Southern Railway Company v. Crockett

• Decision Date: 22 June 1914
• Docket Number: No. 826,826
• Citation: 34 S.Ct. 897,234 U.S. 725,58 L.Ed. 1564
• Parties: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. D. E. CROCKETT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

234 U.S. 725

34 S.Ct. 897

58 L.Ed. 1564

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v D. E. CROCKETT.

No. 826.

Submitted April 16, 1914.

Decided June 22, 1914.

Messrs. L. E. Jeffries and L. D. Smith for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 726 intentionally omitted] Messrs. J. A. Fowler, A. C. Grimm, and H. G. Fowler for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:

Crockett, the defendant in error, brought this action in the circuit court of Knox county, Tennessee, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him while in the employ of the railway company. The action was based upon the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (chap. 149, 35 Stat. at L. 65, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), in connection with the safety appliance act of March 2, 1893 (chap. 196, 27 Stat. at L. 531, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), and the amendments of 1896 and 1903 (chap. 87, 29 Stat. at L. 85, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3175; chap. 976, 32 Stat. at L. 943, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1314). He recovered a judgment in the trial court, which was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. A petition for a writ of certiorari being presented to the supreme court of Tennessee, that court dismissed the petition and affirmed the judgment.

The facts, so far as material, are as follows: Defendant was an interstate carrier by railroad, and plaintiff was in its employ as a switchman, and was engaged in a movement of interstate commerce at the time he was injured. The date of the occurrence was October 15, 1910. In making up a freight train, a switch engine, with a freight car attached, was being moved down grade towards where other freight ears were standing upon the track, when the single car became uncoupled from the engine, and, being propelled by gravity towards the standing cars, came into contact with them. Plaintiff, being upon the car which thus became uncoupled, was by the impact thrown against the brake and injured. He insisted that the car became detached from the engine because of the defective condition of the track at that point, in conjunction with the insufficient height of the drawbar on the engine. There was evidence tending to show that the ground upon which the track rested was wet and marshy, and the cross-ties broken and insufficient, so that the track was uneven and rough, and that, as a result, the engine and the car attached to it were made to alternately rise and fall at the ends where they were coupled together; and tending further to show that the drawbar upon the engine, which was used in coupling the car to it, was not more than 30 inches high, measured from the track to the center of the drawbar; that it was too low to engage properly with the couplers of ordinary freight cars, and that, because of the resulting inadequacy of the coupling, together with the unevenness of the track, the car in question became detached. There was, however, evidence tending to show that plaintiff knew of the defective condition of the track and of the engine; that he had passed over the same track frequently with the same engine, and that prior, to the occurrence in question, cars had, as he knew, repeatedly become detached from the engine because of the conditions mentioned. It was either found or assumed by the state courts that defendant's railway was of standard gauge, and that the standard height of drawbars for freight cars ranged between a maximum of 34 1/2 inches and a minimum of 31 1/2 inches. See Resolution of Interstate Commerce Commission, June 6, 1893 (Ann. Rep. I. C. C. 1893, pp. 74, 263), construed in St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 289, 52 L. ed. 1061, 1065, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464, see also, Ann. Rep. I. C. C. 1896, p. 94. It should be noted that the alleged cause of action arose October 15, 1910, after the enactment of the amendment of that year to the safety appliance act, but before the taking effect of the Commission's order respecting drawbars, made pursuant to the new law. This order, while dated October 10, 1910, became effective on December 31 following.

Defendant requested the trial court to direct a verdict in its favor, upon the ground that plaintiff admittedly knew of the defects and therefore assumed the risk. The court refused the motion, and likewise refused the request of defendant for an instruction to the jury in the following terms: 'If the jury should find from the evidence that the drawbar of the engine was defective by being too low, or the track defective, and that this caused the engine to become detached from the cars, and this caused the plaintiff's injury, still, if you should further find that these defective conditions had existed prior to that time with the knowledge of the plaintiff, and plaintiff knew before he went to work that the defect existed at that time, and that by reason thereof the engine had been accustomed to become uncoupled, and he appreciated the danger, then the court charges you that under those facts the plaintiff could not recover, and your verdict should be in favor of the defendant.'

The contentions of defendant, overruled by each of the state courts and here renewed, are, that by the true interpretation of the employers' liability act, the common-law rule respecting the assumption of risk was not abolished except in cases where the violation by the carrier of some statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury of the employee; and that by the safety appliance act and amendments, as properly interpreted, the height or construction of the drawbars of locomotives was not regulated, so that the fact that the drawbar in question was only 30 inches high was not a violation of these acts, and hence afforded no ground for a recovery under the employers' liability act.

There is a motion to dismiss, based upon the insistence that the record presents no question reviewable in this court under § 237, Judicial Code (act of March 3, 1911, chap. 231, 36 Stat. at L. 1156, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 227). The motion must be overruled, upon the authority of St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 293, 52 L. ed. 1061, 1067, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477, 486, 56 L. ed. 1171, 1175, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 57 L. ed. 1179, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 858; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 499, 58 L. ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635.

Upon the merits, we of course sustain the contention that by the employers' liability act the defense of assumption of risk remains as at common law, saving in the cases mentioned in § 4, that is to say: 'Any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.' Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 503, 58 L. ed. Sup. Ct. Rep. 635.

This leaves for determination the question whether the provision of § 5 of the safety appliance act of 1893 respecting the standard height of drawbars, together with the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission promul- gated in pursuance of it, and the 1903 amendment of that act, had the effect of regulating the height of drawbars upon locomotive engines, as contended by plaintiff, or upon freight cars only, as contended by defendant.¹

In Johnson v. Southern P. Co. 196 U. S. 1, 49 L. ed. 363, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 412, a case that arose under the act as it stood before the 1903 amendment, it was held that the provision of § 2 rendering it 'unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars,' was broad enough to embrace locomotive engines within the description 'any car.' This conclusion was based upon the declared purpose of Congress to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads engaged in interstate commerce, and the specific intent to require the installation of such an equipment that the cars would couple with each other automatically by impact, and obviate the necessity of men going beween them either for coupling or for uncoupling. The court, by Mr Chief Justice Fuller, pointed out (pp. 20, 21) that by the amendment of March 2, 1903, the provisions and requirements of the act were extended to common carriers by railroad in the territories and the District of Columbia, and were made to apply 'in all cases, whether or not the couplers brought together are of the same kind, make, or type,' and that the provisions and requirements relating to train brakes, automatic couplers, grab irons, and the height of drawbars, were made to apply to 'all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles, used in any railroad engaged in interstate commerce.' And it was said that this amendment was affirmative and declaratory of the meaning attributed by the court to the prior law.

In Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co. 205 U. S. 1, 10, 51 L. ed. 681, 685, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407, it was held that a shovel car was within the contemplation of § 2.

In Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 26, 56 L. ed. 72, 74, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822, it was held that the 1903 amendment had enlarged the scope of the original act so as to embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railway that is a highway of interstate commerce, whether the particular vehicles were at the time employed in interstate commerce or not.

In Pennell v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 231 U. S. 675, 58 L. ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220, the question was whether the provision respecting automatic couplers was applicable to the coupling between the locomotive and the...