Reed v. Beckett

• Decision Date: 26 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–1044,15–1044
• Citation: 795 S.E.2d 509
• Parties: Patricia S. Reed, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner v. Joshua D. Beckett, Respondent
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

795 S.E.2d 509

Patricia S. Reed, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner

v.Joshua D. Beckett, Respondent

No. 15–1044

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 12, 2016

Filed: October 26, 2016

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Elaine L. Skorich, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner.

Jeffry A. Pritt, Esq., Pritt Law Firm, PLLC, Union, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent.

Chief Justice Ketchum :

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Monroe County, we are asked to consider whether a person may lose his/her driver's license because, while under the influence of alcohol, he/she operated a vehicle¹ solely upon private land. West Virginia Code § 17C–5–2a(a) [1983], at its core, prohibits intoxicated driving "anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State." Through the adoption of this statute, the Legislature extended West Virginia's driving-under-the-influence statutes to proscribe driving while intoxicated upon private property. Hence, we hold that an individual may lose his/her driver's license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of West Virginia while under the influence of alcohol (and/or drugs), even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The essential facts in this case are undisputed. Around 1:00 a.m. on February 4, 2012, respondent Joshua Beckett was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle ("ATV") on family-owned farm land, in a field that was not open to the public, in Monroe County, West Virginia. Mr. Beckett wrecked the ATV and was injured. A companion called 911 and then transported Mr. Beckett to a highway to be loaded into an ambulance. An emergency medical technician in the ambulance noted the smell of alcohol on Mr. Beckett, and later testified that Mr. Beckett said he had consumed alcohol before he wrecked.

At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Mr. Beckett's blood alcohol content was 0.17%.² A sheriff's deputy thereafter charged Mr. Beckett with the criminal offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") with a blood alcohol content greater than 0.15% (also called aggravated DUI).³ That charge was ultimately dismissed by a magistrate.

While the criminal charge was pending, the sheriff's deputy notified the petitioner, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles ("Commissioner"), that Mr. Beckett had been driving a motor vehicle in West Virginia while under the influence of alcohol. Effective May 9, 2012, the Commissioner entered an order revoking Mr. Beckett's privilege to drive for 45 days. Mr. Beckett appealed and the revocation was stayed.

A hearing was conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Beckett argued to the administrative law judge that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the unlicensed ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The administrative law judge rejected his argument and upheld the Commissioner's revocation order.

Mr. Beckett then appealed to the circuit court and made the same argument. In an order entered September 30, 2015, the circuit court reversed the decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings. The circuit court concluded that because Mr. Beckett's "actions did not occur on land open to public use," the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Beckett's driving privileges.

The Commissioner now appeals the circuit court's September 30, 2015, order.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va. Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo ; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong."⁴

III.ANALYSIS

The Commissioner may administratively revoke a person's license to drive if the Commissioner determines that the person violated a criminal DUI statute.⁵ The statute under which Mr. Beckett was charged, W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2(e) [2010], criminalized being a "person who drives a vehicle in this state " while being under the influence (emphasis added). The parties' arguments center upon what it means to drive a vehicle in this State. The question presented by the parties is this: does the Commissioner have the authority to revoke the license of a person who drives a vehicle under the influence anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State? Or is the Commissioner's administrative jurisdiction limited to DUI offenses that occur only on public streets, public highways, and those private thoroughfares open to public use?

West Virginia Code § 17C–5–2a(a) [1983] provides the following definition of the phrase "in this State," when it is used in a DUI statute:

For purposes of this article [pertaining to criminal DUI] and article five-A [pertaining to administrative license revocation for DUI] of this chapter, the phrase "in this State" shall mean anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State , including, but not limited to, publicly maintained streets and highways, and subdivision streets or other areas not publicly maintained but nonetheless open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Beckett argues that the circuit court correctly found that any interpretation of "in this State" within W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2a(a) must be limited by this Court's 1980 holding in State v. Ball .⁶ In Ball , the Court found that a defendant could not be charged for driving while intoxicated on a private parking lot, because the law then in effect limited the application of the DUI statutes "exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon streets and highways[.]"⁷ The circuit court was persuaded by our statement in Ball that "if chapter 17C [containing our DUI law] is to apply elsewhere than upon streets and highways a different place must be specifically set forth" by the Legislature.⁸ The circuit court applied this language from Ball interpreting the DUI laws from the 1970s to conclude the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to apply our DUI laws to an intoxicated defendant driving on private farm land.

The Commissioner points out that in 1981, subsequent to Ball , the Legislature amended the DUI statutes, adopted W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2a(a) to give an expanded meaning to the phrase "in this State," and effectively overruled Ball . The Commissioner contends that the plain meaning of this statute, which has not been amended since 1983, is that a person cannot drive anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State while under the influence. We agree with the Commissioner that the statute is unambiguous.

In deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, "[w]e look first to the statute's language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed."⁹ "Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation."¹⁰ "A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning."¹¹

W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2a(a) is clear and unambiguous. Through its definition of the phrase "in this State," the Legislature made the act of driving while intoxicated a revocable offense "anywhere within the physical boundaries of this State." The Legislature chose to structure our DUI statutes to regulate the condition of the driver, not the locale in which the driving is taking place. Thus, the Legislature expressed its plain intent to prohibit an intoxicated person from driving a vehicle anywhere in West Virginia, whether on public roads or across private land.

Mr. Beckett cites a case from the State of Washington, involving DUI laws similar to West Virginia's, where the court concluded that it was an unreasonable extension of the legislature's police power to prohibit intoxicated persons from driving on private land.¹² He argues that the same reasoning applies here: while drunk drivers are generally a menace to society whose conduct should be regulated, this Court should read the statute to say that a driver on private land, who poses no danger to the general public, is exempt from regulation.

Our research, however, reveals court cases from nearly two dozen jurisdictions that have reached the exact opposite conclusion: if state law criminalizes the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and the law contains no geographic constraint, then the courts will not read into the statute a requirement that the vehicle be operated exclusively on a public highway.¹³ These courts have generally concluded that the phrase "within this state" is not ambiguous and indicates the legislature's intent to prohibit operation of a vehicle while intoxicated anywhere within the boundaries of the state, whether upon public or private land. Courts in all of our neighboring states have reached the same conclusion.¹⁴

We conclude that the Legislature's definition of the phrase "in this State" in W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2a(a) [1983] extends the reach of our DUI laws to any individual driving a vehicle within the physical boundaries of West Virginia, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. Furthermore, State v. Ball¹⁵ is overruled to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.

IV.CONCLUSION

The circuit court in this case determined that, because of this Court's ruling in Ball , Mr. Beckett's operation of an ATV on private family-owned land could not be regulated by the Commissioner under W.Va. Code § 17C–5–2a(...