Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 28 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 980094.,980094.
• Citation: 996 P.2d 540,2000 UT 22
• Parties: RED FLAME, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Samuel D. MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellee. Susan Durrant, Plaintiff, v. Red Flame, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

996 P.2d 540

2000 UT 22

RED FLAME, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Samuel D. MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellee.

Susan Durrant, Plaintiff, v. Red Flame, Inc., Defendant.

No. 980094.

Supreme Court of Utah.

January 28, 2000.

Bryan L. McDougal, Sandy, for Durrant and Martinez.

Scott W. Christensen, Jason M. Kerr, Salt Lake City, for Red Flame.

RUSSON, Justice.

¶ 1 We granted permission for Red Flame to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its complaint against defendant Samuel Martinez. Red Flame sought to offset its liability by allocating Martinez's comparative fault for an automobile accident allegedly caused by Red Flame's service of alcoholic beverages to Martinez. Red Flame filed its complaint after Martinez's girlfriend, Susan Durrant, brought a dramshop action against Red Flame for injuries she suffered in the accident. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This case arises out of an automobile accident in which Martinez drove his vehicle while in an intoxicated condition after consuming alcohol allegedly provided by Red Flame. Durrant, a passenger in his car, was injured. Durrant settled with Martinez's insurer and released all claims against Martinez (whom she married sometime after the accident). She also filed an action against Red Flame pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101, the Dramshop Liability Act. Red Flame initially sought leave to file a third-party complaint against Martinez under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), for the purpose of offsetting its own liability by apportioning Martinez's comparative fault. The court, relying on Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991), held that principles of comparative fault were inapplicable as between an intoxicated driver and a provider of alcohol in an action brought under the Dramshop Liability Act. Red Flame then filed a separate action against Martinez, and the two cases were consolidated and assigned to a different judge. Martinez moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion based on the "law of the case" doctrine. We review that order on interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 3 The trial court dismissed Red Flame's direct action against Martinez because it determined that the legal basis for bringing that action had already been rejected at the time Red Flame brought its motion to file a third-party complaint against Martinez. Based on its interpretation of the law of the case doctrine, the trial judge held it was foreclosed from reconsidering the legal correctness of another judge's ruling on the same legal issue. We first examine the correctness of that ruling.

¶ 4 As a general principle, the law of the case doctrine in this context¹ prevents "one district court judge [from] overrul[ing] another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987). It is not that the second judge lacks power to revisit an earlier judge's rulings. Rather, there are circumstances where that power should not be exercised. See Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 Utah L.Rev. 1, 16-18. In Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 1984), we addressed the general rule and one relevant exception. We stated:

One branch of what is generally termed the doctrine of "law of the case" has evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same case. "[O]rdinarily one judge of the same court cannot properly overrule the decision of another judge of that court." There are several exceptions to this rule. . . . [In this case,] the second judge may reverse the first judge's ruling if the issues decided by the first judge are presented to the second judge in a "different light," as where a summary judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after additional evidence is adduced.

Id. at 736 (citations omitted); see also AMS Salt Indus. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997)

. Then, in State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1989), we noted that an intervening change in circumstances justifying the second judge's departure from the first judge's ruling was not limited to a change in the known relevant facts, but could also include a change in the relevant law. See id. at 1129 (citing Paulson v. Lee, 229 Mont. 164, 745 P.2d 359, 360 (1987); State v. Scott, 68 Or.App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188, 1190-91 (1984)).

¶ 5 Another potential exception to the rule that one judge cannot overrule a prior judge of equal status in the same case may arise where, although the factual and legal posture of the case has not changed, it appears to the second judge that the first ruling was clearly erroneous and will infect the subsequent proceedings with error. See Vestal, 1967 Utah L.Rev. at 16.

¶ 6 The situation before us is not eligible for either exception. Here, the first judge, Judge Dawson, relied on clear language in Reeves to the effect that comparative fault does not apply where dramshop liability is at issue. When the second judge, Judge Bean, was asked to address the issue, the issue was not presented in a different factual or legal light.² Therefore, nothing had changed and the "different light" exception did not apply. Moreover, any plainly erroneous exception would also be unavailable. There was no reason for Judge Bean to believe that this court would retreat from the plain language of Reeves, even if the case before him was not factually on all fours.

¶ 7 We therefore affirm Judge Bean's ruling based on the law of the case doctrine. Nonetheless, because we treat this issue on interlocutory appeal and are remanding for further proceedings, we rely on rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to address the merits of the comparative fault question. ¶ 8 Rule 30(a) provides in relevant part:

The court may . . . order a new trial or further proceedings to be conducted. . . . [T]he court may pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.

Utah R.App. P. 30(a). The present case is unusual, but does fit within the spirit of the rule. If we remand this case for trial without speaking on the comparative fault issue when we are now of the view that Reeves should be overruled, the result will be a trial and an appeal that will produce only a reversal and a new trial. This vast waste of time and money for all concerned is avoided by our announcing the overruling of Reeves. Then, when defendant Red Flame presents the issue again, as it certainly will, the trial court will be free to reconsider the issue because the law will have changed, thus bringing this case squarely within the "different light" exception to the law of the case doctrine. See Sittner, 692 P.2d at 736

.

¶ 9 With respect to the merits of the dramshop issue, we conclude that the Dramshop Liability Act is subject to the dictates of the comparative fault statute. The comparative fault statute in effect at the time this cause of action was brought provided:

"Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission, proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) (1996).³

¶ 10 According to its plain language, the Dramshop Liability Act provides precisely what the comparative fault statute defines: a cause of action for "injury in person, property, or means of support," Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added), based on the dramshop's act of "directly giv[ing], sell[ing], or otherwise provid[ing] an alcoholic beverage" to any of several enumerated classes of persons, id. § 32A-14-101(1)(b), in violation of its legal duty to withhold alcohol from those persons.⁴ The mere fact that the Dramshop Liability Act prescribes a form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence does not exclude it from application of the comparative fault statute. See S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Utah 1996)

. Hence, the Dramshop Liability Act is subject to the provisions of the comparative fault statute. See Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) ("[W]here statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.").

¶ 11 We thus overrule Reeves. Reeves conclusorily held that principles of comparative fault were not applicable as between different dramshops contributing to the same injury, but were applicable as between dramshops and plaintiffs. See Reeves, 813 P.2d at 116-18

. Reeves did not address the question of apportioning fault between dramshops and intoxicated persons causing injuries, nor did it provide any reasoning suggesting which of its two competing rationales would govern that question. Moreover, to the extent Reeves based its holding upon the premise that strict liability cannot be included in comparative fault calculations, that holding is rebutted by the plain language of the comparative fault statute and our subsequent decision in Bistryski.

¶ 12 We affirm the trial court's decision based on the law of the case doctrine. However, on remand, in the event Red Flame brings an otherwise proper motion or action to allocate Martinez's fault, the trial court may consider the effect of our announcement of a change in the governing law. Under that governing law, Red Flame is entitled to apportion Martinez's proportionate share of fault to offset its own liability under the Dramshop Liability Act.

¶ 13 Justice ZIMMERMAN concurs in Justice RUSSON's opinion.

HOWE, Chief Justice, concurring:

¶ 14 I reluctantly concur that the Dramshop Act is subject to the dictates of the...