Reed v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist.

• Citation: 504 S.W.3d 235
• Decision Date: 06 December 2016
• Docket Number: WD 78813
• Parties: Tracy L. REED, Appellant, v. The KANSAS CITY MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

504 S.W.3d 235

Tracy L. REED, Appellant,

v.The KANSAS CITY MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.

WD 78813

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: December 6, 2016

Athena Dickson, Raymond Dake, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.

Ivan Nugent, Stephen Williams, Kansas City, MO, Stephen Moore, Mission Woods, KS, for Respondent.

Before Division Three: Alok Ahuja, P.J., Victor C. Howard, and James Edward Welsh, JJ.

James Edward Welsh, Judge

Tracy L. Reed appeals the circuit court's judgment based on a jury's verdict rejecting her claims of discrimination and retaliation against her former employer, the Kansas City Missouri School District ("District"), which she brought pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), sections 213.010, et seq. , RSMo.¹ We affirm.

Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,² the evidence at trial showed that Reed began working for the District as a substitute secretary in 1990. She was hired as a full-time secretary in June 1992 and worked at Westport High School for several years. In July 2010, Reed began working at Satchel Paige Elementary as one of two secretaries. For the 2011–12 school year, however, the District reduced the number of secretaries to one at each elementary school. Reed was assigned to stay at Satchel Paige, and, in July 2011, she assumed all of the secretarial duties except budgetary issues.

As a school secretary, Reed was required to perform customer-service oriented tasks in a "high-traffic" environment. In May 2011, Reed's direct supervisor at the time, Principal Chester Palmer, noted in a performance evaluation that Reed needed improvement in communication and customer service. In August 2011, following a complaint that Reed had spoken rudely to a person over the telephone, Palmer wrote a memorandum to Reed, reminding her that she was "expected to perform [her] duties as a professional" and not to "bicker with" or "confront" others.

In July 2012, April Flowers was hired to replace Palmer as school principal at Satchel Paige Elementary. Satchel Paige was a "focus school" that was at risk of becoming a low-performing school unless "sweeping changes" were made to help the school improve its performance. Flowers testified that "a great many changes" were required with "a quick plan to turn around" the school. When Flowers became principal, she had only one month to prepare for the upcoming school year that began in early August. As the sole secretary, Reed was expected to play a crucial role in helping her prepare.

When Flowers came to Satchel Paige in July 2012, she gave Reed a list of forty-six tasks to be completed before school started. These were tasks that every District secretary would routinely perform. According to Flowers, Reed's attitude was "very disrespectful, rude and inappropriate." In addition, Flowers found that Reed had not properly maintained the filing system for student records during the 2011–12 school year (an essential part of her job), and the records were still disorganized and incomplete when Reed was terminated in August 2012. By the time Reed was terminated, she had finished only a few of her forty-six assigned tasks. As a result, Flowers hired Rachel Hayes (a former substitute secretary) to ensure that these tasks were completed on time.

Reed contends that, during the majority of her time with the District, she suffered from chronic mental and physical conditions, including severe depression (bi-polar disorder), paranoia, and other mental health issues, as well as degenerative disc disease

and "a hip condition." Reed was diagnosed with a bi-polar disorder by Dr. James True at Swope Parkway Health Centers, who prescribed medication for her condition. Dr. True reported that Reed has trouble interacting with people, is "quite sensitive to excess stimulation," and "cannot work with distractions." Reed's bi-polar disorder and other psychological conditions cause her to have trouble concentrating, eating, sleeping, getting out of bed, and sometimes going to work. According to Reed, her condition was exacerbated by the stress from being the only secretary at Satchel Paige in 2011–12.

During Reed's employment, the District made reasonable efforts to accommodate her disabilities. Due to her physical disabilities, Reed requested that the filing cabinets be moved closer to her work area. That was done in January 2012. Reed also requested that the security monitor/buzzer used to admit visitors into the building be relocated to her desk in the corner of the front office. When the District offered to move Reed to a workstation in the center of the office that would provide ready access to both the video monitor/buzzer and filing cabinets, Reed refused. She wrote in a July 2012 email: "[W]ith my condition I cannot have a buzzer intercom and telephone on a desk and perform my job with ease, with or without a job accommodation."

Reed ultimately asked the District to hire "additional staffing" to perform certain of her job duties. The District rejected this accommodation request, advising Reed that it was not reasonable "to expect [it] to hire someone to perform many of the essential functions of [her] job." As an alternative, Reed requested to be transferred to a high school where there were multiple secretaries in the office. The District rejected that request because Reed had previously been unsuccessful in a secondary school setting.³

The District terminated Reed's employment on August 3, 2012, after determining—based on information from Reed and her physicians—that Reed "simply [could not] perform the essential duties of [her] job with or without reasonable accommodations." This included Reed's admission that her "mental affliction" affected her "ability to concentrate" and her "ability to complete daily task[s] in a timely manner or if at all," as well as her physician's statement that she "cannot work with distractions." Reed applied for disability insurance benefits following her termination and included a statement from Dr. True stating that she was unable to work because she "cannot tolerate closeness to people or supervision." Dr. True confirmed at trial that Reed suffered from this same inability while employed by the District.

Following her termination, Reed filed a petition against the District in which she asserted employment discrimination and retaliation claims pursuant to the MHRA. Reed claimed in Count I that the District had discriminated against her based on her disability by failing to provide all the accommodations she requested. She claimed in Count III that she had been retaliated against for filing complaints and for requesting such accommodations. In Count II, she alleged that the District discriminated against her based on her age, which was fifty-three at the time of her termination.

Prior to trial, both parties sought the exclusion of certain evidence via motions in limine , which were addressed at pretrial hearings. The circuit court's decision to admit or exclude certain evidence that was the subject of those motions is the basis of this appeal.

At trial, Reed testified in her own behalf and presented the testimony of various witnesses, including Flowers. Both parties introduced numerous exhibits. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the District on all three counts. The circuit court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict and denied Reed's motion for new trial.

Standard of Review

A trial court "enjoys considerable discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence, and, absent clear abuse of discretion, its action will not be grounds for reversal." Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. , 473 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Mo. banc 2015). We presume that the trial court's evidentiary rulings are correct. Hurst v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist. , 437 S.W.3d 327, 342 (Mo. App. 2014). The trial court's discretion is "particularly" considerable in ruling on the admissibility of evidence "where a subjective determination of relevancy must be made," such as in this case. Frazier v. City of Kansas City , 467 S.W.3d 327, 338 (Mo. App. 2015). An evidentiary ruling is an abuse of discretion only if it is "clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration." Cox , 473 S.W.3d at 114. If reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's action, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion. Kline v. City of Kansas City , 334 S.W.3d 632, 642 (Mo. App. 2011).⁴ In addition, we will not reverse a judgment unless we find that an error "materially affected the merits of the action." Cox , 473 S.W.3d at 114. We "will reverse only if the prejudice resulting from the improper admission [or exclusion] of evidence is outcome-determinative." Hurst , 437 S.W.3d at 342.

Statutory Framework

The MHRA was enacted, inter alia , "[t]o ... eliminate and prevent discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment, [or] disability." § 213.030.1(1). Pursuant to section 213.055.1(1), it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, or to otherwise discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability." Section 213.010(1) defines "age," in this context, as "forty or more years but less than seventy years." A "plaintiff can prove discrimination by showing [that] age or any protected characteristic[ ] was a contributing factor for the employment action regardless if other factors also exist."⁵ Hurst , 437 S.W.3d at 339 ; see § 213.055.1. The MHRA also provides that it is an unlawful practice to "retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed...