Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists

• Decision Date: 27 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 03-CV-6187 (DLI)(AKT).,03-CV-6187 (DLI)(AKT).
• Parties: Jewel REDHEAD, Plaintiff, v. CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

566 F.Supp.2d 125

Jewel REDHEAD, Plaintiff, v. CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, Defendant.

No. 03-CV-6187 (DLI)(AKT).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 27, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rick Ostrove, Leeds Morelli & Brown, Carle Place, NY, for Plaintiff.

Milton Thurm, Eileen Budd, Ross Graydon Weaver, Thurm Milton, Molod Spitz & Desantis, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DORA L. IRIZARRY, District Judge.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Jewel Redhead alleges that defendant Conference of Seventh-day Adventists unlawfully discriminated against her when it terminated her from a teaching position at the Linden Seventh-day Adventists School (the "Linden School") for being pregnant and unmarried. Plaintiff claims violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and the New York State Human Rights Law. At the close of discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claim because of the "ministerial exception" to Title VII, and that in any event, plaintiff was lawfully terminated for violating church doctrine. In a decision dated July 26, 2006, the court denied summary judgment on plaintiffs discrimination claims, finding that the ministerial exception did not apply to plaintiff and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant fired plaintiff because she violated the school's religious code, or whether defendant singled plaintiff out for termination because of her gender and pregnancy. See Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211 (E.D.N.Y.2006).

On March 21, 2008, as the parties were preparing for trial, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.2008), discussing, among other things, the ministerial exception and the extent to which courts in Title VII cases can scrutinize an employment action that a religious employer claims was made for a religious reason. At a pre-trial conference held on April 2, 2008, the court granted defendant's request to adjourn the trial sine die so that the court could reconsider its denial of summary judgment in light of the Second Circuit's decision in Cote. After allowing the parties an opportunity to brief the issue, the court held a conference on June 11, 2008, at which it informed the parties that defendant's renewed application for summary judgment was denied, and that the trial would proceed as scheduled. The reasoning behind that decision is set forth below.

I. Background¹

A. The July 26, 2006 Summary Judgment Decision

In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that: (1) neither the First Amendment, the ministerial exception, nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), prevented the court from considering the merits of plaintiffs claim, and (2) plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's asserted reason for terminating plaintiff was merely a pretext for discrimination. Redhead, 440 F.Supp.2d at 224.

Addressing the first issue, the court noted that the Second Circuit had yet to either explicitly reject or adopt the "ministerial exception"—a judicially created doctrine that, in certain circumstances, shields religious institutions from liability under employment statutes such as Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")—but that recently, in Hankins v. Lyght, a Second Circuit panel had declined to apply the doctrine in favor of a statutory interpretation under the RFRA.² Id. at 218-19 (citing Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.2006)). After voicing doubts about the RFRA's applicability to suits between private parties, the court, "constrained to follow Hankins," nevertheless applied the RFRA to plaintiffs claim. Id. at 219. In so doing, the court accepted defendant's argument "that the application of Title VII would (1) substantially burden its (2) sincere (3) religious exercise of ensuring that teachers at the Linden School follow the teachings of the Seventh-day Adventist Church," but noted "that, generally, Title VII's purpose of eradicating employment discrimination is a `compelling government interest.'" Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, which held that the RFRA is amenable to "judicially crafted exceptions," the court incorporated its analysis of the ministerial exception into the RFRA framework in order to ensure that application of Title VII would be the "least restrictive means" of furthering the government's compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination. Id. at 220-22 (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. 418, 434, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)).

After considering the factual record, the court held that the primarily secular nature of plaintiffs duties rendered the ministerial exception inapplicable to her, and that, as such, Title VII, as applied to plaintiff, qualified as an exception to the RFRA. Id. at 221-22. Finding that consideration of the ministerial exception effectively allayed the concerns that the religion clauses of the First Amendment were designed to prevent, the court turned to the merits of plaintiffs discrimination claim. Id. at 222.

Analyzing plaintiffs claim under the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the court determined that plaintiff: (1) was, as a pregnant woman, a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified to teach at the Linden School, (3) suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated, and (4) had put forth sufficient evidence to raise an inference of illegal discrimination by establishing that defendant had terminated her after being notified of her pregnancy. Id. at 222. The court found, however, that defendant had rebutted the inference of discrimination by articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination, namely, that plaintiff was fired because she failed to abide by the Seventh-day Adventist Church doctrine proscribing fornication a "grievous sin," commission of which subjected Linden School employees to termination. Id. at 222-23. After considering the evidentiary record and finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to "whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of her sex and pregnancy or because of an evenly applied religious and moral code," the court denied summary judgment on plaintiffs discrimination claim.³ Id. at 224.

B. The Second Circuit's Decision in Cote

In Cote, the Second Circuit considered the appeal of Father Justinian Rweyemamu, an African-American Catholic priest who brought a Title VII racial discrimination lawsuit against his former Diocese and its Bishop, "[alleging that [they] ... misapplied canon law in denying him a requested promotion and, ultimately, in terminating him." Cote, 520 F.3d at 199-200. The district court had found Father Justinian's claim barred by the ministerial exception and had dismissed it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 200. On appeal, the Second Circuit first considered the Hankins court's analysis of the RFRA, but found it inapplicable as the defendants in Cote had explicitly waived any rights they had under that statute.⁴ Id. at 203-05. The court then went on to discuss the history of the ministerial exception in general, id. at 204-07, and its application in the Second Circuit in particular, id. at 207-09.

In examining how various federal courts across the country have applied the ministerial exception, the Second Circuit noted that "[s]ome courts have stressed the right to church autonomy secured by the Free Exercise Clause," while "[o]thers have emphasized that taking sides in a religious dispute would lead an Article III court into excessive entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause," while still others "have explained that `[t]he right to choose ministers without government restriction underlies the well-being of religious communit[ies].'" Id. at 205 (citations omitted). Drawing some general conclusions from this body of federal case law, the court observed that the doctrine is wellentrenched, encompasses more than just clergy, is not unique to any one religion, and "although its name might imply an absolute exception, it is not always a complete barrier to suit; for example, a case may proceed if it involves a limited inquiry that, `combined with the ability of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion into sensitive religious matters.'" Id. at 206-07 (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir.1999)).

Turning to the application of the ministerial exception within the Second Circuit, the court reviewed its earlier decisions in Catholic High School Ass'n of the Archdiocese v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985), and DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (1993), and concluded that this limited precedent supported:

[T]he following propositions: (1) Title VII and the ADEA are not inapplicable to religious organizations as a general matter; (2) we will permit lay employees-but perhaps not religious employees-to bring discrimination suits against their religious employers; and (3) even when we permit suits by lay employees, we will not subject to examination the genuineness of a proffered religious reason for an employment action.

Cote, 520 F.3d at 207. The court continued, "Presented with this occasion to formally adopt the ministerial exception, we affirm the vitality of that doctrine in the Second Circuit. In our view, the ministerial exception is constitutionally required by various doctrinal underpinnings of the First Amendment." Id. The...