Redding v. Dist. of Columbia

• Citation: 828 F.Supp.2d 272
• Decision Date: 15 December 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–cv–01811 (ABJ).
• Parties: Darlene REDDING, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

828 F.Supp.2d 272

Darlene REDDING, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10–cv–01811 (ABJ).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. 15, 2011.

C. Sukari Hardnett, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.

Denise J. Baker, Office of the Attorney General for District of Columbia Civil Litigation, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action asserting five statutory and common law claims for discrimination and retaliation arising out of her employment as a parking enforcement officer for the defendant District of Columbia. Defendant has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. [Dkt. # 5]. Because plaintiff failed to bring her common law, Title VII, and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims within the applicable time limits, the Court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Darlene Redding worked as a Parking Enforcement Officer for the District of Columbia Department of Public Works from 2001 to 2008. Compl. ¶ 7; Pl.'s Opp. at ¶¶ 5, 17; Ex. A to Def.'s Supp. Reply. She is allegedly afflicted with schizoaffective disorder, mood disorder, psychosis, depressive episodes, and “cardiopathic/hypertension.” Compl. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff alleges that sometime between October 2004 and October 2005, she was sexually assaulted by two male coworkers.² Pl.'s Opp. at ¶ 7; Ex. A to Pl.'s Opp.; Ex. A to Def.'s Supp. Reply. She claims that she reported the sexual assault to her local union and the Metropolitan Police Department. Pl.'s Opp. at ¶¶ 8–9; Ex. A to Pl.'s Opp.

On July 3, 2007, plaintiff filed a signed Charge of Discrimination form (“Charge Form”) with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (“OHR”) and cross-filed with the Washington Field Office of the EEOC, alleging that she was discriminated against, retaliated against, and subjected to a hostile work environment based on her gender and disability. Pl.'s Opp. at ¶ 18; Ex. A to Def.'s Supp. Reply; Def.'s Supp. Reply at 1–3. As evidence, she cited the sexual assault as well as other incidents. Ex. A to Def.'s Supp. Reply, authenticity conceded by plaintiff, see [Dkt. # 16]. The signed form also stated “I will advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures.” Id.

The OHR issued a Letter of Determination rejecting all three claims on May 27, 2008. Ex. B to Def.'s Supp. Reply, authenticity conceded by plaintiff, see [Dkt. # 16]; Def.'s Supp. Reply at 1–3. The letter was mailed to plaintiff's counsel. Id. Plaintiff asserts that she was also informed that a “Right to Sue Letter” (also known as a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights”) would follow, which would permit her to file an action in court. Pl.'s Opp. at ¶ 21.

The EEOC issued the Right to Sue Letter on February 24, 2009. Ex. C to Def.'s Supp. Reply; Def.'s Supp. Reply at ¶¶ 14–16.³ It was addressed to Darlene Redding at the same street address that she had identified as her “home address” on her Charge Form, which is also the same address listed on the caption of the complaint in this case. Ex. C to Def.'s Supp. Reply, authenticity conceded by plaintiff, see [Dkt. # 16]; Def.'s Supp. Reply at ¶¶ 15–16; Compl. at 1. But plaintiff states that she did not receive it. According to plaintiff:

From June 17, 2009 through August 2, 2010, Plaintiff contacted the EEOC's Washington Field office to request a Right to Sue Letter. Plaintiff was informed by [an EEOC employee], on August 2, 2010, that a Right to Sue letter was mailed to her on February 24, 2009. Plaintiff informed [him] that she did not receive a Right to Sue Letter and she wanted to know if a letter was sent to her attorney of record. Plaintiff was informed that the Right to Sue Letter was not sent to her attorney.

Plaintiff's counsel informed [the EEOC employee] that she is counsel of record and a Right to Sue Letter should have been sent to counsel, especially since all parties were put on notice that Plaintiff required periodic hospitalization because of her disability.⁴

Pl.'s Opp. at ¶ 23–24. After that conversation, a second copy of the Right to Sue Letter was mailed to plaintiff, and she filed the complaint in this case within ninety days of receiving it. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 22, 2010. [Dkt. # 1]. Counts I through III allege gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (as amended).⁵ Count IV alleges disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12111(8).⁶ Count V alleges assault and battery.⁷ Defendant has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. [Dkt. # 5].

Defendant contends that Counts I through IV are barred by plaintiff's failure to file this action within ninety days of the issuance and receipt of the Right to Sue Letter.⁸ Def.'s MTD/SJ at 1; Def.'s Mem. at 10. It further argues that Count V is barred by plaintiff's failure to file a required notice of claim and by the applicable statute of limitations. Def.'s MTD/SJ at 1; Def.'s Mem. at 6–9.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” id.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is construed liberally in plaintiff's favor, and the Court should grant plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. See id.; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002) (citations omitted).

A defendant may raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint. Smith–Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575 (D.C.Cir.1998). “[B]ecause statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996), citing Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 73 (D.C.Cir.1981).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(a)

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id.; see also Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236 (D.C.Cir.1987). In assessing a party's motion, “[a]ll underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709 F.Supp.2d 57, 65 (D.D.C.2010), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court may also decide statute of limitations questions at the summary judgment stage. Hancock v. HomEq Servicing Corp., 526 F.3d 785, 785 (D.C.Cir.2008) (affirming the...