Reece v. Review Bd. of Employment Sec. Division

• Decision Date: 22 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 2--576A185,2--576A185
• Citation: 172 Ind.App. 503,360 N.E.2d 1262
• Parties: Dorothy E. REECE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. REVIEW BOARD OF the EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, William H. Skinner and Ralph H. Miles, as Members of and constituting a quorum of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Huffman Manufacturing Corporation, Appellee(Defendant).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1262

360 N.E.2d 1262

172 Ind.App. 503

Dorothy E. REECE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. REVIEW BOARD OF the EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, William H Skinner and Ralph H. Miles, as Members of and constituting a quorum of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Huffman Manufacturing Corporation Appellee(Defendant).

No. 2--576A185.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

March 22, 1977.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1977.

Clyde Williams, Jr., Williams, Delaney & Simkin, Richmond, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Darrel K. Diamond, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

This case was transferred to this office from the Second District in order to help eliminate the disparity in caseloads among the Districts.

Claimant-appellant, Dorothy E. Reece (Dorothy), appeals from the adverse judgment of the Richmond, Indiana, Employment Security Division (ESD) raising the following issue ¹ for our review:

1. Whether, following the initial denial of her claim for compensation benefits, she sought timely review before a Referee of the ESD.

The facts necessary for our disposition of this appeal are as follows: On November 27, 1974, Dorothy filed her claim seeking unemployment compensation benefits. On December 12, 1974, Dorothy's claim for compensation benefits was denied by a Deputy of the ESD. Dorothy was handed a copy of the Determination Letter denying her benefits by an employee of the ESD on December 18, 1974. From the confusing record, it appears that Dorothy received a copy of the Determination Letter denying her benefits by mail on either December 20, 23, 24, or 26, 1974.

On December 26, 1974, Dorothy filed a petition seeking review of the Deputy's decision before a Referee of the ESD. On February 3, 1975, the Referee entered her decision which provided, omitting formal parts, as follows:

'* * *

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED: Indiana Code 1971, Title 22, Article 4, Chapter 17--2(e) of the Indiana Employment Security Act . . .

Claimant appealed deputy's determination, dated December 12, 1974, which held claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause in connection with the work. Claimant appealed in Richmond, Indiana on December 26, 1974. Claimant was heard in Richmond, Indiana on January 27, 1975, and was represented by Clyde Williams, Attorney. Employer did not appear.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The date of the deputy's determination was December 12, 1974. Thereafter the claimant filed her appeal on December 26, 1974. Chapter 17--2(e) of the Indiana Employment Security Act provides that if a determination of the deputy is not appealed within ten (10) days after the date the determination is mailed or otherwise delivered, the determination becomes final. After a determination becomes final, the referee has no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits. (Steel Transport(t)ation Co., Inc. v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division (1962), (134) Ind.App. (95), 186 N.E.2d 174)

DECISION: The determination of the deputy became final ten (10) days after December 12, 1974. The referee has no jurisdiction except to dismiss this appeal. This appeal is dismissed. * * *' (Our emphasis) On April 7, 1976, the Full Review Board sustained the Referee's decision.

IC 1971, 22--4--17--2(e) provides, inter-alia, as follows:

'(e) In cases where the claimant's benefit eligibility or disqualification is disputed, the division shall promptly notify the claimant . . . unless the claimant or such employer within ten (10) days after such notification was mailed to his or its last known address, or otherwise delivered to him or it, asks a hearing before a referee thereon, such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith . . .' (Our emphasis)

In the case at bar the Referee, and upon appeal the Full Review Board, decided that a Deputy's decision that a claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits became final ten (10) days after the Deputy's Determination Letter was deposited in the mail. As authority for its position appellee relies upon the case of Steel Transportation Co. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1962), 134 Ind.App. 95, 186 N.E.2d 174. The Steel Transportation case is devoid of any facts which surrounded the controversy of the parties therein. Rather, the opinion held only that the claimant had not filed notice of his intention to appeal within the statutory ten (10) day period, without reaching the critical issue before this court of when the ten (10) day limitation period begins to run.

IC 1971, 22--4--17--2(e), supra, is ambiguous as to exactly when the ten (10) day limitation period starts to run. If this court should look only at that part of subsection (e) which provides that 'unless the claimant . . . within ten (10) days after such notification was mailed to his . . . last known address,' we could agree with the Review Board that the ten (10) day limitation period starts to run upon the deposit of the Division Deputy's Determination Letter in the mail. However, subsection (e) also provides that 'the division shall promptly notify the claimant,' and further that, 'unless the claimant . . . within ten (10) days after such notification was mailed to his . . . last known address, or otherwise delivered to him . . ., asks (for) a hearing before a referee thereon, such decision shall be final . . .' This statutory language would indicate that our legislature contemplated that an unemployment compensation claimant would have ten (10) days to seek review of the denial of benefits from the date the Division Deputy's Determination Letter was delivered to him.

Having determined that IC 1971, 22--4--17--2(e) is fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is the duty of this court to construe subsection (e) in such a manner as will promote the intention of our legislature in enacting the Employment Security Act. ²

In construing the language of an ambiguous statute this court is guided by several fundamental maxims of statutory construction.

The Employment Security Act represents social legislation, and therefore merits a liberal construction to promote its underlying humanitarian purposes. IC 1971, 22--4--1--1 (Burns Code Ed.); Hacker v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division (1971), 149 Ind.App. 223, 271 N.E.2d 191, 195. In Nordhoff v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1959), 130 Ind.App. 172, 162 N.E.2d 717, at 722, the underlying purposes of the Act were described as follows:

'. . . to alleviate the distressing consequences to the health, welfare, morale and public order of the involved individual and the people generally brought about by unemployment and consequent loss of wages and income of those who become unemployed through no fault of their own. . . .'

See, also, Schakel v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division (1968), 142 Ind.App. 475, 235 N.E.2d 497, 500.

Also, a statutory construction which will result in harsh, unjust, or absurd consequences should be avoided if possible. Chaffin v. Nicosia (1974), 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867, 870; State ex rel. Clark v. Stout ...