presented for decision by this appeal is whether the instrument upon which the action was brought is supported by a consideration that the law recognizes as sufficient. ‘A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.’ 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 831; Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Exch. 162; Chit. Cont. (9th Amer. Ed.) 29; 2 Kent, Comm. 465. It is not essential that the person to whom the consideration moves should be benefited, provided the person from whom it moves is, in a legal sense, injured. The injury may consist of a compromise of a disputed claim, or forbearance to exercise a legal right; the alteration in position being regarded as a detriment that forms a consideration, independent of the actual value of the right forborne. Thomas Wright, as the sole heir at law and next of kin of the...