Recycling Sciences Intern. v. Soil Restoration
| Decision Date | 09 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 C 0311.,00 C 0311. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | RECYCLING SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. SOIL RESTORATION AND RECYCLING L.L.C., et al. Defendants. |
Mark Daniel Roth, Keith Harold Orum, Dvorak & Orum, Chicago, IL, for Recycling Sciences Intern., Inc.
David Lee Applegate, David A. Gottardo, Olson & Hierl, Chicago, IL, David C. Higney, John P. Konvalinka, Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C., Chattanooga, TN, for Soil Restoration and Recycling, L.L.C., Southwest Soil Remediation, Inc., Four Seasons Environmental, Inc.
Philip Scott Beck, Chris J. Lind, Andre M. Pauka, Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott, Chicago, IL, for Raytheon Co.
Donald William Rupert, Douglas M. Eveleigh, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, IL, for Cedarapids, Inc., Carlo Environmental Technologies, Inc.
Frederick H. Cohen, Carrie M. Garcia, Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd., Chicago, IL, John G. Jackson, Chambliss, Bahner & Stophel, Chattanooga, TN, for Astec Industries, Inc.
William T. McGrath, Davis, Mannix & McGrath, Chicago, IL, George P. Coughlin, Dysart, Taylor, Lay, Cotter and McMonigle, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for Tarmac Environmental Co., Inc.
John F. Flannery, Mark Warren Hetzler, Edward Emmett Clair, Fitch, Even, Tabin & Flannery, Chicago, IL, Mark S. Graham, Michael T. Lukon, Luedeka, Neeley & Graham, P.C., Knoxville, TN, for IT Group, Inc.
Joseph P. Della Maria, Jr., Alan S. Madans, Kenneth P. Taube, Rothschild, Barry & Myers, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Foster Wheeler Corp.
Russell M. Pelton, Jr., Michael A. Chabraja, Colleen Young Kraus, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, IL, for Williams Environmental Services, Inc.
David Lee Applegate, David A. Gottardo, Olson & Hierl, Chicago, IL, Lester Julian Savit, Tina M. Tabacchi, Kevin Patrick
Ferguson, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Chicago, IL, for O'Brien & Gere Technical Services, Inc.
Plaintiff, Recycling Sciences International, a Delaware corporation having its sole place of business in Chicago, Illinois, commenced an action against several defendants, alleging patent infringement. Before this Court are two defendants' Motions to Dismiss and/or Motions to Transfer Venue.
Defendant, Williams Environmental Systems, Inc. (Williams), seeks dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of proper venue. In the alternative, Williams seeks a transfer of the cause to the Northern District of Georgia.
Williams is a corporation organized under the laws of Georgia with its principal place of business in Stone Mountain, Georgia. Williams is an environmental remediation contractor. Williams has no employees who reside or have offices located within Illinois and has never performed any remediation services in Illinois. Williams filed tax returns in the State of Illinois for the years 1996 through 1999 that reflect no income attributable to business activity within Illinois. Williams bid on projects within Illinois in 1998 and 1999 based on requests received from potential Illinois customers.1 Williams' bids were never accepted. In 1994, Williams received $102,000 from an Illinois business that leased some equipment from Williams.
Plaintiff alleges patent infringement; therefore, Federal Circuit law is controlling with deference given to the state's highest court to determine whether a defendant is amendable to process in the forum state. LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, 232 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (LSI Indus.). The determination of whether a court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is governed by a two-prong analysis: (1) a defendant must be amendable to process in the forum state, and (2) the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant must comply with federal due process requirements. LSI Indus., 232 F.3d at 1371.
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. When the court rules on a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, the court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Michael J. Neuman & Assoc. v. Florabelle Flowers, Inc., 15 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir.1994); In re Cardizem, 105 F.Supp.2d 618, 671 (E.D.Mich.2000).
A defendant is amenable to service of process if it "could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district is located." Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). The instant case is brought in the Northern District Federal Court; therefore, defendants' amenability to service is governed by the Illinois long-arm statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a).
Section (b)(4) of the Illinois longarm statute provides that a court may exercise jurisdiction if the defendant is a "corporation doing business" within the state. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(4). A corporation is "doing business" in Illinois if it operates within the state with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, not just occasionally or casually. Rokeby-Johnson v. Derek Bryant Ins. Brokers, 230 Ill.App.3d 308, 171 Ill.Dec. 670, 594 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (1992) (Rokeby-Johnson). The court looks to the character and extent of the defendant's conduct as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of Illinois. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill.2d 190, 57 Ill.Dec. 730, 429 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1981). The determination is made on a case-by-case basis, based on the unique situation presented. Hulsey v. Scheidt, 258 Ill.App.3d 567, 196 Ill.Dec. 740, 630 N.E.2d 905, 908 (1994).
In the instant case, Williams had leased equipment to an Illinois company in 1994 and received $102,000 from such lease. In addition, Williams has and continues to bid on projects within Illinois. Williams' conduct has been continual for at least a few years and demonstrates that Williams was "doing business" in Illinois.
The limits of due process on the extraterritorial reach of a state are determined by accessing whether the defendant had established "minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). If minimum contacts with the forum state are established, those contacts are considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
1. Minimum Contacts
A defendant may be subject to either specific or general jurisdiction under the "minimum contacts" test. LSI Indus., 232 F.3d at 1375. Specific jurisdiction exists if: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state; (2) the claim arises out of or is related to those activities; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair. HollyAnne v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1307-08 (Fed.Cir.1999) (HollyAnne).
In the instant case, Williams has purposely directed its activities at residents of Illinois as demonstrated by its bids to work on projects in Illinois, one of which included a visit to Illinois. Williams argues that it did not purposely direct its activities at Illinois because it was merely responding to requests from potential Illinois customers, and it never actually conducted any soil remediation services within Illinois. However, Williams did purposely respond to the potential Illinois customers hoping to receive the job within Illinois. See Logan Prod., Inc. v. Optibase, Inc., 103 F.3d 49, 53 (7th Cir.1996) ().
Plaintiff has also satisfied the second prong of the test. The second prong requires that plaintiff's suit arises out of or directly relates to defendant's activities in Illinois. HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1307-08. Plaintiff has filed suit for patent infringement, which occurs when a party "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention". 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Here, Williams offered to sell its services that are alleged to infringe on plaintiff's patent.
Third, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable and fair. This prong encompasses the due process considerations of personal jurisdiction and places the burden on the party over whom jurisdiction is sought to prove that jurisdiction would be constitutionally unreasonable. 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Lab., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed.Cir.1998).
Several factors are generally considered in determining the constitutionally reasonableness of imposing personal jurisdiction: (a) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection; (b) the burden on the defendant in defending the litigation in the forum state; (c) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (d) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (e) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (f) the importance of the interest in convenient and effective relief; and (g) the existence of an alternative forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (Burger King).
Based on these factors, personal jurisdiction over Williams would not be constitutionally unreasonable. Williams has purposefully sought work in Illinois and has leased equipment to an Illinois company. Litigation in Illinois will impose some burden on Williams; but in today's era of Internet communications, telecommunications, faxes, and ease of air travel, requiring the defendant...
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