Reece v. State, 18553

• Citation: 210 Ga. 578,82 S.E.2d 10
• Decision Date: 11 May 1954
• Docket Number: No. 18553,18553
• Parties: REECE v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 10

82 S.E.2d 10

210 Ga. 578

REECE v. STATE.

No. 18553.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 11, 1954.

Daniel Duke, Atlanta, Gordon M. Combs, Frank D. Holcomb, Marietta, for plaintiff in error.

Luther C. Hames, Jr., Sol. Gen., Marietta, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

CANDLER, Justice.

Amos Reece was indicted for rape in Cobb County, and was convicted without any recommendation and sentenced to be electrocuted. Thereafter he filed a motion for new trial on the usual general grounds, and later amended it by adding two special grounds. He excepted in due time to the denial of his amended motion for new trial, and assigns error on pendente lite exceptions to two antecedent rulings, one refusing to continue the case, and the other denying his motion to quash the indictment. Held:

1. When, as here, the accused has been arrested for the commission of a penal offense and is committed to jail, he is apprised of the fact that his case or the charge against him will undergo grand-jury investigation, and it is incumbent upon him to raise objections to the competency of the grand jurors before they find an indictment against him. Such being the instant case, the court did not err in denying the motion to quash the indictment. See Turner v. State, 78 Ga. 174; Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347, 372, 16 S.E. 945, 35 Am.St.Rep. 216; Parris v. State, 125 Ga. 777, 54 S.E. 751; Tucker v. State, 135 Ga. 79, 68 S.E. 786; Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 64, 11 S.E.2d 350; Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243(5), 249, 12 S.E.2d 64. And this rule applies whether the accused had counsel before the indictment was returned against him or not. Tucker v. State, supra.

2. In the instant case the judge charged the jury: 'Generally, with regard to the question of sanity or insanity at the time of the alleged act and the act alleged to be a crime, the true test of sanity or insanity is as follows: The insanity which renders the perpetrator of a particular act which is criminal incapable of committing a crime is such as deprives him of his capacity to distinguish between right and wrong relative to such act. Mere feebleness or weakness of mind is not sufficient to excuse a person from crime, provided the mind is still sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong with relation to the act charged.' Subsequently, the judge gave this further instruction: 'The law does not attempt to measure the degree of insanity which renders a man legally responsible for his acts. That is a question for the jury.' To this latter instruction the defendant excepts on the ground that it is an abstractly incorrect statement of the law, in that the law does fix a degree of insanity with which a person may be afflicted and yet be legally responsible for his acts, and that the instruction complained of was inconsistent with and antagonistic to the charge set out above and tended to and did confuse and mislead the jury as to a material issue involved in the movant's case. It is also alleged that the charge complained of left with the jury two distinct propositions of law directly antagonistic to and in conflict with each other, and that the excerpt complained of was not withdrawn by the judge anywhere in his charge. Since the trial judge had previously given a correct charge on the issue of insanity, we agree and hold that his further instruction on the question of criminal responsibility was misleading and confusing and...