Redmond Park Hosp. LLC v. Floyd Health Care Mgmt. Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21A0086, A21A0087, A21A0088 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | REDMOND PARK HOSPITAL LLC d/b/a Redmond Regional Medical Center v. FLOYD HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT INC. d/b/a Floyd Medical Center et al. Redmond Park Hospital LLC d/b/a Redmond Regional Medical Center v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc. et al. Redmond Park Hospital LLC d/b/a Redmond Regional Medical Center v. Tanner Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Tanner Medical Center -Carrollton et al. |
Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield, Joshua Barrett Belinfante, Daniel J. Monahan, for Appellant.
Parker Hudson Rainer & Dobbs, Armando L. Basarrate II, Elizabeth M. Kitchens, Grace P. Kopache ; McRae Smith Peek Harman & Monroe, Julius W. Peek, Jr., Benjamin P. Stell, for appellees (case no. A21A0086).
Arnall Golden Gregory, Jason E. Bring, Chesley S. McLeod ; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Margaret K. Eckrote, Deputy Attorney General, Daniel S. Walsh, Robin G. Koenig, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Dale M. Cecka, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees (case no. A21A0087).
KBP Law, Kathlynn B. Polvino ; Baker & Hostetler, Robert M. Rozier ; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Margaret K. Eckrote, Deputy Attorney General, Daniel S. Walsh, Robin G. Koenig, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Dale M. Cecka, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees (case no. A21A0088).
Georgia's State Health Planning and Development Act, OCGA § 31-6-1 et seq. (the "CON Act"),1 and its implementing rules, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. ("Rule") 111-2-2-.01 et seq., mandate that any medical facility seeking to intervene into the administrative appeal of a competing health care facility that has applied for a certificate of need ("CON") from the Department of Community Health ("the Department") to offer new health care services do so within 30 days of the Department's initial decision. OCGA § 31-6-44 (d) ; see also Rule 274-1-.03 (2). Redmond Park Hospital LLC d/b/a Redmond Regional Medical Center ("Redmond") sought to intervene in the administrative appeals of Floyd Health Care Management Inc. d/b/a Floyd Medical Center ("Floyd"), Hamilton Medical Center, Inc. ("Hamilton"), and Tanner Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Tanner Medical Center-Carrollton ("Tanner") (collectively, "the Medical Centers"), each of which had applied for a CON to offer new open heart surgery
services. Redmond, however, failed to do so within 30 days of the Department's initial decision. Redmond now argues that the CON Act does not govern its intervention rights in the CON appellate processes into which it sought to intervene. We disagree with Redmond's position. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the Floyd appeal, Case No. A21A0086, as moot.2 We otherwise affirm the superior courts’ orders in Hamilton, Case No. A21A0087, and Tanner, Case No. A21A0088.
Upon review of a ruling from the Department, this Court generally "determines whether ‘substantial evidence’ supports the agency's findings of fact, and whether the conclusions of law drawn from those findings of fact are sound." Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center , 310 Ga. App. 487, 488, 714 S.E.2d 71 (2011). To the extent that pertinent facts in this case are undisputed and the jurisdictional issues before this Court involve purely questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC v. Georgia Department of Community Health , 344 Ga. App. 583, 583, 811 S.E.2d 64 (2018).
The undisputed facts are as follows. In February 2018, the Medical Centers each applied for a CON that would allow them to develop open heart surgery
services in their respective service areas. The Medical Centers each applied for a CON under the general review considerations contained in OCGA § 31-6-42 (a), and the service-specific Department rules governing open heart surgery services, including the "atypical barrier to care" exception set forth in Rule 111-2-2-.22 (3) (a) (2).3
Redmond notified the Department of its objection to all three applications and filed opposition materials to each during the initial review process. The Department consolidated the applications and issued its initial decision denying all three on June 25, 2018 (the "Initial Decision"). The deadline to request an administrative appeal hearing to the CON Appeal Panel or to request to intervene in such a hearing was July 25, 2018. See OCGA § 31-6-44 (d) ; Rule 274-1-.04 (3). Tanner filed its request for an administrative appeal hearing on July 23, 2018, and Floyd and Hamilton filed their respective requests on July 24, 2018.
