Reddin v. Gates
| Decision Date | 25 October 1879 |
| Citation | 2 N.W. 1079,52 Iowa 210 |
| Parties | REDDIN v. GATES |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clinton Circuit Court.
THE petition states that the defendant "did maliciously wantonly and oppressively assault and beat said James Reddin with a whip commonly called a rawhide, * * * in a cruel malicious and wanton manner, with intent to disgrace."
There was a trial by jury, verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for five hundred dollars. The defendant appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Kirke W. Wheeler, for appellant.
Merrell & Howat, for appellee.
The evidence tended to show that early in the morning, while the plaintiff was in bed, the defendant caught hold of and raised him up to a sitting position, and whipped him over the back and shoulders with a small "raw-hide." Plaintiff had no clothing on his person, but did what he could to screen himself with the bed clothing. The plaintiff's back and shoulders were black and bruised, and there were cords or welts caused by the whipping. The skin was lacerated in more than one place from two to six inches in length. Blood exuded and there were forty or more blows struck. There was a scar on plaintiff's back at the trial, which was two years after the whipping. The plaintiff testified that at times there was pain in the region of the scar, and that he was troubled with shortness of breath. There was evidence tending to show that this could not have been the result of the whipping. The plaintiff was confined to his bed for a short time, but there was evidence tending to show that he probably entirely recovered from the effects of the whipping in about ten days.
The evidence further tended to show that defendant did not know plaintiff did not have any clothing on, and that plaintiff was an employe of defendant; a portion of his duties being to milk cows, drive them to the pasture, and feed hogs. These duties he on one occasion neglected to perform. For such neglect he received the whipping. The age of the plaintiff does not distinctly appear, but counsel for appellant say he was a "minor nearly of age, and a large, vigorous, stalwart young man, on whom his mother was dependent in a measure for her support." The defendant is over six feet high and weighed two hundred pounds.
Thirty-four errors were assigned. All are to some extent insisted on in argument. Several relate to the same thing and may be said to be a statement of different reasons why the same result should be reached. We cannot undertake to discuss all the reasons set forth but will endeavor as briefly as may be to determine the important errors relied on.
I. Fourteen of the errors present the question in various forms that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the court in submitting the question of exemplary damages to the jury. It is said the assault must be malicious, and that evidence that the battery was excessive had no tendency to establish that fact. That the jury were fully warranted in finding the battery was excessive, even if the assault was justifiable, we have no hesitation in affirming. As bearing upon the question of malice, all the circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole may be introduced, and should be considered by the jury. There cannot be even a well grounded pretense that the assault and battery was justifiable. There was no appreciable difference in point of time between them. The attempt to attach a consequence to one essentially different from the other is futile. Every one is presumed to intend the necessary consequences which follow a given act; therefore, the intent of the act may be, and should be, determined from the excessiveness of the battery which immediately followed. There was no error in submitting the question of exemplary damages to the jury.
II. The court charged the jury that malice might be inferred from the circumstances, and if the defendant assaulted and beat the plaintiff, without just cause and provocation, the assault and battery would be malicious. Substantially the same instruction was approved by this court in State v. Hessenkamp, 17 Iowa 25, and McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336. There is nothing in this case which makes it an exception to those cited.
III. The instructions in relation to damages accord with Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379; Garland v. Wholeham, 26 Iowa 185; Guengerich v. Smith, 36 Iowa 587, and Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa 686. This is substantially conceded by counsel, but it is insisted the facts in the case at bar are different. This is true; the facts in no two cases are usually precisely the same. They are, however, governed by the same rule of law. The application of the fact thereto is for the jury. In legal acceptation there is not a particle of difference between this case and those cited.
IV. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that his general character as a quiet, orderly and peaceable man was good. The court charged the jury that such evidence would not justify the assault and battery, and should not be considered by them in rebutting malice or in mitigation of damages. This instruction accords with Quinton v. Van Tuyl, 30 Iowa 554. It is doubtful whether the evidence was admissible for any purpose. Bays v. Herring, 51 Iowa 286, 1 N.W. 558.
V. At the instance of the defendant the plaintiff's back and shoulders were exhibited to the jury, and the plaintiff introduced as evidence against the objection of the defendant a ferrotype showing the condition of his back three days after the battery. The person who took the picture testified it was a correct representation of the plaintiff's back at the time it was taken If it had been possible it would have been competent for the jury to have examined the back at the time the picture was taken, for the purpose of more readily understanding the other evidence. The ferreotype was, therefore, admissible. Locke v. The S. C. & P. R. Co., 46 Iowa 109; Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass. 420; Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340.
The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the weight to be given to such evidence was "meagre and slight." This was a question for the jury, not the court.
VI. The court instructed the jury that the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plaintiff was assaulted and injured substantially as stated in the petition. This instruction is favorable to the defendant, but as it constitutes the law of this case it is insisted...
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