Reed v. City of Muscatine

• Decision Date: 18 December 1897
• Citation: 73 N.W. 579,104 Iowa 183
• Parties: REED v. CITY OF MUSCATINE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

104 Iowa 183

73 N.W. 579

REED

v.CITY OF MUSCATINE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 18, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Muscatine county; A. J. House, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while driving along one of the streets of the defendant city,--due, as is alleged, to a defect therein for which defendant is responsible. Trial to a jury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.E. F. Richman and J. F. Devitt, for appellant.

Titus & Jackson and J. R. Hanley, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

There is but one question in the case which is of sufficient importance to be noticed in an opinion. The petition was filed on the 22d day of March, 1895; and it is alleged that the injury occurred on the 24th day of August, 1894,--more than six months prior to the filing of the petition. There is no allegation that it gave the defendant notice of the happening of the accident, as required by section 1, c. 25, Acts 22d Gen. Assem. Defendant did not demur to the petition, nor did it raise the question of want of notice, in any manner, in the trial court. It has filed in this court, however, what its counsel have seen fit to denominate a “motion to reverse the judgment and dismiss the case.” This motion is bottomed upon the proposition that the notice is jurisdictional, and that, in the absence of allegations that the notice was given, the trial court had no right or authority to hear the case, and that, as the question is jurisdictional, it may be raised for the first time in this court. “Jurisdiction” has been defined to be the “power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit; to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 718. It is conceded that the court had jurisdiction over the parties, but it is argued that it had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The subject-matter is the right which one party claims against the other, and demands judgment of the court upon. Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 93, 1 N. W. 1013. In this case it was the right which plaintiff had to compensation for injuries received through the negligence of the defendant. The district court had the right to consider the question, and therefore had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. In determining such questions, it is important to distinguish between jurisdiction of the general subject and jurisdiction of the particular subject; for, if it be found that the case under consideration belongs to the former class, then it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and neither insufficiencyof allegation nor informality in proceedings will affect that jurisdiction. See Brown, Jur. § 1; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. As said by Judge Elliott in his work on General Practice (volume 1, § 240), “Where there is authority to make a judicial inquiry, there is jurisdiction, and it is evident that this authority exists wherever there is power over a general class of cases.” The distinction is also pointed out in Brown, Jur. § 10. Objections to the jurisdiction of the general subject may be made at any stage of the proceedings, for they cannot be waived. But, as a general rule, if there is jurisdiction of the general subject there may be a waiver of objections to the jurisdiction of the particular subject. That is to say, if the court has the right to decide the general class of cases to which the one in question belongs, its decision, although erroneous, cannot be collaterally attacked, and, if no objection or exception be taken, it will be considered as waived. The difference between a right to decide and a right decision clearly and briefly...