On July 26, 2018, 31 days after the Department issued its Initial Decision, Redmond filed a request to intervene in Floyd's administrative appeal hearing, citing the CON statute and its implementing rules. See OCGA § 31-6-44 (d) ; Rule 274-1-.03. Floyd filed a motion to deny Redmond's request to intervene as untimely under the same statutory and regulatory authority. Thereafter, 51 days after the Department issued its Initial Decision, Redmond filed a request with the CON Appeal Panel seeking to also intervene in Hamilton's and Tanner's respective appeals. As before, Redmond's request to intervene cited the CON statute and its implementing rules, but it also contained a "request to intervene as a permissive party" under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Both Hamilton and Tanner filed motions opposing Redmond's requests to intervene in their respective appeals on the ground that the requests were untimely.
The appeal panel hearing officer issued an order granting the Medical Centers’ motions to deny Redmond's intervention requests in each of the appeals, holding that Redmond's failure to file its requests within 30 days of the Department's Initial Decision precluded it from intervening in the appeals under both the CON Act and the APA (the "Intervention Order"). Upon examination of the merits of the appeals themselves, the hearing officer ultimately affirmed the Department's denial of each of the Medical Centers’ CON applications.
The Medical Centers continued to pursue their administrative appeals, each seeking review from the Department's Commissioner. See OCGA § 31-6-44 (i). Likewise, Redmond appealed to the Commissioner to review the hearing officer's Intervention Order denying its requests to intervene.4 The Commissioner, through a designee, issued a final order reversing the denial of Hamilton's and Tanner's CON applications, instead granting those applications under the "atypical barrier to care" exception (the "Final Order"). See Rule 111-2-2-.22 (3) (a) (2). In the Final Order, the Commissioner's designee affirmed the denial of Floyd's application and denied Redmond's request to overturn the Intervention Order.
In three separate actions, Redmond petitioned the Superior Court of Fulton County for judicial review of the Final Order. In the Floyd action, Redmond requested that it be permitted "to participate as an intervening party" in the event that a petition for review was filed by Floyd.5 In the Hamilton and Tanner actions, Redmond sought judicial review of the Final Order's grant of the CON applications. Redmond also sought a declaratory judgment in the Hamilton and Tanner actions that the "atypical barrier to care" rule6 under which the Commissioner's designee granted their CON applications be declared null and void.
The Medical Centers each moved to dismiss Redmond's petitions for want of standing and, after conducting a consolidated hearing, the superior court granted the Medical Centers’ motions in each action. In three separate orders, the superior court determined that Redmond lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Final Order under both the CON Act and the APA because it failed to timely seek intervention in the initial administrative appeal hearing before the CON Appeal Panel.7 In the Hamilton and Tanner actions, the superior court further held that Redmond could not "invoke declaratory judgment as a means of circumventing the timely intervention requirements of the CON Act and thus avoid its obligation to exhaust all administrative remedies." This appeal follows.
1. Redmond argues that the superior court erred by holding that it lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Final Order, an error that Redmond asserts was premised upon the superior court's erroneous conclusion that its requests to intervene in the administrative appeal hearing before the CON Appeal panel were untimely. We disagree.
By its express language, the CON Act limits the entities who may seek judicial review of a Commissioner's final order to "[a]ny party to the initial administrative appeal hearing." OCGA § 31-6-44.1 (a). Redmond concedes that it was not a party to the initial administrative appeal before the CON Appeal Panel hearing officer. Thus, the issue of whether Redmond had standing to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's Final Order turns on whether Redmond's exclusion from the Medical Centers’ initial administrative appeal hearing was erroneous.8
The CON Act and its implementing rules dictate unequivocally that "[a] request for hearing or intervention shall be filed with the chairperson of the [CON Appeal Panel] within 30 days of the date of the [Department's initial decision]." OCGA § 31-6-44 (d) ; see Rule 274-1-.03 (2) (); Rule 274-1-.03 (3) ().
Nevertheless, Redmond argues that its requests to intervene, filed 31 days and 51 days after the Department's Initial Decision was rendered, were not untimely because (a) there was not an existing proceeding in which to...
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