Reddick v. Kizakazi
| Decision Date | 07 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-CV-01782 |
| Parties | CYNTHIA REDDICK, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIZAKAZI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Cynthia Reddick (“Reddick”) brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
On August 1, 2019, Reddick protectively filed applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income, claiming disability beginning October 30, 2018. (Doc. 14-7, at 4). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied both applications on December 14, 2019, and upon reconsideration on August 18, 2020. (Doc. 14-2, at 16). On August 25, 2020, Reddick filed a request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Randy Riley held on November 24, 2020. (Doc. 14-2, at 37). In a written opinion dated December 9, 2020, the ALJ determined that Reddick “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act from October 20, 2018 through the date of this decision,” and therefore not entitled to benefits under Titles II or XVI. (Doc. 14-2, at 32). On August 19, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Reddick's request for review. (Doc. 14-2, at 2).
On October 18, 2021, Reddick filed the instant complaint. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on January 12, 2022, providing an answer and the requisite transcripts from Reddick's disability proceedings. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Reddick raising two bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 15; Doc. 20; Doc. 23).
To receive benefits under Titles II or XVI of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”[1]Additionally, to be eligible to receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a)(1), 416.912(a)(1).
The Court's review of a determination denying an application for benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Reddick was disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Reddick was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (). If “the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Reddick “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act from October 30, 2018 through the date of this decision.” (Doc. 14-2, at 32). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At the outset, the ALJ determined that Reddick meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2023. (Doc. 142, at 18).
At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in SGA, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. SGA is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574, 416.974. Here, the ALJ determined that Reddick “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 30, 2018, the alleged onset date.” (Doc. 14-2, at 18). Thus, the ALJ's analysis proceeded to step two.
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his or her “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ analysis continues to the third step. Here, the ALJ concluded that Reddick had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease, systemic lupus erythematous, fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus with neuropathy, obesity, depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. (Doc. 14-2, at 19). In addition, the ALJ determined that Reddick had the following non-severe impairments: hypertension and right lateral epicondylitis. (Doc. 14-2, at 19).
At step three, the ALJ must determine whether an impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). The sections in this appendix are commonly referred to as “listings.” If the ALJ determines that the claimant's impairments meet these listings, then the claimant is considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The ALJ determined that none of Reddick's impairments, considered individually or in combination, meet or equal the severity of a listed impairment. (Doc. 14-2, at 19). The ALJ considered the listings under sections 1.02 (), 1.04 (Disorders of the spine), 11.14 (Peripheral neuropathy), 12.04 (Depressive, bipolar and related disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), 14.02 (Systematic vasculitis), and 14.09 (Inflammatory arthritis). (Doc. 14-2, at 19-22).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), crafted upon consideration of the evidence presented. At this intermediate step, the ALJ considers “all [the claimant's] symptoms . . . and the...
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