Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregoire
| Decision Date | 17 November 1954 |
| Citation | 128 Cal.App.2d 766,276 P.2d 78 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | REDWOOD CITY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, an elementary school district of the County of San Mateo, State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Katherine GREGOIRE, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 15993. |
Louis Ferrari, San Francisco, Currie, Lebsack & Hannig, Redwood City, for appellant.
Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., of San Mateo County, Lyle R. Edson, Dep. Dist. Atty., Redwood City, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment after jury verdict in a condemnation suit brought by respondent Redwood City Elementary School District. The jury assessed the market value of the land with improvements thereon at $83,500, as of November 14, 1952, and judgment was rendered in favor of appellant Katherine Gregoire, in that amount.
The property here sought to be condemned was held in joint tenancy by Louis Gregoire and Katherine Gregoire, his wife, when these proceedings were commenced, but Louis Gregoire had died before the case came to trial. The property had been purchased by the Gregoires in 1923. As Mr. Gregoire was in the cut flower business, the property was used to produce flowers for sale and shipment. Large numbers of acacia and eucalyptus trees were planted on the property for use in the florist business. The Gregoire family also used the property as a summer home. The house, which consisted of six bedrooms, sunporch and kitchen, was enlarged in 1932, and a barbecue with kitchen and a dance hall were added to the property. Attached to the house are workmen's quarters. Also on the property are garage, hay barn, chicken coops and sheep barns.
Albert Gregoire, a son of Louis and Katherine Gregoire, testified in detail concerning the above improvements, as well as the types of soil contained on the property and their adaptability for raising crops of different kinds. He was thoroughly familiar with the property, and had been in business with his father. He was at the time of trial living in San Bruno, California, and was still in the business of flower grower and florist. The witness estimated that the property was about 5 blocks distant from a new market, a little more than a mile from a new shopping center at Five Points, and about two miles from the Southern Pacific station in Redwood City.
All of the experts who testified agreed that the highest and best use of the property would be for a residential subdivision of single-family residences. A zoning ordinance permitted construction of single family residences in this area with building sites of a minimum of 6,000 square feet. Appellant's witness Riley estimated that the tract could be divided into 63 lots according to a plat which he had prepared, while respondent's witness Ingram in his plat arrived at 65 lots. The witnesses gave the following estimates of the market value of the property:
Frank J. Graff, for appellant ...... $146,760
Ralph Riley, for appellant ......... $153,000
David Ingram, for respondent ....... $ 78,750
J. Mortimer Clark, for respondent .. $ 78,400
Appellant contends first that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. It is argued that only appellant's witness Graff testified as to the value of the lots that would result if the property was subdivided, and that Graff's estimate of $146,760 was arithmetically demonstrated. Appellant says that it was the duty of respondent to contradict this testimony if it were not correct, and that in not doing so the District acquiesced in Graff's figures. This argument assumes that the jury were bound to accept the figures of Graff if they were not directly contradicted as to the market value of the property if used as a residential subdivision. Graff's evaluation of the property was for use solely as a residential subdivision. The expert witnesses of respondent Clark and Ingram did not base their estimate of market value on residential subdivision use only, but took into consideration other factors, such as the possibility of its continued use for commercial growing of flowers, sales of property in the same general area which were studied and compared with the subject property in the light of the possible uses to which the property could be adapted. Listings of comparable properties at a number of real estate offices were also examined, inquiry made as to how long they had been listed, subdividers and developers were consulted to determine what they would be willing to pay for this property, and the data was analyzed in arriving at market value. Appellant's argument would seem to imply that market value in this case must be fixed solely with reference to the single use of the property as a residential subdivision. It is well settled in this state that fair market value is to be arrived at by considering all the purposes for which the property is adaptable. In the recent case of People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal.2d 738, 751, 264 P.2d 15, 24, it was said: 'This court 'has definitely aligned itself with the great majority of the courts in holding that damages must be measured by the market value of the land at the time it was taken, that the test is not the value for a special purpose, but the fair market value of the land in view of all the purposes to which it is naturally adapted * * *'.' And, see, Sacramento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 412, 104 P. 979; City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, 518, 170 P.2d 928; Orgel on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, § 30, pp. 98-102.
