Redding v. South Carolina R. Co.
| Decision Date | 29 August 1871 |
| Citation | 3 S.C. 1 |
| Parties | REDDING v. SOUTH CAROLINA RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
A master is responsible in a civil action for the tortious act of his servant committed in the course of the latter's employment, and it makes no difference that the act was done willfully and without the knowledge of the master, or even in disobedience of his orders.
Whether a servant was acting in the course of his employment when he committed a tortious act is a question of fact.
If there is no evidence at all to sustain the plaintiff's case, the Judge may order a nonsuit; but if any such evidence is given, the case must go to the jury.
BEFORE GRAHAM, J., AT CHARLESTON, APRIL TERM, 1871.
Action by William F. Redding and Julia D. Redding, his wife, to recover damages for injuries to the person of the female plaintiff alleged to have been committed by a servant of the defendant at the depot of the defendant, in the city of Charleston, on the 26th February, 1870.
Mrs Redding, the female plaintiff, Eliza Brown and Pharaoh Delair, were examined as witnesses for the plaintiffs, and each of them testified, in substance:
That while Mrs. Julia D. Redding was sitting in the ladies' parlor of the South Carolina Railroad Company Depot, at Charleston, in the said County, on the ______ day of February, 1870, a man, Charles Wollen, (who, being present in Court, was identified by the witnesses,) approached Mrs Redding; told her she was a negro that he was instructed by the South Carolina Railroad Company to keep negroes out of that parlor; and, upon her refusal to leave the parlor, seized her and dragged her out, throwing her with violence to the floor upon her face (she being then pregnant,) thereby injuring her.
Mrs Redding also testified that one month previously the same man, Charles Wollen, ordered her out of the same parlor, telling her he was ordered by the Company to keep negroes out of that parlor. Upon her saying she was not a negro, he apologized and left her. Mrs. Redding also testified that she rode in the first-class car, and, although without a ticket, and without paying any fare, was allowed to continue to her journey's end.
J. B. Martin was then called by plaintiffs. He testified as follows:
I am ticket agent at the South Carolina Railroad; was so in February last. One Wollen was employed as a man " knocking about" the depot. The first thing I employed him for was to attend the ladies' room, to clean it out. He was so employed in February. I do not remember the exact time of this occurrence. I discharged him, I presume, about two or three months after this occurrence. I gave no instructions to keep colored persons out of the parlors, and there were none at that time. That ceased to be as soon as the Civil Rights Bill had passed. I don't know when this Bill was passed, but it was before this. We never interfered with colored persons going in there.
Wollen's employment was, as we had no stewardess for the ladies' room, to keep it clean, sweep it out, and empty the chambers, and such things. That was the only employment he had, and the only authority. I am in charge of the whole premises. After the passage of the Civil Rights Bill, the orders were to make no distinction at all. Persons went in there as they pleased.
There is a passage here through the building. On the right hand side is the ladies' room, and my office is on the left. I cannot see into the ladies' room from my office. The ticket-window is all of twenty-five feet from the door of the ladies' room. I have never measured it. Mrs. Redding came to the window that night. She told me that she was ordered out of the ladies' room. I said it was without my knowledge or consent. I saw nothing more of her. There was a gentleman standing there. The first intimation I had of it was, he said that he would shoot my watchman. I asked him why? He then said that his foster sister had been ordered out of that room. I told him that it was done without my knowledge or consent. It was not my orders. Nothing was said by Mrs. Redding, or any body with her, with regard to any violence. She said she was ordered out. No complaint was made to me of violence. She said she had been in there several times before, and had not been ordered out. I know that she has been in there and nobody disturbed her. From the window she went to the cars. At no time that night was any complaint made by her or anybody about any violence.
The plaintiffs here rested, and the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the grounds:
That Charles Wollen was not acting within the scope of any employment or agency, direct or indirect, when he excluded plaintiff from the saloon, but was acting without authority, beyond his legitimate employment, and in violation of the instructions and wishes of the defendant, extended to its proper agents; and that, upon the testimony, the act was the tort of Charles Wollen, for which he is responsible, and not the Company.
The motion was granted.
The plaintiffs appealed to this Court, on the grounds:
1. That the defendants are liable, nothwithstanding that the servant acted contrary to their instructions, if he acted as their servant.
