Redevelopment Commission of Greensboro v. Security Nat. Bank of Greensboro, 604

• Decision Date: 10 June 1960
• Docket Number: No. 604,604
• Citation: 252 N.C. 595,114 S.E.2d 688
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF GREENSBORO and City of Greensboro, v. SECURITY NATIONAL BANK OF GREENSBORO, as Executor and Trustee under the Will of Jack Milton, Deceased.

Page 688

114 S.E.2d 688

252 N.C. 595

REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF GREENSBORO and City of Greensboro, v. SECURITY NATIONAL BANK OF GREENSBORO, as Executor and Trustee under the Will of Jack Milton, Deceased.

No. 604

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 10, 1960

J. Archie Cannon, Jr., and Harry Rockwell, Greensboro, for Redevelopment Commission of Greensboro, plaintiffs, appellees.

Harper J. Elam, III, Greensboro, for the city of Greensboro, plaintiffs, appellees.

Stern & Rendleman by John L. Rendleman, Greensboro, for respondent, appellant.

Claude V. Jones, Durham, for city of Durham.

Daniel K. Edwards and Robinson O. Everett, Durham, for the Redevelopment Commission of the city of Durham, amici curiae.

Dickson Phillips, Fayetteville, for Urban Redevelopment Commission of the city of Laurinburg, amicus curiae.

Hogue & Hogue by C. D. Hogue, Jr., Wilmington, for the Redevelopment Commission of the city of Wilmington, as amici curiae.

Weston P. Hatfield, Winston-Salem, for the Redevelopment Commission of the city of Winston-Salem, amicus curiae.

Cochran, McCleneghan & Miller by Thomas C. Creasy, Jr., Charlotte, for the Redevelopment Commission of the city of Charlotte, amici curiae.

Bunn, Hatch, Little & Bunn by James C. Little, Raleigh, for the Redevelopment Commission of the city of Raleigh, as amici curiae.

PARKER, Justice.

Respondent has no exceptions to Judge Preyer's findings of fact. Therefore, it will be presumed that they are supported by competent evidence, and are binding on appeal. Tanner v. Ervin, 250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d 460.

Respondent has excepted to Judge Preyer's second, third, fourth and fifth conclusions of law, to this part of his decree, to wit, 'Petitioner Redevelopment Commission of Greensboro is entitled to take, and all of the right, title and interest of the respondent in and to, the real property described in paragraph 5 of the petition, is hereby conveyed to said commission,' and to the judgment.

Respondent's first exception is to Judge Preyer's second conclusion of law that the taking of respondent's land in this proceeding under the power of eminent domain is a taking for a public purpose and use, and is not in violation of Article I, Section 1, or of Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution.

The relevant part of Article I, Section 1, of the North Carolina Constitution is 'That we hold it to be self-evident that all persons * * * are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are * * * the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor.' The pertinent part of Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution is, 'No person ought to be * * * in any manner deprived of his * * * property, but by the law of the land.'

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, private property can be taken only for a public purpose, or more properly speaking a public use, and upon the payment of just compensation. City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600; Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550. This principle is so grounded in natural equity that it has never been denied to be an essential part of 'the law of the land' within the meaning of Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution. Eller v. Board of Education, 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144.

When the facts are determined, what is a public purpose, or more properly speaking a public use, is a question of law for the court. City of Charlotte v. Heath, supra; Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Commission, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563; Stratford v. City of Greensboro, 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394.

The question of law is distinct and clear. This Court said in Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Commission, [196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 568] '* * * it is settled by our decisions * * * that, if a particular use is public, the expediency or necessity for establishing it is exclusively for the Legislature.' If the redevelopment project here is for 'a public use,' the grant of the power of eminent domain in G.S. Chapter 160, Article 37, Urban Redevelopment Law, is a clear and valid exercise of legislative power, for the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27.

The main contention of respondent on its first exception is that the taking of property by the power of eminent domain under G.S. Chapter 160, Article 37, is not for a public use permitted under Article I, Section 1, or Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution, but is a taking of private property for a private use, because under G.S. § 160-464(a) the Redevelopment Commission is empowered to 'sell, exchange or otherwise transfer real property or any interest therein in a redevelopment project area to any redeveloper for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or other uses or for public use in accordance with the redevelopment plan, subject to such covenants, conditions and restrictions as may be deemed to be in the public interest or to carry out the purposes of this article; provided, that such sale, exchange or other transfer, and any agreement relating thereto, may be made only after, or subject to, the approval of the redevelopment plan by the governing body of the municipality and after public notice and award as hereinafter specified in subsection (b).'

G.S. § 160-464(d) provides: 'The contract between the commission and a redeveloper shall contain, without being limited to the following provisions: (1) Plans prepared by the redeveloper or otherwise and other such documents as may be required to show the type, material, structure and general character of the redevelopment project; (2) A statement of the use intended for each part of the project; (3) A guaranty of completion of the redevelopment project within specified time limits; (4) The amount, if known, of the consideration to be paid; (5) Adequate safeguards for proper maintenance of all parts of the project; (6) Such other continuing controls as may be deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of this article.'

G.S. § 160-464(e) states: 'Any deed to a redeveloper in furtherance of a redevelopment contract shall be executed in the name of the commission, by its proper officers, and shall contain in addition to all other provisions, such conditions, restrictions and provisions as the commission may deem desirable to run with the land in order to effectuate the purposes of this article.'

This contention of respondent that the taking of its property is for private use misconceives the nature and extent of the public purpose or public use which is the subject of the Urban Redevelopment statute. The primary purpose of the taking is the eradication of 'blighted areas,' the reconstruction and rehabilitation of such areas, and the adaption of them for uses which will prevent a recurrence of the blighted conditions. This is lucidly stated in G.S. § 160-455, as follows: 'Findings and declaration of policy.--It is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding: (a) That there exist in urban communities in this State blighted areas as defined herein. (b) That such areas are economic or social liabilities, inimical and injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the State, harmful to the social and economic well-being of the entire communities in which they exist, depreciating values therein, reducing tax revenues, and thereby depreciating further the general community-wide values. (c) That the existence of such areas contributes substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime, necessitating excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for the preservation of the public health and safety, for crime prevention, correction, prosecution, punishment and the treatment of juvenile delinquency and for the maintenance of adequate police, fire and accident protection and other public services and facilities, constitutes an economic and social liability, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of communities. (d) That the foregoing conditions are beyond remedy or control entirely by regulatory processes in the exercise of the police power and cannot be effectively dealt with by private enterprise under existing law without the additional aids herein granted. (e) That the acquisition, preparation, sale, sound replanning, and redevelopment of such areas in accordance with sound and approved plans for their redevelopment will promote the public health, safety, convenience and welfare. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of North Carolina to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the inhabitants thereof by the creation of bodies corporate and politic to be known as redevelopment commissions, which shall exist and operate for the public purposes of acquiring and replanning such areas and of holding or disposing of them in such manner that they shall become available for economically and socially sound redevelopment. Such purposes are hereby declared to be public uses for which public money may be spent, and private property may be acquired by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.'

In Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693, we held that the eradication of slum areas in cities and towns of the State having a population of more than fifteen thousand inhabitants, and the adaptation of the property to a low-cost housing project to be leased to tenants was a public use. See also Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252. The General Assembly 1941, Chapter 78, amended the original Housing Authorities Law so as to make it apply to 'urban and rural areas throughout the State.' In Mallard v. Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority, 221 N.C. 334, 20 S.E.2d 281, we held that the Wells and Cox cases were controlling and the amendment to the original law applicable to rural communities was a public use.

Respondent contends...