Redding v. Callaway
Decision Date | 08 March 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 31472.,31472. |
Citation | 41 S.E.2d 804 |
Parties | REDDING . v. CALLAWAY. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The allegations of count 1 of the petition are not sufficient to sustain a wilful intention, on the part of the defendant, to take the life of the deceased, nor does it allege acts of recklessness or indifference to consequences so as to authorize a finding of an actual intent on the part of the defendant to kill the deceased.
2. The petition shows on its face that the deceased, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the conse quences of the defendant's negligence as alleged.
Error from Superior Court, Muscogee County; T. Hicks Fort, Judge.
Action by Arices Redding against Merrel P. Callaway, trustee of the property of the Central of Georgia Railway Company, to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's son. To review a judgment sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing the petition, the plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
Arices Redding, hereinafter called the plaintiff, filed her petition against Merrel P. Callaway as trustee of the property of the Central of Georgia Railway Company, hereinafter called the defendant. The plaintiff sought the recovery of damages for the negligent homicide of her son, Eugene Care. General and special demurrers were filed to the petition. The court sustained the general demurrer and dismissed the petition. On this judgment error is assigned. The petition contained two counts.
It is alleged that at the time of the homicide the plaintiff was dependent upon and was supported by the deceased, her son. It is further alleged that the son was, at the time of his death, 25 years of age, and, so far as the petition shows, was in good health and in possession of all of his senses, and laboring under no liabilities. We quote the material paragraphs of the petition:
Paragraph 4 reads: "On or about June 21, 1945, the said Eugene Care, while proceeding to the place of his employment in the City of Columbus, in the early morning, was walking along the right of way of the Central of Georgia Railway Company, by the side of Central Street in a very populous area in the City of Columbus; and was following a pathway by the side of the track of said railroad company, which passageway had been constantly used by pedestrians, said Care and many others, for many years, such use being well known to the agents and servants of defendant, who made no objection thereto."
Paragraph 5 reads:
Paragraph 6: "In this situation the servants and agents of the defendant in charge of said Seminole Limited clearly saw the perilous position of said Eugene Care on the said right of way, and saw that he was sufficiently near the track over which said Seminole Limited would pass, to be struck by said train, and clearly saw the freight train approaching from the opposite direction which was making a loud noise and attracting the attention of the said Care, and clearly saw that the said Care was not aware of the approach of the said Seminole Limited behind him, and saw all this some four hundred yards before reaching the said Eugene Care, but notwithstanding all this, said train continued on its way at the rapid and dangerous rate of speed of 45 miles an hour and the engineer and fireman on said train made no effort whatever to reduce the speed of the train, and did not give any warning by the blowing of the whistle or of the ringing of the bell, or otherwise, of the approach of said train; but drove said train full speed ahead and struck and killed said Eugene Care." Paragraph 7:
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of count 2 are the same as in count 1. We quote paragraphs 6 and 7 of count 2:
Paragraph 7 of count 2 reads:
It will thus be seen that the only difference between count 1 and count 2 of the petition is that under count 1 the petition seeks a recovery for wilful and wanton negligence on the part of the agents and servants of the defendant who were in charge of and operating the train of the defendant which occasioned the death of the deceased, and the second count is based on ordinary negligence.
R. S. Wimberly, of Lumpkin, and Theo J. McGee, of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.
R. M. Arnold, of Columbus, for defendant in error.
1. It will be noted that the deceased was walking northwesterly on a footpath longitudonally with an outside track of three parallel railroad tracks. It was in the daytime. He was not on a crossing nor within 50 feet of one. There was approaching him from the rear, a passenger train of the defendant which was on the track immediately parallel to the path on which the deceased was walking. Going in the opposite direction from the deceased and the passenger train, one of the parallel tracks (the petition does not say on which track), a freight train was being operated. The petition does not say how far distant in front of the deceased the freight train was. The petition does allege that the deceased was giving his entire attention to the approaching freight train with a view of walking at a safe distance from it as he would meet and pass it. While thus engaged it is alleged that the passenger train approached from the rear, struck the deceased and killed him wilfully and wantonly. It is conceded that the deceased was at the time a trespasser. Under the decisions of our court, it would appear that before one who is a trespasser can allege and recover for the wilful and wanton infliction of injury by the employees of a railroad company in charge of the operating of its trains, it must appear (1) that the employees actually saw the trespasser; (2) they must actually see him in time to prevent injury or death to him by the exercise of ordinary care; (3) that when seen by them the trespasser is in a dangerous position and the perilousness of that position must be discovered and known to the...
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