In the instant case there is simply a conflict in the evidence between the experts for appellant and respondent. The divergence in estimates of market value was not nearly so great in this case as it was in City of Daly City v. Smith, 110 Cal.App.2d 524, 243 P.2d 46, in which case the appellate court held that as to the sufficiency of the evidence, such case presented merely a conflict in the evidence. The jury here exercised its discretion, and awarded appellant $5,000 more than the highest estimate of respondent's experts, and that verdict cannot be set aside as unsupported. City of Fresno v. Hedstrom, 103 Cal.App.2d 453, 461, 229 P.2d 809.
Appellant complains of error committed by the trial court in refusing to permit appellant's son, Albert Gregoire, to give his opinion as to value. This witness testified that he had had charge of the property since 1945 for his father, that numerous people had asked to buy the property, that it was wanted by the Archbishop of San Francisco for school purposes, and by numerous subdividers, but that the property was never for sale. He was asked by his counsel: 'Mr. Gregoire, with all the knowledge that you have, with regard to this property, and the discussions you have had with people who have wanted to buy, and your keeping in touch with the developments that have gone on there, and the availability of this property for subdivision purposes, and applying all the knowledge that you have learned in regard to it over these long years since 1924, I understood you to say, what in your opinion is the value of it?' The court sustained the objection to the question. The court asked if he was the owner. Counsel replied that he was the agent of the owner, and evidently referring to Mrs. Gregoire the owner, said The court then said: 'The law says owners or experts,' to which counsel replied: 'Or his agent.' The court: 'Are you going to argue with me all during this trial?' Counsel: 'I haven't so far.' The court: Counsel: 'Very well, your Honor.'
Appellant says that the court cut him off, preventing further argument and that he intended to demonstrate that the witness was qualified not only as representative of the owner, but by reason of his familiarity with the property. Appellant admits that no case has been found where an agent has been permitted to testify for the owner in this type of case.
In the present case the owner of the property was in court. The record does not show why, as counsel stated, she was not in a position to testify. The trial court is the judge of the qualifications of the witness to testify as to land values. 10 Cal.Jur. 1021-1022, § 277. Clearly, the witness here could not qualify as owner. Counsel in the exchange with the court quoted above, did not attempt to show that the witness was specially qualified to judge the market value of this land apart from his attempt to show that he stood in the same position as the owner. The remark of the court appears to mean that the court considered the subject closed as far as showing that the agent of an owner was competent by reason of the fact of agency. The court then asked if there were any more questions from the witness, and counsel apparently had none, for he told counsel for respondent to cross-examine. Furthermore the question propounded to the witness did not call for the fair market value of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig.
...; Zakaria v. Gerber Prods. Co. , 755 Fed. App'x 623, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (California); Redwood City Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Gregoire , 128 Cal.App.2d 766, 276 P.2d 78, 81-82 (1954) (California). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, under the substantive law of all three Bellwether S......
-
Mears v. Mears
...the business was inadmissible evidence because evidence of offers to buy or sell property is improper. Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregoire, 128 Cal.App.2d 766, 276, P.2d 78; People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal.2d 738, 264 P.2d 15; City of Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 P. 224. W......
-
San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Sweet
...720; Los Angeles City High School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 135 Cal.App.2d 760, 768, 287 P.2d 871; see Redwood City, Etc., School District v. Gregoire, 128 Cal.App.2d 766, 771, 276 P.2d 78.) A witness so qualified, even though not an expert appraiser, is entitled to state the reasons for his opin......
-
Tacchino v. State Department of Highways
...plan to do with his property is not to be considered by the jury as enhancing its market value. Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregoire, 128 Cal.App.2d 766, 276 P.2d 78, 83 (1954). The owners of the land sought to be condemned are entitled to recover the value of the land at its hi......