Reed v. Director General of Railroads
| Decision Date | 12 April 1920 |
| Docket Number | 203 |
| Citation | 110 A. 254,267 Pa. 86 |
| Parties | Reed, Administratrix, v. Director General of Railroads, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 22, 1920
Appeal, No. 203, Jan. T., 1920, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 1, Phila. Co., June T., 1918, No. 2226, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Gertrude M. Reed Administratrix of the estate of Leo C. Reed, deceased, v Director General of Railroads, United States Railroad Administration, operating Philadelphia & Reading Railway. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for death of plaintiff's husband. Before PATTERSON, J.
The circumstances of the accident are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
At the trial the jury rendered a verdict for $19,000, upon which judgment was entered for $15,000, all above that sum having been remitted. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were refusal of binding instructions for defendant, and refusal of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and judgment is here entered for defendant non obstante veredicto.
Wm. Clarke Mason, for appellant.
John J. McDevitt, Jr., for appellee.
Before BROWN, C.J., STEWART, WALLING, SIMPSON and KEPHART, JJ.
Plaintiff, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, brought an action of trespass, averring he was negligently killed while working for defendant in interstate commerce. A verdict and judgment having been entered for plaintiff, defendant appeals, inter alia, because its point for binding instructions was refused and its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto dismissed. Complaint is made that these decisions are erroneous for several reasons, but we will consider only one thereof, viz: did decedent's death result from a risk which he assumed as the result of his employment? If it did plaintiff cannot recover.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as of course we must do, we find the facts to be as follows: Decedent was a member of a crew which had brought a train from Philadelphia to South Bethlehem. Some of the cars contained goods shipped in interstate commerce. When all the cars were released at their appropriate places, the engine went back to get the caboose for the purpose of taking it to the point where it was to stay until wanted for further traffic, and then itself go to the roundhouse where it was to remain until again needed. This movement was through defendant's yard, where there were a number of tracks upon which cars and locomotives werre being shifted constantly. Though the yard ran also the main passenger tracks of defendant, and, at the points where other tracks crossed over or connected therewith, derailing devices had been wisely installed for the purpose of preventing locomotives and cars using the other tracks from running on to or over the passenger tracks, at a time when passenger trains were standing or traveling thereon, and thereby possibly causing collision and serious loss of life.
The engine and caboose which had reached South Bethlehem were moving over a track which had one of those derailing devices where it connected with the passenger tracks. The caboose being in front of the locomotive, the engineer could not see the device when operating the engine from his cab and hence decedent was directed to and did locate himself on the front of the caboose, with a duty to signal the engineer in time for him to safely stop if the derailing device was set against further passage. It was so set on this occasion, but either through the negligence of decedent himself, or of the engineer in failing to notice or heed the signalling of decedent, the locomotive did not stop in time, the caboose was derailed and decedent was crushed to death between it and cars on an adjoining track. In considering the present question we also assume the negligence was that of the engineer and not of decedent.
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, one engaged in interstate commerce is not absolutely deprived of recovery because of his contributory negligence; but neither he nor those claiming under him can recover if an accident results from a risk assumed by him in the performance of his duties. The only exceptions to this are where the accident is the result of a breach of some statutory duty, in which event the employee is protected by section 4 of the act (Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492; Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 725); or where...
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