Redmond v. United States

• Decision Date: 01 February 2022
• Docket Number: 22-60C
• Parties: SCOTT D. REDMOND, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

SCOTT D. REDMOND, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 22-60C

United States Court of Federal Claims

February 1, 2022

Scott D. Redmond, Pro Se, San Mateo, CA.

Ioana Cristei, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

OPINION AND ORDER

ELAINE D. KAPLAN, Chief Judge.

BACKGROUND

I. Preliminary Matters

On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, 2679, and seeking damages, costs, fees, and declaratory relief. See Compl. at 1-2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's complaint was unsigned and filed under the name "John Doe." Id. at 1. Accordingly, the Court instructed Plaintiff that he should caption all future filings in accordance with Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"), which provides that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties," and that all other pleadings must "nam[e] the first party on each side." See Order at 2 ECF No. 6.^[1]

Shortly thereafter, the Clerk received Plaintiff's submission, entitled "Plaintiff's Name Request And Affidavit," requesting that his name be removed from "all case records" and that the Clerk "correct the text to 'DOE 1' on all future publications or documents," and alleging that Plaintiff "has been attacked in the past as a whistle-blower and threatened with further bodily harm over this case."

The Clerk is directed to FILE Plaintiff's submission as a motion for leave to proceed under the pseudonym "John Doe." However, as explained in the Court's prior Order, "[t]he use of pseudonyms in a complaint is contrary to" the requirements of RCFC 10(a), and the Court will accordingly allow a party "to proceed anonymously only where unusual circumstances justify concealing [the] party's identity." Whalen v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 685, 691 (2008) (quoting Wolfchild v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 521, 552 (2004)); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing "a limited number of exceptions to the general requirement of disclosure") (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his need for anonymity outweighs the "the general presumption that parties' identities [will] be available to the public and the likelihood of prejudice to the opposing party." Boggs v. United States, 143 Fed.Cl. 508, 511 (2019) (quoting Whalen, 80 Fed.Cl. at 691); see also Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bowers, 283 Fed.Appx. 808, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting the "presumption of public access to judicial records"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed under a pseudonym is DENIED.

Also submitted to the Clerk was a one-page document printed with the line "Motion To Request FBI 302 Reports, "^[2] and two submissions titled "New Evidence" and "New Evidence Published In National News Confirming RICO Violations," dated January 26 and 27, 2022, respectively, which consist of news articles published by The Daily Mail and Bloomberg Businessweek and purport to "verif[y] the fact that Defendants regularly hire assassins that have led to the murder of over 32 persons in this case," and allegedly confirm "that United States public officials knowingly and actively participate in an organized crime, RICO-violating 'Enterprise' known covertly as the 'Silicon Valley Cartel.'" The Court construes these submissions as motions to file the documents therein as additional exhibits in support of Plaintiff's complaint. The Clerk is therefore directed to FILE these submissions.

The Court is also in receipt of Plaintiff's submission, titled "Non Bias Validation Request And Affidavit," requesting that the Court provide assurances that he will receive "a fair hearing." Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 144, "Bias or prejudice of judge." That statutory provision, however, applies only to "a district court." See 28 U.S.C. § 144.^[3] The Court of Federal Claims is not a district court. Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S.Ct. 553, 563 (2017) (distinguishing between "the Court of Federal Claims" and "the federal district courts"). The provision on which Plaintiff relies is thus inapplicable, and his motion is DENIED.

Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff's "Motion for Court Provided Attorney and Request [Department] of Justice to Join Case." Motion to Appoint Counsel at 1 (arguing that counsel should be appointed "due to extenuating circumstances including the public-interest nature of this anti-corruption case and the extensive service to nation and community by Plaintiff" and explaining that he has not been able to secure a law firm to represent him), ECF No. 10. Plaintiff cites Gideon v. Wainwright, which held that indigent state criminal defendants are entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (recognizing the "obvious truth" that, "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"). That provision is inapplicable to Plaintiff's civil claim against the federal government.

Further, although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides that this Court "may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel," this civil right "is highly circumscribed, and has been authorized in exceedingly restricted circumstances." Lariscey v. United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Washington v. United States, 93 Fed.Cl. 706, 709 (2010) (providing that "only in civil cases that present an extreme hardship to petitioner are courts empowered to cause legal assistance to be provided"). Such "extreme circumstances" are not present here. Washington, 93 Fed.Cl. at 708; see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C. , 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding "that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty"); Omran v. United States, 629 Fed.Appx. 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("With only monetary compensation potentially at stake, there is no private interest, government interest or risk of erroneous decision here strong enough to overcome 'the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.'" (quoting Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1270)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for the Court to request an attorney, ECF No. 10, is DENIED.

II. The Complaint

In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that he has been subject to "reprisal for his whistle-blowing and his assistance to law enforcement," which he alleges was "sponsored by public officials who were employees and contractors of [the United States]." Compl. at 5 (asserting that the United States, through various federal agencies, has "spent over $30 million dollars [sic] in fees and services contracting and executing attacks on Plaintiff"). In addition to a bevy of tort claims alleged against the United States, Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of contract and patent infringement. The bulk of Plaintiff's complaint and the exhibit submitted in support thereof, as well as the two supplemental exhibits titled "New Evidence," consist of links to online news articles; copies of news articles; and lengthy, uncited quotes from news articles. See generally Compl. at 7-23; Compl., Ex. 1 ("Political Corruption Case Overview - Evidence Package One"), ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff seeks "[a] declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) that the denial of [his] applications was unlawful, " "compensatory and injunctive relief directing" the government to approve a loan application, damages, "including any punitive or exemplary damages claimed, in the precedent amounts per past related cases, per the reasons claimed herein," and costs and fees. Id. at 60.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court has determined that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's claims, and the case will therefore be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction is a threshold matter, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998), and the Court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S 500, 506-07, 514 (2006). As such, the Court may raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own at any time without a motion from a party. Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." RCFC 12(h)(3); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506-07, 514 (stating that courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party"). And while it is well established that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the Court that jurisdictional requirements have been met, Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 497, 499, aff'd, 98 Fed. App'x. 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Zulueta v. United States, 553 Fed. App'x. 983, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements" (citation omitted)).

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