2. That the servant was acting in the course of his employment.
3. That whether the servant was acting in the course of his employment, was a question of fact, and should have been submitted to the jury to decide.
Chamberlain, Seabrook & Dunbar , for appellants, maintained the following propositions:
1. If Wollen was at the time acting as the servant of the respondents, but acted in violation of their orders, the respondents are unquestionably liable for his acts, unless they are shown to be willful or malicious.
2. The evidence shows that Wollen was at the time in the course of his employment, and hence the respondents are liable, in the absence of any evidence tending to show that he acted willfully or maliciously.
3. The question whether Wollen was at the time in the course of his employment is a mixed question of law and fact. It was not competent for His Honor, the Circuit Judge, to pass upon the question, but it should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions as to the matters of law involved.
They cited upon the first point-Story on Ag., § 452; McManus vs. Crickett , 1 East. 106; Middleton vs. Fowler , Salk., 282; Wright vs. Wilcox , 19 Wend. 343; Richm. Turnp. Co. vs. Vanderbilt , 2 Com. 479; Joel vs. Morrison , 6 C. & P., 511; Sleath vs. Wilson , 9 C. & P., 607; Parkerson vs. Wightman , 4 Strob. 363; Weed vs. The Panama R. R. R. Co. , 17 N.Y. 362; Story on Bailm., §§ 400, 406; Stokes vs. Saltonstall , 13 Pet. 181; Shearm. & Red. on Neg., 79; Limpus vs. London Omnibus Co. , 4 Hurl. & C., 526; The Phil. & Read. R. R. Co. vs. Derby , 14 How. 483. Upon the second point- 1 Red. on Rail., 383, 512-13, notes, 3d Ed.; Phil. Railway vs. Witt , 4 Whart. 143. And upon the third point- Parks vs. Ross , 11 How. 393; Richardson vs. City of Boston , 19 How. 268-9; Brown vs. Frost , 2 Bay 126; Hopkins vs. DeGraffenreid , 2 Bay 441; 2 Bail. 321; Magrath vs. Isaacs , 2 McC. 23; Clements vs. Benjamin , 12 John. R., 299; Pratt vs. Hull , 13 John. R., 334; Keller vs. The N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. , 24 How., Pr. R., 172.
Conner , contra, submitted the following points and authorities:
The general rule of law is, that the principal is liable for the acts of his agent, in the course of his employment ; but the rule and the limitation of it go together. The act complained of must be within the scope of the employment- within the agency.-Story on Agency, § 456.
The principal is not liable for the torts or negligence of his agent, in any matters beyond the scope of the agency, unless he has expressly authorized them to be done, or has subsequently adopted them for his own use or benefit.-Story on Agency, § 446; McManus vs. Crickett , 1 East. 106.
The fact that the servant was, at the time of the injury, engaged in the service of his master, is not conclusive of the master's liability. The act causing the injury must have been one within the scope of the authority which the servant had from the master, or which the master gave the servant reasonable cause to believe that he had, or which servants employed in the same capacity usually have.-Shear. & Red. on Neg., 70.
The language of C. J. Kenyon, in Ellis vs. Turner , is apposite: The defendants are responsible for the acts of their servant in those things that respect his duty under them, but are not responsible for his misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to them, as if he were to commit assault upon a third person in the course of his voyage.-8 Term. 533. And to the same point is McClanahan vs. Brock : " How can an act of one of the defendant's servants, outside of his employment, and in no way connected with it, be considered as the neglect of his bailment?" And the nonsuit was sustained.-5 Rich. 27; Eastern Counties R. R. Co. vs. Broom , 2 Eng. Law & Equity, 406; Crocker vs. New London & Willimantic R. R. Co. , 24 Conn. 265; Thames Steamboat Co. vs. Housatonic R. R. Co. , Ibid, 56.
- Lowell vs. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. , 23 Pick. 24.
Alderson, J., in McKenzie vs. McLeod , 10 Bingham 390; (25 E. C. L. R., 187): When the master " has neither ordered the thing to be done, nor allowed the servant any discretion as to the mode of doing it, I cannot see how, in common justice, or common sense, the master can be held responsible."
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