Redding Rancheria v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 06 April 2001 |
Docket Number | No. C036723.,C036723. |
Citation | 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 773,88 Cal.App.4th 384 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | REDDING RANCHERIA, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Shasta County, Respondent, Suzanne Hansard, Real Party in Interest. |
Rapport & Marston and David J. Rapport, Ukiah, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dugan Barr & Associates, Redding, Douglas Mudford and J. Michael Favor, for Real Party in Interest.
Here we hold an Indian tribe and its commercial entity are immune from an ordinary tort suit arising outside of Indian country.
Suzanne Hansard (plaintiff) sued Win River Casino and several Does in Shasta County Superior Court. She alleged she was working as a bartender at a Redding hotel, attending to a party "for defendant WIN RIVER and its employees, who had booked one of the facility's banquet rooms[.]" "[O]ne or more" of the employees threw gifts into the crowd, and a package struck her, causing injury. She framed the complaint in terms of negligence, assault and battery.
Redding Rancheria (Tribe) moved to quash service of summons (Code Civ. Proc, § 418.10, subd. (a)(1)), alleging Win River Casino is "an economic enterprise of the Redding Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe," and, hence, immune from a state tort suit. The Tribe also alleged: "Plaintiff failed to exhaust her tribal administrative remedies, which, under tribal law, is a prerequisite to filing suit." The facts regarding the Tribe's status, tribal laws, and the structure of Win River Casino as a tribal enterprise were supported by a declaration of the Tribe's attorney. In part, she declared: Although plaintiff had submitted her claim to the tribal council pursuant to a tribal claims ordinance, she declined to allow the council to adjudicate her claim; according to an annexed letter by her lawyer, plaintiff believed the fact all Tribe members had an economic interest in the casino would render the proceedings unfair.
In opposition, plaintiff filed a declaration explaining she was just doing her job at the hotel, had no knowledge of any tribal immunity, and had never consented "to waive any of my rights as a citizen of [the] State of California or the United States of America." Had she understood the immunity now claimed by the Tribe, for conduct occurring off tribal lands, "I very likely would have declined to work the party." She presented no evidence to contest the casino's status as a tribal entity, nor that she had submitted a claim to the Tribe.
At the hearing, the Tribe urged all of the legal points raised by plaintiffs opposition had been rejected by the United States Supreme Court decision, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (Kiowa). The trial court denied the motion, stating in part: "I can see that if they were running a business off reservation, but I can't see it here where it's a tort action."
A formal order denying the motion was served on the Tribe; the Tribe responded by filing a petition for writ of mandate. We issued an alternative writ. We now grant the Tribe's prayer for relief, for the reasons that follow.
1. An aboriginal American tribe is a sovereign nation and "As a matter of federal law, ... is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." (Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700; see Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419-1420, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 (Morongo Band).) Plaintiff does not point to any federal law which grants California jurisdiction over alleged off-reservation Indian torts. In some cases, the United States Supreme Court has looked to organic acts to determine whether Congress granted a state power to regulate off-reservation Indian conduct. (E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973) 411 U.S. 145, 148-150, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270-1271, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119-120 [ ]; Organized Village of Kake v. Egan (1962) 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 [ ].) But a state's power to regulate a tribe's conduct is not the same as a state's power to sue a tribe. (See Oklahoma Tax Com. v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505, 511-514, 111 S.Ct. 905, 910-912, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112, 1121-1123 (Potawatomi) [ ].) In any event, we find nothing in California's organic act (Act for Admission of the State of California, 9 Stat. 452), or in any other federal law, which grants California any special power over Indian tribes. (See Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 853, 171 Cal.Rptr. 733 (Long) [ ]; Middletown Rancheria v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1340, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 105 [ ].) Plaintiff attempts to analogize the tribal claim system with California's Tort Claims Act, but this mixes apples and oranges. (See Long, supra, at p. 858, 171 Cal.Rptr. 733, fn. 6 [] .)
2. Tribal immunity applies to commercial as well as governmental activities: (Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 755, 118 S.Ct. 1700 [pointing to Potawatomi case].) Contrary to plaintiffs view, no "tribal goal" is required to conclude a tribal activity is immunized. Nor is it necessary to determine whether, absent the immunity, a Tribe's ability to self-govern would be infringed. (See Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma (1988) 107 N.M. 174, 178, 754 P.2d 845, 849 (Padilla) [].) Padilla, relied on by plaintiff, did conclude immunity for offreservation conduct "is solely a matter of comity." (Id. at p. 179, 754 P.2d at p. 850, cert. den. sub nom. Pueblo of Acoma v. Padilla (1989) 490 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202 [ ].) Well-reasoned cases have rejected this view. The comity rationale has no further viability. (See Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 760, 118 S.Ct. 1700 []; Thompson v. Crow Tribe of Indians (1998) 289 Mont. 358, 364, 962 P.2d 577, 581 [ ].)
3. A tribal entity is treated as the Tribe for immunity purposes. (See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Auth. (1st Cir.2000) 207 F.3d 21, 29 [] (Ninigret Dev. Corp.); Chance v. Coquille Indian Tribe (1998) 327 Or. 318, 321, 963 P.2d 638, 639.) Although plaintiffs answer argues the casino is not in legal effect an arm of the Tribe, plaintiff presented no evidence in the trial court to challenge the Tribe's evidence the casino was an arm of the Tribe. (Cf. Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 632, 637-645, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (Trudgeon) [ ].) Trudgeon specifically held an Indian casino (a tribal corporation) was entitled to immunity because of the importance of gaming in promoting tribal self-determination, the close link between the tribe and the casino, and the existence of federal law promoting Indian gambling.
(Id. at pp. 639-642, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 65.) Plaintiff does not analyze the facts linking the Win River Casino to the Tribe, but...
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