Red Rock Mental Health v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 15 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 82416,82416
• Citation: 940 P.2d 486
• Parties: , 1997 OK 133 RED ROCK MENTAL HEALTH and State Insurance Fund, Petitioners, v. Karen ROBERTS, Kelly Services and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 486

940 P.2d 486

1996 OK 117, 1997 OK 133

RED ROCK MENTAL HEALTH and State Insurance Fund, Petitioners, v. Karen ROBERTS, Kelly Services and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 82416.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 15, 1996.

As Modified on Grant of Rehearing

May 27, 1997.

Robert Highsaw, Oklahoma City, for Petitioners.

James B. Durant and Kathleen J. Adler, Pierce, Couch, Hendrickson Baysinger & Green, Oklahoma City, for Respondents Kelly Services and CNA Insurance Company.

Matthew J. Graves and John S. Oldfield, Jr., Oldfield & Coker, Oklahoma City, for Respondent Karen Roberts.

OPALA, Justice.

Two issues are tendered on certiorari: Did the three-judge review panel of the Workers' Compensation [WC] Court err in vacating the dismissal of Red Rock as a party respondent? and Did the panel err in crafting sua sponte a reimbursement claim for one employer-respondent against another? We answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative.

I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Karen Roberts [Roberts or claimant] was an employee of Kelly Services [Kelly] assigned to Red Rock Mental Health [Red Rock] as a medical record clerk when, in December 1991, she began to experience pain in her hands (wrists) and arms (elbows). She continued to work for Kelly until March 1992, when she became a full-time worker for Red Rock, in whose employment she remained until July 13, 1992. One month later, Roberts filed a compensation claim (Form 3) (and an amended form in December 1992) for statutory benefits alleged to be due her from Kelly and Red Rock for the cumulative-effect trauma to her hands and arms.

The trial judge's February 16, 1993 order (a) found the claimant's symptoms first occurred in December 1991 and that she was "further exposed" on July 13, 1992; (b) declared Kelly, Red Rock and their insurance carriers "jointly and severally liable" for the claimant's medical expenses; (c) established a compensation rate based on Roberts' salary at Red Rock and (d) reserved for future determination the extent of temporary total disability [TTD] compensation and the "apportionment of liability" for permanent partial disability [PPD]. Both Kelly and Red Rock appealed from this decision. The review panel vacated the order and remanded the claim to the trial judge to "establish the date of the accident."

The trial judge's second (June 18, 1993 ) order, which set in motion the proceedings now under review, (a) dismissed Red Rock from the proceeding as a party respondent; (b) found Roberts sustained an accidental personal injury from cumulative trauma to her hands and arms (elbows), which began in December 1991 and extended to March 10, 1992 (while the claimant was in Kelly's employ); and (c) awarded claimant TTD solely against Kelly. Only Kelly appealed from the June 18 order to the review panel. Its appeal notice urged that (a) it should bear no liability for the claimant's post-Kelly "injurious exposure" to the same body parts and (b) the doctrine of "last injurious exposure" is applicable to this case. Kelly's brief to the panel contends that (a) the liability for claimant's loss should be apportioned between it and Red Rock and (b) if Kelly is the proper employer to respond in benefits, the compensation rates for TTD and PPD should be based solely on Roberts' salary at Kelly.

The panel's September 20, 1993 order on appeal (a) set aside Red Rock's dismissal as a party respondent, (b) affirmed the date of injury established by the trial judge's June 18 order, (c) awarded TTD against Kelly, based on Kelly's wage rate and (d) crafted sua sponte a reimbursement claim by Kelly against Red Rock. ¹ Red Rock then brought The Court of Appeals vacated the panel's order and held that Red Rock was "liable for the injury without right of contribution" because the claimant was last exposed to trauma on July 13, 1992 while employed by Red Rock. The appellate court reasoned that in a cumulative-trauma case the date of injury for imposition of the employer's (and insurance carrier's) liability is the date of the last trauma. ² We granted certiorari and now vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion, modify in part the panel's order and remand the claim for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement.

the review proceeding presently on certiorari.

II THE COURT OF APPEALS' DISPOSITION WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY RED ROCK FOR REVIEW

Roberts' claim against Red Rock is not before us for settlement. The panel's September 20 order, which set aside Red Rock's dismissal from the claim and restored its previous status as a party respondent, made no adjudication of Red Rock's liability for the claimant's alleged job-related injury.

