Redman v. State

• Decision Date: 19 February 1908
• Parties: REDMAN v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

108 S.W. 365

REDMAN v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

February 19, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Hill County; W. C. Wear, Judge.

C. A. Redman was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Ivy, Hill & Greenwood, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

This conviction was for murder in the first degree, the punishment assessed at life imprisonment.

The facts in this case in substance show that the deceased had stated to two or three different parties on Wednesday before the killing on Monday that old man Caruth's daughter, Kittie, was six months gone, and that appellant was the daddy of the child. Wallace, one of the parties to whom the deceased had told this, told the appellant about it on the Thursday following. The deceased was working in a field close by when he told him. Appellant saw him several times that day and he said nothing about it. Kittie Caruth was a first cousin of appellant, her mother and appellant's father being brother and sister. On Saturday, the appellant purchased a pistol in Hillsboro, and on Sunday night he went to his uncle's house, had a talk with Kittie Caruth and wanted to know of her if what old man Robertson said was true. She denounced it as false. The appellant, in company with Bert Caruth and the witnesses Billbray and Wallace, went to see old man James about the matter, the said James being the grandfather of Kittie, and the matter was there talked over as to what deceased should have said in regard to Kittie's pregnancy. The next Monday morning, appellant and Bert Caruth went to the field where Robertson was working, and Bert Caruth asked deceased if it was true that he had been saying these things about Kittie. He said, "Yes, he had told it to a couple of gentlemen, and that he thought it ought to be told." Appellant spoke up, and told him it was a damn lie, and commenced shooting; emptied his pistol; the deceased fell, and then got up and started to a barn or some kind of an outhouse, some 200 yards off. Appellant followed him, reloading his pistol. The wife and daughter of the deceased appeared upon the scene, and begged appellant not to shoot any more. Deceased got in this outhouse and shut the door. Appellant went to the door, pushed it open, and fired four or five shots, killing deceased. Deceased cried out several times, "Lord, have mercy! Don't!" Kittie Caruth got upon the stand and testified that three months after the death of deceased she gave birth to a child and appellant was the father of said child. She admitted, however, that she had practically denied to the grand jury and to other parties that appellant was the father of the child.

Bill of exceptions No. 1 shows that appellant placed Miss Blanche Caruth, Kittie's sister, upon the stand, and offered to prove by her, and would have done so, that appellant had frequently been to their home as a visitor and guest; that ever since appellant had been in Hill county he had frequently been in their home; that she had observed his conduct when he was in the presence of and associated with Kittie Caruth, and had never seen him take or offer to take any liberty with her sister, Kittie Caruth; that appellant had frequently attended gatherings with witness and said Kittie Caruth. The bill shows further that deceased had at different times and to different persons made statements imputing a want of chastity and virtue to Miss Kittie Caruth, which statements were communicated to appellant before the homicide. That appellant was her first cousin, and the evidence showed that deceased had charged that Kittie Caruth was pregnant, she being an unmarried female. Appellant claimed he killed deceased on account of said slander. The state placed said Kittie Caruth on the stand, and proved by her that about three months after the homicide she gave birth to a baby, and proved by her that appellant was the father of her child. She testified that appellant had intercourse with her but twice, once in her home in Hill county, and once in the home of appellant's father in Goliad county, and that when the intercourse occurred in her home her brother, Bert Caruth, was in the room when and where it occurred, and that her sister, Blanche Caruth, was in the next room. Kittie Caruth admitted that she had told every one with whom she had talked about it that appellant was innocent, and that she had so testified under oath before the grand jury. She admitted that she was never engaged to appellant. She also stated that she had been receiving the attentions of one Wes Holmes before the killing, and had carried on a correspondence with him. This was all against her father's commands; that there was evidence to the effect that deceased, John Robertson, in his statement about Kittie Caruth had said Wes Holmes might be guilty of placing this girl in a family way, and that suspicion pointed to him, and that Holmes was a cousin of his wife, and his wife had sent Holmes word to leave the country; and the evidence further shows that Wes Holmes had left the country.

The above is a rehearsal of all the facts set up in the bills of exceptions. The evidence was admissible. It is a matter of vital importance to appellant as to whether or not he was the author of Kittie Caruth's shame. If he was, he could not claim, in law, any reduction of the homicide to manslaughter by virtue of slander of a female relative. Therefore, any circumstances that went to refute the idea that he was the author of her shame would be admissible, however meager said circumstance. If his conduct towards Kittie Caruth in the presence of her relatives or associates was decorous, decent, and proper, while a small fact, nevertheless would be admissible on the controverting issue as to whether or not he was the author of her shame.

Bill of exceptions No. 3 complains of the refusal to allow appellant to prove by W. A. Wallace as to what appellant said on the night before the killing; that he (appellant) did not believe the statements of John Robertson, and that he believed that Robertson was lying on Kittie Caruth, and that he believed Kittie was innocent. This would be a self-serving declaration and not admissible.

Among other clauses of the court's charge, we find the following: "The burden is on the state at every point and on every issue to establish the guilt of the defendant by legal competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant; and in case you have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant you will give him the benefit of such doubt, and find him not guilty of every grade of homicide above manslaughter." This charge was tantamount to telling the jury to find appellant at least guilty of manslaughter. Article 765 of White's Annotated Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: "The defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal evidence, and in case of reasonable doubt as to his guilt he is...