Reed Bros., Inc. v. Board of Sup'rs of Lee County

• Decision Date: 16 February 1921
• Docket Number: 21830
• Citation: 126 Miss. 162,88 So. 504
• Parties: REED BROS., INC., v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF LEE COUNTY
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

88 So. 504

126 Miss. 162

REED BROS., INC., v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF LEE COUNTY

No. 21830

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 16, 1921

TAXATION. Statute providing for ad valorem taxes held unconstitutional.

Chapter 75, Laws 1908 (section 6889, 6890, Hemingway's Code) providing that stocks of goods, wares, and merchandise offered for sale by any firm, person, or corporation commencing business after the 1st day of February of the current year shall be assessed for ad valorem taxes, on given basis of the tax for a whole year, fixing the dates and proportions at quarterly periods, is unconstitutional because in conflict with section 112 of the state Constitution, providing that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state, and shall be assessed under general laws and by uniform rules according to its true value; the general law fixing the 1st day of February in each year as the date for assessing and valuing other property for ad valorem taxation.

HON. C P. LONG, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Lee county, HON. C. P. LONG, Judge.

Proceedings to impose an assessment on the property of Reed Bros Incorporated. The assessment was sustained by the board of supervisors of Lee county and by the circuit court, and Reed Bros. appeal. Reversed and rendered for appellant.

Judgment reversed.

Robins & Thomas, for appellant.

Section 112 of the Constitution: "Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform rules, according to its true value.

Chapter 75 of the Laws of 1908, being section 6889 and 6890, Hemingway's Code, reads as follows: "Special tax on business opened after February first, apportion--(1) An ad valorem tax shall be assessed and collected upon all stocks of goods, wares and merchandise offered for sale by any person, firm, or corporation, commencing business after the first day of February, of the current year, which said tax shall be apportioned according to the date at which the business is commenced, as follows, to-wit:

If commenced after February First and Before April First, 1-4.

If commenced after April First and Before July First, 1-2.

If commenced after July First and Before October First, 1-4.

It is our contention that this act of the legislature when carried into effect is discriminatory. We recognize that this court, in numerous cases, has held that the legislature may exempt certain classes of property from taxation, and it may make certain classifications of property for the purpose of taxation. A reference to Judge TRULY'S opinion in the case of Adams v. Kuykendall (1903), 83 Miss. 583, et seq., together with the cases there cited, will show the trend and development of this doctrine.

It might be of some value to the court, in a development of this question, to review the familiar case of Mississippi Mills v. Cooke (1878), 56 Miss. 41, in which three opinions of the court were written, and each of which is instructive and helpful.

Section 112 of the Constitution, as we see it defines the limitations of the inherent power of the legislature to tax, according to their will, and these limitations might be summed up as follows: (1) Tax shall be uniform; (2) Equal; (3) In proportion to value; (4) By general laws; (5) by Uniform rules.

We will not insist upon the third limitation mentioned as being violated, for we assume that this statute conforms to the constitutional provision with reference to being assessed according to its value, and we may also concede that law complies with the constitution by being a general law.

However, it is our idea that if the legislative act in its effect, results, in an unequal distribution of the burden of taxation, then is is not uniform, and the rule of its enforcement is not uniform and is discriminatory. In other words, while we may confess the power of the legislature, under this constitutional provision, to discriminate to a certain point, yet this particular law, in its enforcement, shows an illegal discrimination.

While we may admit the right of the legislature to place the burden upon a certain class of property, to-wit: merchandise; yet the same rate of taxation would necessarily have to apply to all other property, to come within the limitations of this provision of the Constitution, although it would apply to all persons alike, who held merchandise, but the discrimination comes in that a farmer could buy mules after the first day of February, yet there is no statute which makes the distribution of the burden of tax equal and compel him to pay his part, and the mules would escape taxation, and not be put on a uniform basis with merchandise, because the mules were not possessed by the owner on the first day of February.

The power of the legislature to classify is limited. Certain attempts at classifying by the legislature, may be illegal and in contravention of this constitutional provision as shown in the case of Adams v. Kuykendall, supra, and as shown in the case of Adams v. Mississippi Lumber Company, 84 Miss. 23, s. c. 36 So. 68.

We respectfully submit that this case should be reversed and the assessment held illegal.

Mitchell & Clayton, for appellees.

The only question to be considered by the court is the constitutionality of section 6889 of Hemingway's Code. Appellants contend that this section is unconstitutional in that it violates the provision of section 112 of the constitution. Our contention is that this section only fixes a time for assessing taxable property and in no sense does it discriminate.

Section 6888 of Hemingway's Code, provides that: "All taxable property brought into the state or acquired or held by any person before the first day of February shall be assessed and taxes thereon paid for the current year." Section 6889 making a definite provision for stocks of goods, wares and merchandise and it might well be contended that section 6889 is in conflict with section 6888. If this be true, however, it does not follow that either of said sections violate any provision of the constitution.

So far as the constitution is concerned there is no time fixed for the assessing of property and that matter is left solely to the legislature. As we view the matter the legislature might fix the first day of February for the time to assess real estate and fix the first day of April as the time for personal property other than stocks of merchandise and fix the assessment of merchandise as provided in section 6889. This whole subject matter is the time at which property is to be assessed during the year.

It is easy to see a reason for classifying stocks and merchandise as property for in this law it is part of the history of this state of which the court would take judicial knowledge that mercantile firms would begin business of February and second or at an early date after February the first in order to avoid taxes for the current year. This was the evil to be remedied. Section 6889 is the remedy provided for this evil. We submit that the legislature had the right to correct this evil and that this act is valid.

We have had a statute similar to this since 1896 and it has become the fixed policy of the state to enforce such statute. In the case of Jennings v. Coahoma County, 79 Miss. 523, this statute of 1896, chapter 38, was before the court and although the constitutionality of same was not raised, the court held the statute effective.

The court should be reluctant to disturb the policy of the state in revenue matters and we believe will not do so unless absolutely necessary.

We submit that the court should hold this statute valid and that this case should be affirmed.

OPINION

ETHRIDGE, J.

This is an appeal from an assessment imposed on Reed Bros Incorporated, under chapter 75, Laws of 1908 (sections 6889, 6890, Hemingway's Code). The case...