Reed's Admrx. v. I. C. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1918 |
| Citation | 182 Ky. 455 |
| Parties | Reed's Administratrix v. Illinois Central Railroad Company. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from McCracken Circuit Court.
SAMUEL A. ANDERSON, JOS. R. GROGAN and W. MIKE OLIVER for appellant.
WHEELER & HUGHES for appellee.
This equitable action was brought in the McCracken circuit court by the Illinois Central Railroad Company against the administratrix of Jerry Reed to enjoin her from prosecuting, in a circuit court in the state of Minnesota, an action there brought against the railroad company to recover damages for the death of her husband, Jerry Reed, which was caused, as alleged by her in the petition filed in the Minnesota court, by the negligence of the railroad company.
When the case came on for hearing in the lower court it was adjudged "that the defendant, Linnie Reed, as administratrix of the estate of Jerry Reed, deceased, be and she is perpetually restrained and enjoined from maintaining, carrying on or prosecuting any suit or procedure by her, now instituted in the state of Minnesota against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, because of, or on account of the death of Jerry Reed, deceased, and she is perpetually restrained and enjoined from prosecuting or assisting in the prosecution, or in any manner trying the cause of Linnie Reed, as administratrix of the estate of Jerry Reed, deceased, plaintiff v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, now pending in the district court of the second judicial district, in the county of Ramsey, in the state of Minnesota, and the said Linnie Reed, administratrix, as aforesaid, is restrained and enjoined perpetually from in any manner assisting or engaging in the prosecution of said suit, so instituted in the state of Minnesota, by her as administratrix of Jerry Reed, deceased, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company." From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Briefly stated the facts out of which the litigation arose are these: Jerry Reed, at the time he received the injury that resulted in his death, was in the employ of the railroad company as a laborer in its yards in Paducah, Kentucky, and it was his duty in the course of his employment to carry ice from an icehouse nearby to passenger cars that were standing on the tracks in the yards. While performing this labor, Reed, in attempting to pass through an opening on one of the tracks that had been made by uncoupling and separating for a distance of a few feet two of the passenger cars, was caught between the cars when an engine attached to one of them backed it against the other for the purpose of making a coupling and was crushed to death, the administratrix claiming that his death was caused by the negligence of the trainmen while the railroad company's contention is that his death was brought about solely by his own negligence.
In its petition for an injunction it was averred that the death of Reed was not caused by any fault on its part; that the trainmen in charge of the engine did not know of the presence of Reed between the cars at the time or before the coupling was made, or have reason to anticipate that he would go between them, as his conduct in so doing was in violation of the rules of the company; that neither the trainmen nor any other employee of the railroad company was guilty of any negligence in the movement of the cars, or in any other respect that contributed to or brought about the death of Reed.
It was further charged that Reed, at the time of his death, was a citizen of the state of Kentucky, residing in the county of McCracken, and that his widow, who qualified as administratrix, was, at the time of her appointment and qualification, and when the injunction suit was brought, a citizen of the state of Kentucky, residing in McCracken county, in which county she qualified as administratrix; that soon thereafter, and while residing in McCracken county, she was persuaded to and did employ one Samuel A. Anderson, an attorney residing in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, who made a specialty of damage suits against corporations, to bring a damage suit for her against the railroad company; that Anderson, in the prosecution of his practice as a damage suit lawyer, had agents or "runners," who were not lawyers, soliciting business for him in the city of Paducah as well as at various other points in several states of the union at which railroad companies, whose lines of railroad entered the state of Minnesota, had lines of road, and transacted business; that through the instrumentality of his agent or "runner," located in Paducah, who was not an attorney-at-law, Anderson procured the administratrix to employ him as attorney to institute and prosecute the damage suit in the courts of Minnesota against the railroad company, and as a part of the contract of employment it was agreed that Anderson would investigate, at his own expense, the facts in relation to the case and pay all cost incident to the institution of the suit, make all bonds that might be necessary in its prosecution, and pay, at his own expense, the railroad fare, hotel bills and other necessary expenses of any witnesses that it might be necessary to take from Paducah to St. Paul, and in addition, support and maintain the administratrix during the pendency of the suit; that in consideration of his services, Anderson should receive thirty-three and one-third per cent of the amount recovered by judgment or compromise; that pursuant to this contract Anderson had paid to the administratrix forty dollars a month, as well as contributed in other ways to her wants.
It was further averred that the practice and procedure in negligence cases in the state of Minnesota were materially different from and much more favorable to the plaintiff in suits against corporations than the practice and procedure in the courts of this state, and that the suit was brought in Minnesota for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the practice and procedure in the courts of Kentucky, and to obtain the advantages that would result from the difference between the practice and procedure in Minnesota and Kentucky controlling and regulating this character of suits.
It is provided in part in section 841 of the Kentucky Statutes that "No company, association or corporation created by, or organized under, the laws or authority of any state or county other than this state, shall possess, control, maintain or operate any railway, or part thereof, in this state until, by incorporation under the laws of this state, the same shall have become a corporation, citizen and resident of this state." And further provided that any company, association or corporation operating a railroad in this state may become "a corporation, citizen and resident of this state," by being incorporated in this state in the manner provided in the statute. And it was averred in the petition that the railroad company had observed the requirements of this statute and thereby become a citizen and resident of this state.
It was further averred that the court in which the suit was brought in the state of Minnesota was about one thousand miles distant from Paducah, in this state, the place of the accident, and that it would entail great and unreasonable expense on the part of the railroad company in transporting and defraying the expenses of its witnesses from Paducah, where they all lived, to the place of trial in Minnesota, and in addition thereto would cause it to suffer great loss and inconvenience on account of the necessity of taking and keeping away from their business for several days and perhaps weeks, witnesses who were connected with the train service and whose presence it would need on the trial of the case; that all of the witnesses that would be needed on the trial of the case by both the plaintiff and defendant were residents of the city of Paducah and engaged in business there at the time the accident happened and when the injunction suit was brought.
It was further averred that there was a circuit court having jurisdiction of actions like this in practically continuous session in the city of Paducah, in which the action could have been brought by the administratrix and prosecuted within a reasonable time to a final conclusion, and that the suit was brought in the state of Minnesota not only for the purpose of subjecting the railroad company to great and unnecessary expenses but to vexatiously harass and annoy it in the conduct of its business.
To this petition, the averments of which were supported by evidence, an answer was filed by the administratrix traversing all of the material allegations, and in behalf of the administratrix the depositions of several witnesses were taken, but their evidence was confined to an attempt to show that the business of the railroad company would not be seriously disarranged or interfered with if it was required to take some of its trainmen as witnesses to appear in the trial in the Minnesota court.
On this appeal several grounds are relied on for reversal, but we think they may be condensed into these two: (1) That as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, under which the suit was brought, authorized its institution and prosecution in the state of Minnesota, this right could not be taken away from the plaintiff by injunction in the manner stated; (2) that the court erred in granting a perpetual injunction because the petition did not state, and the evidence did not establish, facts sufficient to warrant an injunction.
Before, however, coming to consider these grounds it may be stated that the principle that the courts of one state have the power to enjoin a citizen of that state from prosecuting in the courts of another state a suit against one of its citizens is probably as well settled by the great weight of authority as any question involving the power and jurisdiction of courts could be, although there is much difference of opinion as...
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