Redford v. Spokane Street-Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1896
• Citation: 46 P. 650,15 Wash. 419
• Parties: REDFORD v. SPOKANE ST. RY. CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

46 P. 650

15 Wash. 419

REDFORD v. SPOKANE ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 27, 1896

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; Jesse Arthur, Judge.

Action by Oliver W. Redford against the Spokane Street-Railway Company, a corporation. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Griffitts & Nuzum, for appellant.

Forster & Wakefield and Everett C. Ellis, for respondent.

GORDON J.

This action was brought to recover damages for injuries resulting from a collision between a car operated by the appellant and a vehicle owned and occupied by the respondent. The cause was before this court upon a former appeal, and is reported in 9 Wash., at page 55, 36 P. 1085. Upon such appeal this court reversed a judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff therein (respondent here), and awarded a new trial, which resulted in another verdict favorable to the respondent, and from the judgment entered thereupon in his favor the cause is again before it.

As a first ground of error relied upon for a reversal the appellant complains of an order of the lower court denying its motion to set aside the panel and venire from which the trial jury was drawn. In support of this claim appellant insists that the act of March 19, 1895 (Sess. Laws 1895, p 139), is unconstitutional, for the reason that it discriminates "against citizens as jurors, if they are not householders. It makes it necessary to be a householder when no such requirement is made of jurors summoned on an open venire"; and that "it is unequal, and discriminates against certain classes of citizens, and requires qualification for duty inconsistent with the constitution of the state." The particular sections of the constitution relied upon are sections 12, 21, and 22 of article 1. We are unable to perceive (and the brief of counsel in no way makes it clear) what bearing sections 21 and 22, supra, have upon the question. Section 12, however provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations." The learned counsel for the appellant cites no authority in support of his contention that the act in question is obnoxious to this provision. On the other hand, we think that the act is constitutional, and must be sustained upon the authority of McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Consolidated Va. Min Co., 16 Nev. 432; Cordova v. State, 6 Tex. App. 207. That the act requires that jurors shall be householders-a qualification not required by the old law-furnishes no sufficient reason, in our judgment, for holding that it is unconstitutional, nor is the question affected by the further fact that that qualification is not a requisite of jurors summoned upon an open venire. The act of 1895 is uniform in its operations in so far as it operates at all, and its constitutionality is not affected by the number of persons within the scope of its operation.

2. The court, at the instance of the appellant, submitted to the jury two special requests for findings, as follows: "(1) After the plaintiff stopped his horse and buggy at the place of the accident, and before or just at the time of the collision, was the buggy backed or moved closer to the street-car track than where it was when the plaintiff first stopped?" "No." "(2) When the plaintiff stopped his horse and buggy on Bridge street at the point of the accident, was the buggy far enough from the railroad track so that a car could pass in safety if the buggy had remained stationary at the exact place it was when plaintiff first stopped?" "No." It is insisted that these special findings are inconsistent with the general verdict, and that they are sufficient to show that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence which would defeat a recovery, and that appellant is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the general verdict. In connection therewith we may also consider the failure of the court to instruct the jury in accordance with appellant's request No. 20, which is as follows: "If plaintiff, while riding along the street described in this case as 'Bridge Street,' stopped in the street, it was his duty in law to stop in such a position as to allow the defendant's car to pass without striking his vehicle, and to look and see that such was his position; and, if he failed to do so, such failure would of itself constitute such contributory negligence as would defeat a...