Neither do we have here for review the correctness of (a) the award of TTD against Kelly, (b) the determination of the date of injury (when claimant was in Kelly's employ), or (c) the adjudication of the compensation rate (based on salary earned at Kelly's). This is so because these dispositions became the settled law of the case ³ when Kelly did not appeal from the panel's September 20 order. ⁴ The unreviewable portions of the panel's order may not hence be disturbed.

The Court of Appeals' opinion went beyond the issues presented by Red Rock. Inasmuch as no award or finding of liability has been entered against Red Rock and no proceeding for review was brought by Kelly, the appellate court's declaration of Red Rock's accountability "as a matter of law" and its determination of the "date of injury in a cumulative trauma case" can be viewed as no more than an impermissible enlargement of issues properly within its reviewing cognizance.

Tendered by Red Rock's certiorari petition are two issues--whether there was error (1) in the panel's sua sponte interposition of a TTD reimbursement claim by Kelly against Red Rock and (2) the panel's reinstatement of Red Rock as a party respondent to the claim. We accordingly confine our corrective relief to the tendered questions.

III THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL'S SUA SPONTE INTERPOSITION OF A REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM IS JURISDICTIONALLY INFIRM

The review panel's sua sponte interposition of the reimbursement claim--an issue not pressed by Kelly's notice of appeal--reached beyond the scope of the panel's review. That scope is limited by our case law

and by WC court rules to issues presented in the notice of appeal. ⁵

A. The WC Court Cannot Adversely Affect Red Rock Anterior to an Adjudication of its Liability for Some Compensable Harm to the Employee; Rights Against Red Rock Depend on its Liability for the Claimed Injury

No party-employer may be saddled with any obligation incident to a servant's on-the-job harm until the servant's claim for that injury has been adjudicated. ⁶ The WC court's notion of crafting a sua sponte reimbursement claim against Red Rock must hence be invalidated as sans legislative authority. There is simply no statutory basis for shifting either TTD (or medical-expense) liability to a successor-employer entity which as yet bears no adjudicated obligation for the harm in suit. ⁷ Moreover, the panel-crafted claim is unknown to the forms of relief available in the WC court. The rules of that court provide no form for a reimbursement claim by one employer against another. ⁸

B. The Panel-crafted Reimbursement Claim Is Coram Non Judice ⁹

The WC court is a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction which has only such cognizance as is conferred upon it by law. ¹⁰ Its jurisdiction is confined to determining liability of the employer (and its insurance carrier) towards the claimant. ¹¹ The WC court's range of cognizable claims ¹² is restricted to (a) those asserted by a claimant against the employer for compensable on-the-job harm ¹³ or death ¹⁴ and (b) claims by The jurisdiction of the WC court to make an award upon a claim not arising under the WC law cannot be conferred by agreement, waiver or conduct of the parties. ¹⁷ When the proceedings show on their face that the adjudicated liability is beyond the trial tribunal's cognizance, the order is void pro tanto, i.e., to the extent that the extra-statutory element came to be settled. ¹⁸

                medical providers to successful claimants. 15  In contrast to this restriction, the "unlimited" district court's range of cognizable claims extends to all actions in law and equity. 16
                

The WC court has no jurisdiction to consider a controversy between (a) two insurance companies in which an injured claimant is not interested, ¹⁹ (b) an employer and its insurer unless a claimant's right is affected, ²⁰ or (c) an employer and an insurance carrier of another employer if the statutory liability to the claimant is not implicated. ²¹ Since these excluded claims could not be litigated in the WC court when the district court was merely a tribunal of general jurisdiction, ²² it follows a fortiori that they may not now be entertained there when the district court has become a constitutional tribunal of unlimited jurisdiction. ²³

The WC law creates no reimbursement claim by one employer's carrier against that of another for TTD liability. ²⁴ No common-law claim can lie in the WC court. ²⁵ Neither the trial judge nor the review panel of that court is competent to entertain claims unauthorized by statute.

Although Red Rock did not raise the jurisdictional question in its brief before the Court of Appeals, jurisdictional inquiries into a trial tribunal's cognizance may be re-examined sua sponte, on appellate or certiorari In sum, any claim that does not directly affect a claimant's right to compensation is beyond the jurisdiction of the WC court. We conclude that the review panel impermissibly crafted sua sponte a TTD reimbursement claim by one employer against another.

                review. 26  Lack of jurisdiction is patent on the face of the proceedings in this cause.  The WC court was without cognizance to decide more than the worker's claim against her employers or the latters' insurers
                

IV THE...