Red Rover Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Decision Date | 10 November 1941 |
Docket Number | Civil 4438 |
Citation | 58 Ariz. 203,118 P.2d 1102 |
Parties | RED ROVER COPPER COMPANY, a Corporation, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, and L. L. MOODY, Respondents |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL by Certiorari from an award of The Industrial Commission of Arizona. Award affirmed.
Messrs Perry, Silverthorne & Johnson, for Petitioner.
Mr. Wm H. Chester, Mr. Rouland W. Hill, and Mr. Howard A. Twitty for Respondents.
LOCKWOOD C.J.
This matter is before us on certiorari from an award of the Industrial Commission, in favor of L. L. Moody, petitioner, and against Red Rover Copper Company, a corporation, called the company.
The record before us shows the following facts: In early November, 1940, petitioner applied to the company for employment at its mine. On November 13 he was told by the foreman that if he would sign a rejection of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act he would be employed, but not otherwise. He was also told that he would be insured by Lloyd's of London, and that such insurance was better than state compensation, as it insured him twenty-four hours a day, off and on the job. He signed the rejection and went to work on the following morning, continuing in his employment until November 25, when he was injured by an accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. He was given medical attention and was paid compensation, on the basis of the Lloyd's policy, from the date of his injury, until March 28, 1941. On March 20, 1941, he filed a claim for compensation under the Act with the commission, setting forth his injuries and an affidavit to the effect that he had rejected the Compensation Act because he was told that he could not go to work unless he did so, and that the industrial insurance carried by Lloyd's was better than the state industrial insurance. Due notice of the hearing was given to the company and it was represented thereat. A copy of the Lloyd's policy covering the petitioner was introduced and it clearly appeared therefrom that the benefits thereunder were much less than that provided by the Act for injuries such as the evidence shows petitioner received. The evidence also shows that at the time of the hearing petitioner was still suffering from temporary total disability and his condition had not reached a stationary stage.
The matter was submitted to the commission for decision, and thereafter, and on June 18, 1941, petitioner executed a release, which reads are follows:
This release was never approved by the commission nor did it know that it had been executed until July 21, when the company filed a petition for rehearing.
On July 12 the commission made an award, which contained, among other things, the following findings:
(Signed) Les L. Moody
Les L. Moody
and the usual other findings in regard to injury, wages, etc., which would support the following award in favor of petitioner and against the company:
The petition for rehearing having been denied, the matter is before us. There are three questions arising for our consideration. The first, and most important, is whether the commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction in finding that the rejection of the Compensation Act above referred to was void and not binding upon petitioner. It is urged that such finding and the award necessarily involved the cancellation of a written instrument executed by petitioner, and that the commission, not being a court of equity, had no jurisdiction to take such action. This involves a somewhat extended consideration of our constitutional and statutory provisions covering the Compensation Act. Code 1939, § 56-901 et seq.
Before Arizona became a state the common law rule governed almost entirely the relation between employer and employee, so far as accidents arising out of and in the course of the employment were concerned. Any liability of the employer for such an accident was based on his proven negligence, and he might raise the common law defenses of fellow servant assumption of risk, and contributory negligence as matters of law for the consideration of the court. Our Constitution, following the modern rule which is now in effect in practically every part of the United States, adopted the policy of placing the burden of injuries of this nature upon the industry, and took away the fellow servant defense, and left those of contributory negligence and...
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