Reed v. Hall

Decision Date22 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–0342.,14–0342.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesPatricia S. REED, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. Dustin HALL, Respondent Below, Respondent.

Janet E. James, Esq., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

William C. Forbes, Esq., W. Jesse Forbes, Esq., Forbes Law Offices, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

WORKMAN, Chief Justice:

The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “the DMV”)1 appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirming an order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter “OAH” or “hearing examiner”) that reversed a license revocation order entered by the DMV Commissioner based upon the arrest of Dustin Hall for driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter DUI). Upon thorough review of the record, arguments of counsel, and applicable precedent, this Court reverses the order of the circuit court, in part, and affirms it, in part.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On February 3, 2011, Officer N.W. Harden of the South Charleston Police Department was assisting two other officers of the department with a traffic stop along Montrose Drive in South Charleston, West Virginia. Officer Harden overheard a radio call from the Kanawha County 911 Center regarding a vehicle being driven the wrong way on MacCorkle Avenue approaching Montrose Drive. Officer Harden observed the vehicle traveling south in the northbound lanes of Montrose Drive, and he stopped the vehicle near the eastbound ramp to Interstate 64.

According to the testimony of Officer Harden, the driver of the vehicle, Mr. Hall,2 had difficulty locating his driver's license and appeared disoriented and confused. When asked to walk to the rear of the vehicle, Mr. Hall was unsteady walking to the roadside and while standing. Mr. Hall informed Officer A.J. Davis, also present at the scene, that he had consumed alcoholic beverages with his boss.

Officer Harden explained and administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test

to Mr. Hall. During the administration of that test, Mr. Hall's eyes displayed lack of smooth pursuit and distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation. He had onset of nystagmus prior to forty-five degrees in both eyes. Officer Harden also explained and demonstrated the walk-and-turn and one leg stand tests, but Mr. Hall refused to perform those tests.

Officer Harden placed Mr. Hall under arrest for DUI at 3:17 a.m. Officer Harden thereafter transferred custody of Mr. Hall to Officer J.D. Keeney, also with the South Charleston Police Department, and Officer Keeney transported Mr. Hall to the police department's headquarters. At the South Charleston police station, Officer J.A. Bailes read the West Virginia implied consent form to Mr. Hall, advising him that the penalty for refusal of submit to the secondary breath test was license revocation. Mr. Hall signed the implied consent form but refused to take the secondary breath test, stating that he wished to have a blood test. Officer Bailes testified that Mr. Hall told him [a]t least twice” that he refused to take the test. Officer Bailes stated, “I specifically asked him twice, once he had a 15–minute period to change his mind.”

Subsequently, Officer Harden was informed that Mr. Hall had refused the secondary breath test and had requested a blood test. Specifically, Officer Harden testified,

By the time the wrecker came and had taken [Mr. Hall's] vehicle and I had gotten back to our headquarters, I was informed that Mr. Hall didn't want to take the breathalyzer, but wished to have blood drawn. So right before we left, I asked him again for the 15 minutes if he wanted to take it or have blood drawn. He would have rather had blood drawn.

Officer Harden explained that “the officers then processed, fingerprinted and photographed Mr. Hall, and then we took him and put him in the back of the police cruiser for transportation to Thomas Memorial Hospital [located in South Charleston, West Virginia] to have blood drawn.” Ms. Andrea Gray withdrew blood from Mr. Hall at 4:26 a.m., and she gave the blood specimen to Officer Harden. Officer Keeney then transported Mr. Hall back to the South Charleston Police Department for arraignment and thereafter took him to the South Central Regional Jail.

Officer Harden testified that he “placed the blood sample into Evidence Locker No. 5 around 0541 hours in the morning for submission to the West Virginia State Police Laboratory.” When Officer Harden later spoke with a technician at the South Charleston Police Department about the blood sample, he was informed that the West Virginia State Police Laboratory had not been accepting blood specimens, so the sample had not been submitted for analysis. Officer Harden testified that the blood sample remained at the police department.

Mr. Hall's driver's license was revoked by the DMV for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test, effective March 16, 2011. Mr. Hall's commercial driver's license was disqualified on the same grounds as of that date. The DMV regular driver's license revocation order provided that Mr. Hall's license was revoked for one year for “refusing the secondary chemical test” and six months for “driving under the influence.”3

Mr. Hall requested an administrative hearing before the OAH, and such hearing was conducted on June 27, 2012, and October 17, 2012. Mr. Hall appeared but did not testify. On July 29, 2013, the OAH entered a “Decision of the Hearing Examiner and Final Order of the Chief Hearing Examiner” rescinding Mr. Hall's license revocation and disqualification. With regard to the implied consent form provided to Mr. Hall, the hearing examiner found that the investigating officer was not the officer who directed Mr. Hall to submit to the secondary breath test; “rather, this was done by another officer who did not arrest [Mr. Hall].” The hearing examiner also noted that the testimony “suggests that [Mr. Hall] may have been given a choice, or at least led to believe he had a choice, as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or whether he wanted to take a blood test.” Based upon that issue, the hearing examiner stated: “Therefore, the portions of the Orders heretofore entered which disqualified [Mr. Hall] from driving a commercial vehicle and revoked his privilege to drive any motor vehicle for refusing to submit to a designated secondary chemical test should likewise be rescinded.”

Further, the hearing examiner found that Mr. Hall was effectively denied an independent blood test “when the Investigating Officer failed to cause [Mr. Hall's] blood specimens to be submitted to a qualified laboratory for the specimens could be [sic] analyzed for their blood alcohol concentration.” The hearing examiner found that the absence of the blood test “denied him the right to obtain evidence for his defense” and constituted a denial of “his due process rights.” On the basis of the denial of the right to obtain a blood test, the hearing examiner stated:

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the only appropriate sanction that can be imposed due to the denial of [Mr. Hall's] right to the independent blood test is to rescind the portions of the Orders heretofore entered which disqualified [Mr. Hall] from driving a commercial motor vehicle and revoking his privilege to drive any motor vehicle for driving a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcohol.

The circuit court entered a final order on March 6, 2014, upholding the OAH's order. The DMV now appeals to this Court and argues that the circuit court erred in upholding the OAH's rescission of the driver's license revocations.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has previously established the standards for our review of a circuit court's order deciding an administrative appeal as follows:

On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va.Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). Syllabus point two of Muscatell provides: “In cases where the circuit court has [reversed] the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo. With these standards as guidance, we consider the parties' arguments.

III. Discussion

This case is approached most effectively by addressing the independent components which inform this Court's ultimate determination. Specifically, the chronology of Mr. Hall's interactions with law enforcement personnel must be examined with emphasis upon compliance with statutory provisions relating to implied consent and the right to demand a blood test.

A. Implied Consent

West Virginia's implied consent law, codified in West Virginia Code § 17C–5–4 (2010)4 provided, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given his or her consent by the operation of the motor vehicle to a preliminary breath analysis and a secondary chemical test of either his or her blood, breath or urine for the purposes of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood.
....
(c) A secondary test of blood, breath or urine is incidental to a lawful arrest and is to be administered at the direction of the arresting law-enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed an offense prohibited by section two of this article or by an ordinance of a municipality of this state which has the same elements as an offense described in section two of this article
...

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