Reed v. Colpoys

• Decision Date: 29 July 1938
• Docket Number: No. 7197.,7197.
• Citation: 69 App. DC 163,99 F.2d 396
• Parties: REED v. COLPOYS, U. S. Marshal.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

69 App. DC 163, 99 F.2d 396 (1938)

REED v. COLPOYS, U. S. Marshal.

No. 7197.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued July 25, 1938.

Decided July 29, 1938.

James J. Laughlin, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and John J. Wilson and John C. Conliff, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and STEPHENS, Associate Justice, and LUHRING, Associate Justice of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia discharging a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition for the writ. The appellant was sentenced November 26, 1923, by the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Illinois, to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a period of one to fourteen years for the crime of "assault to rob." On March 11, 1925, he was paroled in accordance with a parole agreement which he signed and by the terms of which he was permitted to leave the State of Illinois but required to place himself under the supervision of one L. Rutherford, Chief of Police of Pocahontas, Virginia; and under its further terms he was obliged to submit a report on or about April 1, 1925. In violation of his parole agreement, he failed to submit this report and a warrant of the State of Illinois was issued upon June 12, 1925, for his arrest. It appears that at that time and for a long time thereafter his whereabouts were unknown and that on April 21, 1938, the Acting Governor of the State of Illinois forwarded requisition papers to the Chief Justice of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia for the extradition of the appellant — representing in due manner that the appellant stands charged in Illinois with the crime, under the laws of that State, of "assault to rob," and representing that he has fled from the justice of the State of Illinois and taken refuge in the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice, after a hearing on this requisition, found the appellant to be a fugitive from the justice of the State of Illinois and thereupon issued an order surrendering him to the agent of that State. But pending the appellant's application for the writ of habeas corpus herein, the Chief Justice remanded the appellant to the custody of the appellee. The proceeding contests the right to extradite upon the facts above set forth.

The appellant first contends that he is not a fugitive from justice within the terms of Article IV, Section 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, providing:

"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."

The contention is wholly without merit. It is settled law that one is a fugitive from justice within the purview of the Constitutional provision who, having been charged with crime in the demanding State, leaves that State for any purpose whatsoever. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 1906, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073; Ex parte Reggel, 1885, 114 U.S. 642, 5 S.Ct. 1148, 29 L.Ed. 250; Roberts v. Reilly, 1885, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544; Barrett v. Bigger, 1927, 57 App.D.C. 81, 17 F. 2d 669. The law is also settled that a paroled prisoner who has, in violation of parole, left the State in which he was convicted of crime is, within the Constitutional provision in question, a person charged with crime in the State where he was convicted and one who has fled from the justice of that State, so that he is subject to extradition. Drinkall v. Spiegel, Sheriff, 1896, 68 Conn. 441, 36 A. 830, 36 L.R.A. 486; Hughes v. Pflanz, 6 Cir., 1905, 138 F. 980. It is also settled that a paroled prisoner who has left the State of conviction pursuant to the terms of his parole, but later violates the same, is a person charged with crime and a fugitive from justice subject to extradition. People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallon, 218 App.Div. 461, 218 N.Y.S. 432, affirmed without opinion 1927, 245 N.Y. 521, 157 N.E. 842; Ex parte Nabors, 1928, 33 N.M. 324, 267 P. 58. The State cases are appropriate because, in respect of interstate extradition, the Chief Justice of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia is acting for the District of Columbia as the governor of a State acts elsewhere. Pursuant to the Constitutional provision above set forth the Congress passed Section 5278 of the United States Revised Statutes, providing:

"Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to...