Reddick v. State

• Decision Date: 21 January 1889
• Citation: 25 Fla. 433,5 So. 704
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: REDDICK v. STATE.

5 So. 704

25 Fla. 433

REDDICK v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

January 21, 1889

Error to circuit court, Duval county; JAMES M. BAKER, Judge.

MAXWELL J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In all cases where a man is on trial, accused of crime, he has the right to introduce evidence to show his general good character or reputation, but the evidence is to be confined to general reputation, and particular acts of good conduct on the part of the accused cannot be shown in evidence, and the same rule applies to the prosecution. The prosecution cannot put in issue the character of the accused, but, when the accused himself puts his character in issue, the state has the right to introduce evidence in rebuttal to show that the general character of the accused is base, but the evidence so introduced by the state, or evidence brought out on cross-examination by the state, must be confined to the general character of the accused, and, if particular acts of bad conduct on the part of the accused are allowed in proof such proof is illegal, and cause for reversal.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of Henry Churchill, and there was evidence at the trial to show that the name of the deceased was Churchwell, and there was evidence to show that the deceased was as well known by the name of Churchill as by Churchwell, his true name. Held that independent of the names being idem sonans, there was no error in the verdict of conviction.

Where counsel for the accused requested the court to charge the jury, and the charge requested by him had already been (substantially) given by the court, the court was not required to repeat the charge.

COUNSEL Frank W. Pope, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

MITCHELL J.

The plaintiff in error was tried at the spring term of 1886 for the murder of Henry Churchill, and convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. Motion for new trial was entered and overruled, and plaintiff in error sentenced to the state penitentiary for the term of five years, and the case is now before this court upon writ of error.

The first error assigned is: 'The court erred in overruling the objection of counsel for defendant to that part of the testimony of John Ligon, as follows: 'Two years ago I chased defendant out of Georgia. I was deputy-sheriff of Brooks county, in that state, at the time, and had a warrant for his arrest. He was charged with assault with intent to murder. I chased him into Madison county, and there lost track of him.” The record sent to this court shows that the plaintiff in error at the trial introduced evidence tending to show his good character, and it shows that the evidence of John Ligon was introduced by the state in rebuttal of the evidence so introduced by the plaintiff in error; which evidence, so admitted, on cross-examination, showing or tending to show a particular act on the part of the plaintiff in error, and tending, to some extent at least, to break down the good character the plaintiff in error had shown, was illegal, and the court erred in admitting it.

The practice of allowing defendants on trial, charged with crime to introduce evidence showing good character, was first adopted in the English courts during the reign of Charles II., and the practice there was to admit such testimony only in capital cases, in favorum vitoe, when the evidence was circumstantial or there was a doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but never admitted when the guilt of the accused was plainly shown by the evidence, the court, we presume, being the judge as to whether the evidence showed a plain case of guilt. The evidence in such cases, under the English practice, from the time it was first adopted to the present, was confined to the general character or reputation of the accused; that is, he could introduce evidence as to his general good character, but could not, for instance, show particular acts of kindness or honesty; and the prosecution was bound by the same rule. The prosecution could not put in issue the character of the defendant, but, when the defendant put his own character in issue, the prosecution had the right to introduce witnesses in rebuttal, and to show by them, or upon cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses, that the defendant's general character was bad, but was not allowed to show particular acts of misconduct on his part. This is the practice in most of the states of the Union, including our own. Now, it may be contended that, although illegal, the evidence of Ligon was immaterial, and did not prejudice the plaintiff in error's case. But is this true? Who can tell what influence this evidence had upon the jury? It was the only evidence in the case tending to impeach the good character of the plaintiff in error, but it was, in our opinion, calculated to prejudice the jury against him. That the testimony was illegal, and that it should not have been admitted, see Whart. Crim. Ev. § 23 et seq.; Reg. v. Rowton, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 1865, p. 325; Com. v. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342; McCarty v. State, 51 Ill. 231; State v. Laxton, 76 N.C. 216; Snyder v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 519; Conkey v. People, 5 Park. Crim. R. 31; Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1, 7 N.W. 444; Jones v. State, 10 Tex.App. 552; Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91, 97; Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8; Thomas v. People, 67 N.Y. 218; Hirschman v. State, 101 Ill. 568; Rosc. Crim. Ev. 97; 2 Russ. Crimes, 784; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 574; 3 Greenl. Ev. 25; 1 Phil. Ev. 617, 762- 765; 1 Starkie, Ev. 25; Best, Ev. 270; Whart. Crim. Pl. § 801, and cases cited; Johnson v. State, 61 Ga. 305; Meyncke v. State, 68 Ind. 401. It is not in doubtful cases only that good character is of weight. Whart. Crim. Ev. § 65. The best rule is that where illegal testimony has been admitted in a criminal case a new trial will be granted, unless it is clear that no injury has been done to the defendant by it. Whart. Crim. Pl. §§ 801, 802, notes 6, 7; Wooten v. State, 24 Fla. ----, ante, 39.

The second error assigned is: 'The court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested by the defendant, as follows: 'If you believe from the evidence that the name of the deceased was Churchwell, and that he was known generally by that name, the fact that a few persons may have called him Churchill does not mean, under the law, that he was generally known by that name. Generally known by a name, means that a person is called by that name by his neighbors as often or oftener than by his real or baptismal name.”

The third error is 'That the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested by counsel for plaintiff in error, as follows: 'A mistake in the name of a third person in a material allegation will be fatal at the trial, for it creates a variance between the allegation and the proof.”

The fourth error assigned is the charge given at the instance of the state's attorney, as follows: 'A variance between the name used in the indictment of the person killed and the name proved, will be fatal, but the person killed may be called in the indictment either by his real name or the name he was called by, and it is not necessary that he should be called by the name used by every one in the community, but if he was generally called and known by the name used in the indictment it is sufficient.'

The court upon this point of the case charged as follows: 'If you believe from the evidence that the name of the deceased was Churchwell; that by the name of Churchwell he was known; and that he was not generally known by the name of Churchill, as laid in the indictment,--it is your duty to acquit the defendant by a verdict of not guilty.'

We will consider this charge of the court and the second, third, and fourth assignment of errors together....