Redditt v. Singer Mfg. Co

• Decision Date: 07 March 1899
• Citation: 32 S.E. 392,124 N.C. 100
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: REDDITT. v. SINGER MFG. CO.

32 S.E. 392

(124 N.C. 100)

REDDITT.

v.SINGER MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 7, 1899.

Corporations—Torts of Agents.

Where a corporation authorizes its state agent to make a settlement with a subagent, it is not liable to the latter for slanderous statements made by the former pending the settlement, in the absence of evidence that the corporation expressly or impliedly authorized the statements, or ratified them.

Appeal from superior court, Pamlico county; Hoke, Judge.

Action by W. A. Redditt against the Singer Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Error.

Osborne, Maxwell & Keerans and D. L. Ward, for appellant.

Shepherd & Busbee, for appellee.

FAIRCLOTH, C. J. The defendant is a corporation in the state of Virginia, manufacturing sewing machines, and has a state agent and subagents in North Carolina, and the plaintiff was one of the agents for selling the machines. The defendant's state agent was directed by the defendant to take possession of the machines in plaintiff's hands, and to have a settlement with plaintiff, and collect the amount due by plaintiff for machines already sold. The agent brought an action of claim and delivery for the machines, and they were delivered; and, pending negotiations in making the settlement, the plaintiff alleges that said agent used and uttered slanderous words of and concerning the plaintiff; and he institutes this action for damages, against the defendant corporation, resulting from the utterance of such slanderous words by said agent. There is no allegation nor any proof that said slanderous words were spoken by the authority or consent of the defendant, or that they have been ratified. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant demurred, and made a motion to dismiss the action, on the ground that the defendant is not liable for damages for the alleged slanderous words of its agent. The motion was refused, and exception entered.

The court charged the jury that "a corporation is responsible for slanderous words uttered by its agent in the course and scope of such agent's employment, and in aid of the company's interest." Exception. This charge presents the decisive question in this case. An examination in detail of the numerous authorities and decisions would be a tedious undertaking, and it may be remarked that a careful examination into the facts in each would reconcile many apparent conflicts. It is a fundamental principle that the law shall fit the facts in every case. A few general propositions may be stated: (1) That a corporation, contrary to the early cases, is now liable to civil and criminal actions under the same conditions and circumstances as natural persons are. (2) That, as a corporation must do business through agencies, it is liable for the misconduct of its agents, in the line of their duty, if they act under the express or implied authority of the company, or their tortious acts are ratified, as by taking the benefits of such misconduct. (3) That when liability is established, and the circumstances are aggravating or malicious, the company is subject to punitive damages on the same principle that natural persons are. From our examination, we think that in a vast majority of the cases the principle is recognized that in some way the company must authorize or approve the tortious act of its agent, and that it would be unreasonable to hold the company liable on a bare presumption, in the absence of allegation or any proof of authority or ratification. If A. sends his servant down town to purchase goods, and, in the act of purchasing, the servant should slander by words or assault the merchant, it would be a violent presumption that the master approved or had authorized such misconduct, and it would be unreasonable to hold him responsible without something indicating his approval. The principle which we approve is well stated in State v. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. Law, 369: "If a corporation has...